posted 09-08-2002 01:59 PM               

The crux of our difference is whether Europe was so defensively strong it could weather any Mongol assault (which seems to be the direction you are leaning) or whether it simply wasn't worth the trouble for the Mongols. Any invasion (or defence against invasion) depends on a risk/benefit analysis. When the benefits are very great, enormous effort can be made, at very high risk. Two examples from the Age of Discovery: Hernan Cortez expedition to Mexico was fueled by expectation (and confirmation) of huge wealth in the interior, even though it involved a miniscule force (although technologically superior) into an unknown land. At least one later expedition into the southwestern U.S. lost every single man but one, so the risk was very real. The Portugese expansion to India and the Spice Islands did lead to enormous wealth and influence, but at a very high cost. Losses due to shipwreck, scurvy and other diseases, hostile natives, etc. were so severe that ships were sent out from Lisbon with two full crews, so there would be enough hands left to sail back.

The Portugese also sailed by the South African coast, and named part of that land Natal. At the time of da Gama, Natal farmland was hardly worth enough to the Portugese that they bothered with it. Their goal was the higher risk, greatly wealthy East Indies. Three hundred years later, to Boer farmers and English colonials, farmland looked like a worthwhile target, and the European technological edge had grown decisively. The Zulus were mowed down it what was a relatively low-cost European adventure for relatively modest gains.

Tomaz, the "last statement" you take exception to was in parentheses. It is the reverse of the earlier line: strength can always be redefined as degree of weakness, and poverty can be defined as lack of wealth. Lighten up!

posted 09-10-2002 08:46 AM               

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It is true that the Magyars reached as far West as France on their incursions, but always as raiders rather than a massed army ready for a full-scale engagement.

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This is true... differences in vocabulary... (I'm just popping in, so pardon me, guys, if I'm on stuff that's gotten to the whipped-horse stage).

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Then the notion that medieval Europe was so poor and backwaters that it wasn't worth seizing. This is an idea which I'm not buying. Medieval Europe may not have been as rich as some parts of China and Persia.

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It wasn't a tenth as rich as Persia or China, nor the Eastern Roman empire, at least not during the period in question. This one's just historical fact, amigo.

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What about the natural resources and communications? Europe was by all means a desirable target.

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Why? What, besides natural resources perhaps, could it offer that Persia, China, or the middle east could not? Persia certainly did not lack for skilled metalworkers, and demographically Europe was still sparsely populated compared to other areas bordering the central steppe.

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The Huns certainly tried extremely hard to invade Western Europe.

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Sure. But the medieval world and the Roman one... not comparable.

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The later "Byzantine" orientation of the Avars and Bulgars is understandable given the weak economy of contemporary Western Europe and the relative prosperity (and vulnerability) of the Byzantine empire at the time.

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And since you're using the Strategikon, how about the reformulation of the Byzantine cavalry along explicit Avar lines?

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Secondly, the Mongols invaded a number of regions which were poor by any standards.

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True. Though I would guess that few of them were both relatively poor *and* anywhere near as intensively armed and fortified as western europe.

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Calmly considering all the facts I can only conclude that the actual military potential of the Mongols available for an invasion of Europe was grossly inadequate for any permanent conquest.

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I don't see the two in opposition, actually..
once you're planning the campaign, and weighing the costs and benefits, you see HUGE costs, militarily speaking, and in the end... relatively little benefit.

posted 09-10-2002 10:39 AM               

Correct, even though the economy of the Byzantine Empire was a bit jaded by the mid-13th c. But this factor alone is quite irrelevant. The riches of China or Persia simply weren't within reach of every Mongol. The Mongol conquests were in a sense similar to the expansion of the United States - gains were made on a first come, first serve basis.

The Mongols who later formed the Golden Horde were essentially the men who did not get to partake in the conquest of China. So they sought their luck elsewhere, seizing the comparatively very poor regions of Eastern Europe. This was clearly a far cry from China in comparison to wealth. No doubt that medieval Europe, being the closest reasonably rich region, was a desirable goal for them. Hence the ultimately unsuccessful 1241 invasion and subsequent attempts to gain a firmer foothold in the Balkans.

Therefore, I would like to suggest that from the perspective of the Golden Horde Western Europe was the No. 1 target, by all means preferable to the Russian steppe. It is evident that considerable efforts were invested in a further Mongol expansion to the west, proving that Europe was considered a worthy target.

"Why? What, besides natural resources perhaps, could it offer that Persia, China, or the middle east could not? Persia certainly did not lack for skilled metalworkers, and demographically Europe was still sparsely populated compared to other areas bordering the central steppe."

In the addition to the above, don't forget the Mongol desire for world domination. It may have been an entirely irrational motive, but it played an important role nonetheless.

