posted 09-03-2002 05:30 AM               

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Lack of grassland meant that the nomads would have to conquer the West by siege and on foot, not on horseback. A horse eats twenty-five acres of pasture or 168 bales of hay per year. Raising fodder and gathering hay for stockbreeding was a time-consuming business, since it took a man with a scythe two days just to mow a single acre in May: twice as long with a sickle. This had compelled the Huns, Avars and Magyars to settle down and make the transition to a much more complex social organisation based on mixed farming on the open field system with three-year crop rotations on the wooded plains and valleys. Reducing the numbers of mounts to boost total troop strength in agricultural conditions would have meant Europeanising, diluting and assimilating the Mongols, robbing them of their mobility in terrain where military manoeuvres were already heavily restricted by the rivers, mountain valleys and the vert, and decisively limiting their destructive potential. To fight in European conditions the Mongols would have to leave their unique advantages behind them when they quit the steppes, bring an end to their nomadic existence, and reinvent themselves as a small conventional force on European lines, a process which would have been as self-defeating for the 13th-century invaders as it had been for earlier nomads from the East.

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The dearth of European pasture was such that any horse nomad army was always going to be too small to sustain a war of conquest, and Batu’s ordu was really beaten, as its Hunnic, Avar and Magyar predecessors had been, not by the enemy, but by the absence of any viable logistical base. Aware that a single defeat beyond the Danube might cost him everything he’d gained on his rampage through Hungary, Batu remained east of the river throughout the summer and autumn. Having once gazed upon the Danube, three khans, Möngke, Güyüg and Büri, withdrew with their men and horses to the greener pastures of Russia and Mongolia.

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Needing a quick kill, Batu bypassed the siege of Gran and went for the jugular at Vienna. The farthest point west the Mongols reached was Wiener Neustadt, and from here, with the ordu probably haemorrhaging horses from lack of grazing, retreat seems to have become the most attractive option. According to tradition, it was concern over the possible consequences of Ögödei’s death which compelled Batu to withdraw to the Kipchak steppe, making his capital at Sarai on the Volga. But I rather suspect the reconnaissance conducted by the Mongol yurtchi, responsible for provisioning, would also have alerted Batu to the real danger of starvation and disintegration the ordu was facing had it pressed on to the West, and that this contributed to his decision to turn back, and never return to wreak his vengeance on the Christians for insolence of their Pope. If so it was a sound strategic decision, perhaps the best Batu ever made.

Sübodei was arguably the greatest commander of the thirteenth century. And yet his strategic genius goes largely unrecognised, even by the Mongolists on this forum. Make no mistake, if the conquest of Europe had been within the bounds of human possibility, Sübodei would surely have been the man to accomplish it. But it was not within the bounds of human possibility. The Carpathian mountains marked the end of horse warfare and Mongol military supremacy. They were the mighty rock against which the nomad waves must always crash in vain.

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In the light of all this number-crunching it would appear that the fate of Europe was never in the hands of the Mongols, that the papal hysteria was as unjustified as it was indecorous, and that the kings of the West were not betrayed by what their better instinct told them: that it was not the Mongol incursion which posed the greater threat to their security. Instead, as always, the warlords of Europe had more reason to fear each other.

So the probability assessment indicates that a Mongol invasion of Christendom would have failed on logistics. They didn’t have a big enough siege train with them in 1241, and even if they had somehow managed to hold onto Hungary before regrouping and returning with reinforcements, the ecology of Europe could never have supported the sudden introduction of a million or so new horses consuming the 168 million more bales of hay a year that would have been necessary to sustain the Mongolian system of nomadic warfare on the basis of low-yield mediaeval agriculture. Even the intensive cultivation of the day could only have foddered a tiny fraction of this number, which after all is why infantry had always been the mainstay of the Western militaries. Within a year of the invasion Mongol horse numbers would have crashed simply from starvation. But from Batu’s point of view, climbing out of the saddle and adapting to European conditions would mean surrendering the fighting qualities which had made Mongol armies successful in the first place, and with a hundred thousand improvised infantrymen he still wouldn’t have the manpower and the resources to prevail.

The hard data suggests that Batu Khan and Sübodei had about as much chance of conquering Europe as they had of conquering the moon, and if the ordu had continued west in 1242 it would most likely have been on a one-way recon to decimation and dispersal. But fortunately for all concerned, the Mongols showed keener judgement than many armchair generals of these latter days, who on the one hand imagine a world empire that might have stretched all the way to the Western Ocean, and yet on the other hand are unable to explain why the dream of nomad dominion failed to become reality.

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posted 09-04-2002 06:57 PM            

A castle presents an army with three options: stop and take it, which bogs you down at every one, vitiating the sort of mobility that was the Mongol hallmark; bypass it, which leaves you with armed enemies behind you; or detail a force to pin the garrison down, which means your army gets smaller and smaller as you advance. And the defenders of all these fortresses would not have consisted mostly of terrified civilians led by civil servants or businessmen, as in China, but by part-time or full-time soldiers led by same---less likely to capitulate to threats or shows of force.

posted 09-05-2002 04:44 AM               

Logistical constraints have been discussed in sufficient detail to show that no steppe army could operate in Central or Western Europe successfully. But even if the Mongols had somehow miraculously managed to overcome the logistical difficulties I don't think they would have triumphed on European battlefields.