A similar question might arise in regard to WWII. Why did Hitler choose to invade the Soviet Union? What did the Soviet Union have that Germany had not? Oil perhaps, but this might have been more easily procured in the Middle East. Instead, it was Hitler's fixation with the idea of a Lebensraum that pushed Germany into an impossible struggle. 1941 vs. 1241? A reversal of Batu's grand plans? I'm not sure, but the idea is intriguing now that I think of it.

"quote:
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The Huns certainly tried extremely hard to invade Western Europe.
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Sure. But the medieval world and the Roman one... not comparable."

Much agreed, but there are perhaps still lessons to be learned there. The Huns struck west in a moment when the Roman empire didn't really exist anymore. Yet despite a complete political breakdown in Western Europe at the time and a serious lack of potential plunder the Huns attacked twice and were defeated.

"And since you're using the Strategikon, how about the reformulation of the Byzantine cavalry along explicit Avar lines?"

In what way does this apply to 13th c. Europe? There was nothing remotely resembling the classic medieval military system in the 6th c. For all we know, Maurice might well prefer the mounted knight and crossbowman if he had a choice.

"I don't see the two in opposition, actually..
once you're planning the campaign, and weighing the costs and benefits, you see HUGE costs, militarily speaking, and in the end... relatively little benefit."

posted 09-10-2002 05:29 PM               

The post you gave us access to is indeed very well presented. I am afraid I have a high standard when it comes to putting material on the Net. If it had been trash I wouldn't have spent any time analyzing it. Indeed, when someone puts together something as ambitious as the post in question, I have higher standards than when an author is clearly shooting from the hip. Sinor's article at the beginning of this thread is very good, although I do think he assumes that 19th c. European standards apply both to horse care and the relative value of horses vs. plunder (which wasn't supposed to happen in 19th c. Europe). I have neglected to thank you for bringing this post to our attention - please forgive the oversight.

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Speaking strictly in regard to rational factors, yes. But there are many subjective issues with warfare that need to be considered. For a nation as bent on conquering the world as the Mongols, material gains were sometimes not the main concern

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That gets back to square one of this discussion. The old wisdom held that the Mongols turned around because of internal issues within their already vast empire - not rational from a European perspective, but if you already controlled most of the known world, the order of the large part you controlled might be more important than the smaller bits you have yet to subdue (and posed no significant offensive threat to the Mongols). So you can look at the Mongol reversal to settle the succession as "irrational" or a "subjective issue", and beyond the issue of material gain; or as a rational decision where the gain was not worth the trouble.

As I noted before, the Picts in Scotland could say the same about Rome as some are saying about the Europeans facing the Mongols: they came, they build Hadrian's wall to protect themselves from the Picts, they tried to conquer and built the Antonine wall, they withdrew back to Hadrian's wall, and ultimately the Romans left. By similar logic to what I have seen, the Picts must have been militarily superior to the Romans. The internal issues of the Roman Empire (and other fronts) are dismissed.

One more note on the abilities of nomads in rough terrain. This is a comment on an earlier era:

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A region that perhaps can be more profitably studied to ascertain the social changes induced by Carolingian warfare is the Carolingian Ostmark,9 a vast area constituting the watershed of the middle Danube from its confluence with the Inn to that with the Sava, including western Hungary and parts of northern Yugoslavia as well as the modern Austrian provinces of Upper and Lower Austria, the Salzkammergut, Styria, Carinthia, and the Burgenland. The morphology of the region, dominated by the eastern Alps and the Danubian Plain, is very complex. The Alpine barrier consists of three ranges: northern and southern limestone ranges separated by a central granite massif. Although much of this region was wild and inhospitable in the early middle ages, the course of the Danube and its major tributaries, the Drava and the Sava, facilitated the movement of armies from west to east.10 During the ninth century this region attracted the attention of annalists because it was difficult to pacify and because it was plagued by wars and rebellions by subject peoples. As a consequence, our information concerning Carolingian campaigns in this region is relatively abundant.

Since the Ostmark was dominated by the nomadic Avars until late in the eighth century and overrun by the Magyars shortly after the year 900, one might assume that mounted combat troops would have been of greater importance there than in such regions as Aquitaine. One might also suspect that light-steppe cavalry detachments would have been more useful in the Ostmark than heavy-shock cavalrymen, which so many scholars insist constituted the dominant tactical element in Carolingian armies. As in Aquitaine, fortifications were very common in these marches, and they also must have been of considerable tactical importance, for contemporary annalists devoted much attention to the fortresses in the area. Finally, contemporary sources also give us some information about the ships which operated on the great rivers of this region to support armies on campaigns.

from: [url]http://www.deremilitari.org/bowlus.htm [/url]

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posted 09-11-2002 04:07 AM               

The Roman empire was a strong, united political entity with its own central government, bureaucracy and economy. The Mongols on the other hand can hardly be said to ever have formed an empire themselves. Genghis may have come close to achieving that goal and Kublai certainly succeeded in organizing a well-run state. But globally speaking, the vast territories occupied (in the loose sense of the word) by the Mongols during their expansion could never actually grow into a single centralized empire. The reasons are clear: the distances involved were too huge for effective management and the Mongols weren't all that good at running a state themselves.

All this is crucial for our understanding of the relationship between Europe and the Golden Horde. We simply cannot explain the events of 1241 from anything like a "global" Mongol standpoint. Therefore, I think it would be best to approach the matter from the perspective of the Golden Horde. And from their point of view I would think that Western Europe was a major target, certainly not something as ephemeral as Scotland to the Romans.

The article which you've cited is of limited use on its own. Warfare in the Ostmark is a complex, at times very cloudy issue. There are a number of false interpretations in the article which someone not familiar with the local history of our part of the world probably isn't aware of.

To keep this short, history of the Ostmark tells very little about the performance of steppe armies in the European environment. Neither the Avars nor the Magyars seem to ever have exercised anything like complete control over the Ostmark. This territory was essentially a very broad frontier, sparsely inhabited and poorly defended (the statement regarding strong fortifications is entirely out of place). The Magyars used it mainly as a corridor for their raids in Italy. The Avars seem to have treated the Ostmark as a poor and fairly uninteresting extension of their state.

posted 09-11-2002 08:54 AM               

It's an interesting, and to me, unanswerable problem: the return campaign, at least in Hungary (I don't know the details of return campaigns into Poland, because of the lack of sources regarding the Lithuanians, who begin to blossom mightily at this point) was smashed not by western-style troops, but almost exclusively by Cumans. Could western-style decisive-conflict troops have taken down the invading contingents, or would it have worked like the Ottoman Empire's use of turcoman-style raiders, slowly devastating the unfortified sections of the empire and Italy until there was insufficient strength to defend it?

posted 09-12-2002 04:05 AM               

Avar influence in Strategikon is apparent. However, this is not to say that the Byzantines actually patterned their entire military system after them. The heavy cavalryman ideally armed with both lance and bow had been around for a long time. The Persians were fielding comparable forces centuries before the Avars came to Europe.

I believe the Byzantines quickly recognized quality when they saw it, so they copied some of the best features of Avar horsemen and incorporated them within the existing system. But they still retained infantry, which they valued for operations in the Balkans. Here Strategikon also hints at the efficiency of Slavic infantry, which was reportedly very good at fording rivers and a dangerous adversary in broken terrain, especially against cavalry. This is a clear omen that the steppe horseman wasn't the be all, end all of medieval warfare.

What Maurice's Strategikon has to say about the "fair-haired people" is entirely irrelevant for classic medieval warfare, though. This did not fully evolve until the late 11th c. Merovingian armies certainly had very little in common with the later medieval concepts. 6th c. Western Europe was militarily inferior to the East in many respects as Maurice recognized.

There can be little question that Eastern cavalry could be a valuable addition to a Western European army. Magyar mercenaries and Saracen archers proved that well enough. However, what we are discussing here is very different from an all-out Mongol invasion. I don't doubt that a contingent of horse archers operating within a Western army could greatly bolster its overall value (for our immediate neighborhood, compare Dürnkrut, 1278). However, I'm not sure how a purely steppe army could defeat Western Europe on its own. The benefits of medieval combined arms concept were simply too great in the European environment.

Your comment regarding the near invulnerability of European stone fortifications is spot on. Even if the Mongols succeeded in defeating opposing armies in the field, they would still have to take the strongholds one by one. Worse yet, the defenders could choose to avoid battle for some time, waiting for a more opportune moment. This very strategy frustrated Saladin in Outremer.

"Frankly, I don't see any evidence that they really wanted to try: the expedition defeated by Ladislas the Cumanclearly involved a much lesser force, and because the Mongols had at least one English knight spying for them, they well knew what to expect further west. Had the "irrational desire" for world conquest spurred them that greatly, perhaps they would have tried... but I doubt it."

posted 09-12-2002 11:17 PM               

I agree, the Romans were nothing like the Mongols. That is not what I was stating at all. What I was getting at is that analyzing the local issues on the borderlands between the steppe and the rest of Europe is not the whole picture; and that the whole picture needs to be looked at. For an even more controversial example (I may regret this ) consider the Vietnam war. By any battlefield standards, the U.S. forces won almost every significant confrontation with the Communist forces. The great Tet offensive was a disaster for the Viet Cong, militarily. However, in larger terms, the Tet offensive was brilliant.

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But globally speaking, the vast territories occupied (in the loose sense of the word) by the Mongols during their expansion could never actually grow into a single centralized empire. The reasons are clear: the distances involved were too huge for effective management and the Mongols weren't all that good at running a state themselves

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Again, I concur. Indeed, this is the basis of what I have been suggesting: that the internal affairs of the Mongols (i.e. the struggle between the Golden Horde, the Mamelukes, and the Ilkhanids; and issues like succession) contributed greatly to the lack of further significant Mongol interest in the West. The Golden Horde was the poorest of the Mongol successor states and not the strongest; and for them to take on Europe and watch two powerful states to the East and South was very likely too much.

I did not think Bowlus' article was perfect. My impression was that the Ostmark was sparsely populated, and the quality (and perhaps quantity) of any fortifications in the Carolingian period would be quite limited. I do think his geography is correct, and that both the Avars and Magyars did exercise considerable control over these lands. The same might be said of the Golden Horde and the Russians. Russia around Moscow and points north and west is not steppe - it was vast forests, marshes, and some clearings. Nonetheless, the Mongols did pass throught these lands, and the Russians paid tribute for hundreds of years.

I would like to remind everyone of what I started critiquing:

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So even assuming the Mongols and their horses survived the Italian campaign (which is doubtful to say the least given their logistical shortcomings), as they swept north and west through the mountain passes and by long devious ways into the forests of France and Germany, the ordu would have disintegrated to graze on the small broken pastures that existed in the western lands prior to the intensive clearing of the great forests and the enclosure of mediaeval arable lands for paddock in modern times. Simply to keep their mounts alive the Mongols would have been forced to scatter through the endless woodlands as they searched for the few patches of meadowland to devour. With no significant grazing the nomads would have been quite unable to reassemble in one place and in the kind of force necessary to sustain the military effort. Instead the isolated minghan and jagun would be cut off and annihilated by the plodding and limitless armed multitudes of a sedentary agrarian-based civilisation fighting in its own element. After butchering their emaciated ponies, the hunted remnants would be tracked down, cut off and trapped. The heavy hooves of the Frankish horse would trample the bones of the khans, while those marauders depleted but not destroyed would have had little choice but to flee back into the East

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That is hardly a complete picture of the situation. The author believes that the Mongols would have starved in Italy, not found any pasture in the whole of France and Germany, gotten scattered and/or lost, and been massacred by the local peasants.

posted 09-14-2002 10:52 AM               

I'm also quite convinced by the comparison to Vietnam (which seems to be a militarily controversial topic only in the US, curiously; elsewhere the strategic defeat of the US is openly recognized). As a matter of fact, the Vietnamese strategy was in many ways similar to medieval warfare. The importance of pitched battles was relatively small whereas on the other hand the steady pressure on the enemy and even a comparatively heavy reliance on fortifications played a much more prominent role.

The actual extent to which the Mongols controlled the northern regions of Russia must have been seriously limited. The Mongols may have enjoyed a measure of authority over the local tributary leaders, but whether the bulk of the population actually felt it directly is doubtful.

There was a similar situation in the Ostmark and its vicinity during the 7th c. The Eastern Alps were at the time inhabited mainly by Slavs under the nominal rule of their Avar allies. The exact relationship between the two nations remains unclear - it was obviously an unequal partnership with the Avars in command, but little more could be said about it. Recent research has shown that the majority of Slavic population experienced very few direct consequences of the theoretical Avar domination. Most people living in the Eastern Alps probably never even saw an Avar in their lifetime. This means that any talk of Avar domination of the area is on extremely shaky ground. Since the Avars had difficulty reestablishing control of the region after the huge Slavic uprising in 626 led by Samo, it's quite apparent that the Avar military machine was not all that effective against Slavic infantry in the difficult terrain of modern-day Austria and Slovenia. I don't think the Mongols would have done it any better to be honest; the Turks certainly didn't.

"That is hardly a complete picture of the situation. The author believes that the Mongols would have starved in Italy, not found any pasture in the whole of France and Germany, gotten scattered and/or lost, and been massacred by the local peasants."

Well, the writer of the article indeed assumes a few too many things for my liking, but I believe his main points still stand. Insofar that a Mongol army of any real size would have had real trouble living off the land, dictating a dispersal of the force over a large area, which would inevitably bring a multitude of dangers with it.

"If there any evidence that a French or German army would know how to defeat a steppe army? The Europeans had the right tools, but the crucial integration was harder to get."

This is a highly pertinent point. There can be no question that Western Europe had its fair share of experienced commanders familiar with horse archers and Eastern methods of warfare. The real problem is, would these people get to make decisions in case of an all-out clash of civilizations?

posted 09-22-2002 11:30 AM               

The analogy with the Vietnam War is useful, as it highlights the difference between battlefield success (which the VC and NVA rarely achieved) and victory. The U.S. and South Vietnam were defeated because the U.S. gave up: the internal politics of the U.S. decided the war. (Of course, great credit must be given to the North Vietnamese people and government for their dedication and sacrifice.) Getting back to the Mongols; they crushed the European field armies they faced, although certain fortifications still held out eight months after the field armies were beaten. The Mongols then left. An arguement that the Mongols were defeated in any military sense (as opposed to political sense, i.e. internal politics) seems to be inadequate.

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There can be no question that Western Europe had its fair share of experienced commanders familiar with horse archers and Eastern methods of warfare

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Certainly, at times Western Europe did have such commanders (i.e. the Third Crusade). The record of the 13th century is more doubtful; certainly the later crusading efforts of the 1200's were singularly unsuccessful. There does not seem to have been any evidence of an effort to codify or formally pass on the experience gained in fighting Eastern armies; one finds Western commanders making the same errors time and again (again, the HYW is case in point about not learning- for the French, but at the end for the English).

Two new comments:

in re sieges - The failure of the Mongols against fortresses in Hungary has been taken as proof of military defeat. I think this can be inverted. The Mongols had previous and subsequent success in sieges elsewhere; and clearly knew of siege equipment and engineering. They didn't bring these skills to Europe. Men like Subotai were not idiots; if they didn't bring such men and gear, it argues that they were not launching an all-out conquest, but merely a test probe. The Mongols would have known that Europe had stone fortresses, from Russian and Cuman contacts at the least. A probe was not unknown to the Mongols: they defeated the massed Russian and steppe princes at the Kalka River in 1223, then left Eastern Europe to join the main Mongol forces against the Hsia and Tanguts in Central Asia, and didn't return to Russia until 1240. So the Mongols did test a few Hungarian fortresses, and found that without a full siege train the castles were too strong; that is not surprising. In a recon expedition, that is to be expected.

posted 09-24-2002 06:08 AM               

"The record of the 13th century is more doubtful; certainly the later crusading efforts of the 1200's were singularly unsuccessful. There does not seem to have been any evidence of an effort to codify or formally pass on the experience gained in fighting Eastern armies; one finds Western commanders making the same errors time and again (again, the HYW is case in point about not learning- for the French, but at the end for the English)."

Yet the Iberian peninsula saw quite some action between the Christian and Muslim armies; it was the former who prevailed. Your comment is correct but not entirely relevant. There isn't much in the way of evidence of any formal codification of tactics or strategy in the middle ages. Does that mean that no such thing existed? I'm not at all sure. Knowledge of military matters and combat experience may not have been written down, but they were certainly passed to the younger generations orally.

While the later crusades invariably ended up in a disaster, many achieved notable successes in the early stages. Some crusading leaders, particularly Louis IX, apparently had extensive knowledge of Saracen warfare. Preparations for the Louis' two crusades were very serious and display an in-depth familiarity with the Eastern military system.

"The Mongols had previous and subsequent success in sieges elsewhere; and clearly knew of siege equipment and engineering. They didn't bring these skills to Europe. Men like Subotai were not idiots; if they didn't bring such men and gear, it argues that they were not launching an all-out conquest, but merely a test probe."

To this I answer that the Mongol leadership may very well have underestimated the strength of Hungarian fortifications. There were obviously skilled siege engineers in Batu's army who were capable of constructing catapults on the spot. But bringing a siege train would have inevitably slowed the Mongols down to the extent of negating the surprise effect and superior mobility.

In regard to your second argument, I must say there is a vast difference between a nomadic and semi-nomadic way of life. I haven't read Elton's book yet, but I would interpret some of that information with a great deal of caution.

Logistics was clearly a factor of extreme importance during the Migration period. This is especially apparent in the case of the Goths. Their custom was to set off after harvest, some time in the early autumn. The idea was to gather as much supplies as possible before departing. Theodoric's invasion of Italy is one such case. The Goths - 20 to 25.000 warriors and about 100.000 non-combatants - left the Eastern Balkans after harvest in 488. The push to the north took longer than anticipated due to the Gepidic threat, so the Goths stopped in Slavonia for a while and moved on only after harvest in the next year. (Wolfram's Die Goten provides some excellent information on the subject, but I'm not sure whether it has ever been translated to English.)

This demonstrates just how important reliable supply was in the early middle ages. Now, the Goths were familiar with sedentary living and knew how to cultivate land with reasonable efficiency. While possessing large herds, they were not entirely dependent on them. Yet despite all the measures and forethought, the Goths still oftentimes had trouble sustaining themselves The Mongols on the contrary were pure nomads. They had neither the knowledge of raising crops nor any first-hand experience with the European climate and environment. Logistically I don't think they would have done too well on any extended operation.

posted 09-24-2002 11:47 PM               

To match your ignorance of Elton, I must say I do not know of Herr Wolfram’s work. A quick glance at Amazon suggests that it has not been translated into English at all.

The knowledge of logistics needed for the Goths to move 125,000 people, plus herds and wagons, through Illyria and Italy could easily been known to the Mongols. They and their kin had been raiding and invading China for a millennium, where the same annual cycle of harvest and ripening apply as in the West. Nomads in Central Asia were in close contact with the settled populations of the oases – cities like Samarkand and the like – which had regular agriculture. Of course, nomads are exquisitely sensitive to the growing season as it affects herds. The Mongols also had access to many people who could tell them about the West. Kosztolnyik mentions a Kievan who defected to the Hungarians prior to Mohi. He was surely not the only non-Mongol in Batu’s entire force.

Vietnam tactics are not important here, agreed. The fact that the Americans left Vietnam does not, however, suggest that the NVA and VC bested the US on the battlefield.

Kosztolnyik’s account of Mohi is interesting, but a bit confusing. On the first page, he notes the Tatar vanguard did not engage in senseless destruction (a point I have made before). The next paragraph has Ugrin sallying forth from Pest because of the Tatar pillaging of the countryside, and being badly defeated (pointing out that even Hungarians could be taken in by basic steppe tactics).

The Reconquista is irrelevant to this discussion. The Moors were not primarily horse bowmen, and I know of no significant use of steppe tactics or steppe mercenaries west of Egypt. Abu Bakr al-Turtusi describes how a Moorish force would meet a Christian Spanish one of the 11th century. He chooses exactly what a writer in Outremer would recommend: infantry with large shields and spears in front, archers behind them, and the cavalry in reserve for a counterstroke. (see France Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades). Not a steppe tactic at all.

posted 09-25-2002 09:56 AM               

Despite all this tremendous effort (which meant no less than sacrificing the element of surprise in favor of logistics), the Goths still needed to forage whatever they could find. Destruction of the countryside was in fact enormous. The Balkans in particular suffered heavily during the Migration period. Some of the previously flourishing Roman provinces such as Moesia and Dalmatia were reduced to barely inhabitable wilderness. The side effects of hundreds of thousands of barbarians passing through were certainly very perceptible. It took the Balkans many centuries to recover. The fact that some other regions were relatively less affected in the long run owes it only to the sedentary nature of the barbarian peoples who eventually settled down there. An entirely nomadic invader like the Mongols would have brought even greater devastation, at the same time depriving themselves of pasture and supply. Arguably for this reason neither the Huns nor Avars ever managed to gain a firm foothold in Central and Western Europe. The Hungarians succeeded only thanks to adapting to the sedentary way of life.

"Vietnam tactics are not important here, agreed. The fact that the Americans left Vietnam does not, however, suggest that the NVA and VC bested the US on the battlefield."

No, of course not. But it doesn't prove that the US could actually win the conflict by force either. Leaving Vietnam was not an easy decision for the American leadership. But it had to be done - not just because military involvement wasn't worth the cost (it never was, not even in the beginning) but quite simply because the US was clearly not capable of winning the war militarily.

Kosztolnyik does a good job at fusing the various accounts of the Hungarian campaign together. We may get as picky as we want, but his main points stand. You can check them any time in the primary sources if you wish to do so. Oh, and while we're talking about Ugrin's first debacle outside Pest I think that episode really points out one far more important fact. Namely, that the Austrians had no difficulty thrashing the Mongol vanguard, the same vanguard that defeated Ugrin.

I mentioned Spain as some of the Moorish tactics and strategy resembled that used by the steppe nomads. Granted, mounted archery was not the Moorish forte, but light cavalry certainly was. Ambushes and feigned retreats were just as popular with the Berber as they were with the Mongols.

I also believe Louis IX had a fair number of people at his court well versed in Eastern warfare. Louis himself had ample opportunity to experience the effects of a military system inherently similar to that of the Mongols during his active stay in Egypt. Unless he and all his followers were complete idiots, they must have learned a thing or two in the meantime.

posted 09-27-2002 09:34 PM               

The climax is, in fact, anti-climactic. "In the morning, in broad daylight, when the forces of Subutai Khan had merged with the army of Batu, and the Tatars were able to surround the Hungarian camp in its entirety, they opened fire and arrayed (sic) the camp with flaming arrows. The compound easily caught fire - panic broke out among the king's men, whose leadership was of no avail. 'In fuga' flight from the scene was the only way out of a disaster."

Kosztolnyik then describes what individuals escaped (one group broke out through the Mongol lines, instead of into a trap) and who died. What he doesn't suggest is that at some point the Hungarians either trapped and slaughtered a significant portion of the Mongols, or when the Hungarians resisted with sufficient ferocity to inflict major losses.

The Moors certainly had light cavalry, which lead the Spanish to develop jinetes. These light horse were peculiar to Spain in Western Europe. The French and English and Flemings did not use such light horse. The first I know of them being reintroduced to Western Europe are the Irish hobelars of the Anglo-Scots Wars. These troops had to be imported because the English had nothing like them, some 60 years after the Mongols. Also, I believe that Iberian light horse were significantly different than the steppe horse bowmen. For one thing, while they could hurl javelins, the range and number of javelins would be only a small fraction of the firepower of horse bowmen, and be far more dangerous for the javeliners, since they have to be quite close to their targets. And both the Moors and Spanish had foot bowmen, who would easily outrange and outfire any javelin-throwing horsemen. The use of ambush and false retreat was well known to European warriors (Hastings, anyone?), so that alone does not make the Iberian experience comparable to that of the steppe.

posted 09-28-2002 11:27 AM               

Thanks to the warning of the Ruthenian deserter the Hungarians went out of the camp at night and found out that a "considerable" part of the Mongol army had already crossed the river (and there were probably some still on the bridge even though Thomas doesn't say that explicitly). In this critical moment the Hungarians attacked (it seems they took the Mongols by surprise), fighting "very manfully", and killed "many" while the rest were pushed back to the river and drowned in an effort to escape.

It doesn't take any stretching of the facts to establish that this engagement was a definite Hungarian victory and that the Mongol contigent involved in the operation suffered heavy losses. Attempting to launch a preemptive night attack the Mongols were themselves outsmarted. The slaughter must have been great, so great in fact that the Hungarians were assured of victory. Had the battle on the bridge seemed less decisive the Hungarians would surely have left a far more substantial guard and there wouldn't have been much cause for celebration either.

Since the sizeable Mongol detachment sent over the bridge was effectively wiped out, it can be extrapolated that the Mongol casualties were high. And this does not take into account the last phase of the fighting, which must have been brutal as well. Even if the Hungarians were ultimately defeated I'm sure many of them did not perish without a good fight. These facts considered, it's quite evident that the Mongol victory at Mohi was bought at a heavy price. This helps to explain the huge steppe cemetery which Carpini is talking about.

"What Marshall (and I) am interested in is the fact that after over a century of Franks going to fight the Saracens, European Franks still made basic mistakes over and over again."

Surely there were cases of crusading hysteria and poor judgement, but I don't think there were all that many engagements where the European military system as such failed against an eastern army of comparable size and strength.

It would be false to automatically attribute the failures of the later crusades to any inherent flaw in the European way of waging war. What is routinely ignored is that the later crusades were for the most part extremely ambitiously planned operations that involved numerically small forces, forced to fight a strong enemy under adverse circumstances. Despite all that, the crusaders still managed to win a number of victories before being driven off. This speaks well of the qualities of European warfare.

"(and I did notice Frederick of Austria's success - and the fact that he did nothing with it thereafter. That doesn't argue for European tactical superiority.)"

Well, why not? The facts are quite simple - the Mongol vanguard (obviously a fairly large force, not merely a small unit of scouts) defeats the hastily assembled Hungarians but falls prey to the Frederick's Austrians. Albeit the entire context of the battle isn't known, it was apparently a clear-cut victory in the field. If this is not a sign of tactical superiority I don't know what is.

posted 09-29-2002 05:22 PM               

quote:

---

Well, why not? The facts are quite simple - the Mongol vanguard (obviously a fairly large force, not merely a small unit of scouts) defeats the hastily assembled Hungarians but falls prey to the Frederick's Austrians. Albeit the entire context of the battle isn't known, it was apparently a clear-cut victory in the field. If this is not a sign of tactical superiority I don't know what is.

---

An inferior argument. We don't know the numbers involved, we don't know the tactical situation. The Mongols won "clear cut victories in the field" at Mohi and Liegnitz, which you insist is NOT a sign of tactical superiority. The statement that a Mongol commander was killed does not prove it was a major battle or that the Austrians crushed the Mongols (although Frederick did apparently win). Example: in 1812, Napoleon was on a scouting trip (or in transit between units, I forget which), with an escort of a couple squadrons of light cavalry. He was attacked by a very superior force of Russian Tatar auxiliaries (who just happen to have been armed with bows, which is why this incident is noteworthy at all.) As it happened, the Emperor escaped unharmed. If he had been wounded or killed, the fight might have had enormous consequences, but it still would have been a small skirmish. It would have proved little about the tactical capacities of the French Army and the Russian Army in any case.

The fact that the Austrians then did nothing with their victory does tend to suggest that they did not see themselves as being clearly superior to the Mongols.

quote:

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The slaughter must have been great, so great in fact that the Hungarians were assured of victory. Had the battle on the bridge seemed less decisive the Hungarians would surely have left a far more substantial guard and there wouldn't have been much cause for celebration either.

Since the sizeable Mongol detachment sent over the bridge was effectively wiped out, it can be extrapolated that the Mongol casualties were high.

---

posted 10-01-2002 06:23 AM               

As I happen to have the primary sources at hand, there is no need to read too much into Kosztolnyik's text. Kosztolnyik's exact wording is really quite irrelevant here. I believe it would be far more productive to study the main sources instead, particularly Thomas of Spalato because he has the most to say on Mohi.

Even though the exact number of combatants involved in the night battle isn't known, the implications are it was considerable. Prince Coloman and archbishop Ugrin, the most prominent leaders by far (the only other personality of similar rank being the Templar master), both participated in the fighting with their contigents, possibly with some troops of lower-ranking leaders attached to their force. If this information is correct (and I think we can trust Thomas on this count), a very considerable number, most probably majority of the Hungarian soldiers must have participated in the fighting.

As for the Mongols, the size of their force is more difficult to assess. Still, it can't have been very small; its task was after all to attack the Hungarian camp at dawn, keeping the enemy busy until the flanking force under Batu could arrive. This indicates in my opinion that a significant number of Mongols participated in the night battle. No wise commander would ever appoint a company to ambush a division, after all. Since the Mongols lost this first encounter sorely, losses must have been significant, or at least that's the interpretation that seems most reasonable to me.

The original accounts make it clear the Hungarian army was inefficient and poorly led. However, I don't think one could argue on such ground that the Hungarians were entirely incompetent in all matters military or that they were complete idiots. In their eyes, there must have been a good cause for celebration after the nightly victory. About the only explanation for this that I can see is that the battle on the bridge involved such considerable Mongol forces and ended in such a decisive Hungarian victory that the matter appeared to be settled for good.

"The Mongols won "clear cut victories in the field" at Mohi and Liegnitz, which you insist is NOT a sign of tactical superiority."

This is not what I've been saying. Liegnitz was a major tactical success for the Mongols and as such demonstrates the Mongol military superiority over a hastily assembled Polish army made up of very diverse components. Similarly, Mohi - which I consider less of a success, particularly in the strategic sense - displays the Mongol superiority over the disorganized Hungarian army. None of those two battles proves any tactical superiority of the Mongol model over the Western European system, though.

I concur that to little is known about Frederick's skirmish to make it anything like a conclusive proof. Nevertheless, I think my opinion rests on reasonable ground. Clearly the Hungarians, themselves defeated by the same vanguard, were deeply impressed by the Austrian victory and their military competence, so it must have been a more or less evenly matched battle in which the Austrians really did well.

posted 10-05-2002 07:57 AM               

"...it is clear that the Hungarian army's ability to combine eastern and western tactical traditions rendered it highly effective; not only against European foes but even against those from the east. Hungary may have been defeated by the invading Mongols, but even the battle of Mohi in 1241 had not been a completely one-sided affair. According to a Chinese chronicler, the Hungarians' combined light and heavy cavalry had at one point made the invading Mongol commander consider retreat."

posted 10-06-2002 01:41 PM               

Russ Mitchell had this to say when I mentioned Nicolle:

"Nicolle is a dirty word in Hungary. He may be great on Turks and okay on Western Europe, but his knowledge of Eastern Europe is laughable. Really, embarrassingly bad. Just fair warning. The man actually confuses the Hungarian king, of the Neapolitan Angevin house with "a prince of Bessarabia." (my copy's out on loan, so I can't cite you the page). He buys into the notion that Russia existed in its modern form, and also falls prey to the Daco-Roman continuity theory (a product of 19th-century squabbles between magyars and vlachs/romanians under the Austrians -- for some reason they let themselves get drawn into a pointless who-was-here first argument, on the notion that whoever had been would then theoretically have more rights in the empire: sound stupid to you? Does to me, too, but then again, so does Manifest Destiny, and I'm a yank.), and because of that totally fails to understand the region. However, you're right, his line drawings in and of themselves are valuable if you have cross-reference information to double-check his interpretations."

posted 10-07-2002 06:12 AM               

Coming from Central Europe myself I'm probably more entitled to blame Nicolle than anyone else on this forum, but I do not consider his work worthless at all. The sheer amount of effort he devoted to military history is, for lack of a better word, incredible. Not to mention his attempt to present military history of Eurasia, North Africa and the Middle East as a whole. No doubt he commited blunders. Some of his interpretations may be questionable. But I can understand that. No other military historian has ever tried anything as ambitious before. Nicolle's contribution breaks new ground and even if it is far from perfect, I believe it deserves attention.

posted 10-07-2002 10:34 AM               

I hope to get permission to republish a couple of more articles on the De Re Militari website dealing with Mongols in Europe, namely:

Rogers, Greg S., "An examination of Historians' Explanations for the Mongol withdrawal from East Central Europe", East European Quarterly, v.30 (1996)

"The Arts of War under Chinggis Khan", an appendix to the book, The Secret History of the Mongols, translated by Urgunge Onon (Curzon Press, 2001).