Medieval Europe was an entity militarily strong enough to resist just about any contemporary threat, including the Mongols. This may seem a doubtful statement at first, particularly to those used to more traditional historiography. But contrary to what so many scholars would have us believe, the European military system was sound and worked well in its time.

Even though obviously optimized for the European climate and environment, European warfare could be successfully adapted to face just about any kind of adversary. European armies scored great victories over the supposedly more civilized and advanced opponents, most notably the Byzantines and Saracens. The persistent idea of superiority of horse archers to European armies is merely a myth. An in-depth study of the Crusades reveals that the standard European assortment of mounted knights, heavy infantry and crossbowmen - under competent leaders, of course - was able to ward off horse archers easily, even when heavily outnumbered and caught in unknown terrain.

As a matter of fact, I see very little "remarkable capacity for adaption" on the part of the Mongols. They were clinging to the very basics of steppe warfare without introducing any new major concepts. The best Mongol leaders such as Genghis or Subotai were certainly capable of enforcing very strict discipline and efficiently managing their armies, but they were still fighting just like the Huns or Avars half a millenium earlier. In fact, I would go so far as to mark the Mongol wmilitary thinking as rigid and inflexible; that was certainly evident on the 1241 raid when it utterly failed to deal with Hungarian fortifications, the only segment of Western European warfare which the Mongols ever really experienced.

Medieval Europe was entirely familiar with steppe warfare by 1241 and knew what to expect from the Mongols. But the latter on the other hand had no previous experience with anything resembling the European feudalism. Even the sparsely populated, poorly defended regions of Eastern Europe turned out to be a major challenge for the Mongols. The fight would certainly have become much harder in Austria, Germany or Italy.

Another important aspect is military technology. This is another field where Europe was at a huge advantage. With abundant supplies of quality iron ore and skilled artisans it was possible to turn out large quantities of first-rate arms and armor. There was also a huge pool of manpower at hand for feudal Europe was a warlike society very unlike China. Compared to that, the resources available to the Mongols - particularly to the Golden Horde - appear dangerously modest.

In regard to weaponry, the Mongols had nothing new at hand that could be used with decisive effect. On the other hand - and much to my disagreement with the author of the article - medieval Europe did not have to wait for the longbow to get an effective missile weapon. It already had the crossbow, which was in widespread use by 1241. The effect of the crossbow was so great that the Mongols themselves feared it.

posted 09-05-2002 01:09 PM               

Taking some thoughts in order: referrring to Frederick II of the HRE and Louis IX and Henry III
“Each was capable with his allies of fielding a host that was numerically equal or superior to the enemy’s, but arguably tactically outmatched. The Franks of the West after all fought like the Poles, whom Kaidu and Baidar had swept aside at Liegnitz”.
The author later notes that

“In theory, by accepting that five-horse limit, which still enabled 65,000 Mongols to spread their terror through the deserts of the Middle East, Batu Khan could have maintained on a permanent basis in Europe only three tüman or 30,000 troops”

Now, how often did any of those monarchs field a 30,000 man army? That is about the upper limit of medieval field armies. And a 30,000 man medieval army undoubtedly had a lot of spear and shield infantry, of limited value on the battlefield (especially against horse archers). None of these three ever fielded a 65,000 man force.

Next, the author comes to the crux of the matter, and sweeps right past it.

“The length of Mongolian communications was excessive if campaigns were to be sustained in Europe. At least in theory horse archers could live off the land, but siege trains with all their oxen, draught horses, carts, and baggage wagons couldn’t. If we lay aside logistics for a moment, the tactical analysis supports the idea that, as the undisputed masters of Asiatic warfare, the Mongol ordu could have won an impressive string of pitched battles in Europe. But it’s what would have happened next that would have been decisive. Christendom wasn’t China or Persia or Arabia, where entire kingdoms could fall with the stroke of a sword or the thrust of a lance.”

I agree the length of Mongol lines were to long: the saving grace of Europe is that it is far from Mongolia, and the unity and concentration of the Mongol effort had been dispersed by the distance and lands already conquered. Clearly, the author is not familiar with the Mongol effort to conquer China, which was several large realms (as we already know, and the author documents with a map), and took about 70 years. NOT “the stroke of a sword”.

From this the author continues:

“In the West the extinction of a ruling dynasty had long ceased to spell the end of a state, and the fate of the free peoples was not bound to the life of their kings. To prevent the social order from capsizing under the barbarian surge in the Dark Ages, feudalism had refitted the European ship of state with a hull of watertight compartments. The political leadership of Italy, France and Germany was diffuse, and the governing institutions were resilient. With local rulers still overshadowing the centralised states, and the power of organised religion providing the shared sense of identity, when decapitated, the institutionalised leadership simply sprouted a new head, like a hydra.”

This is an unusual argument: that disunity and fragmentation strengthen a society. The notion that medieval folk were “free peoples” is an anachronism of the first order. They were serfs, guild members, vassals, all bound to each other. To speak of the political leadership of “Italy” is itself a joke – hasn’t he heard of the Guelfs and Ghibellines? He already noted that: “For their part we all know that the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire could allow no mere Tatar apocalypse to intrude on their own struggles for power”

Next is the artillery/fortification issue.

“Of course, in his wisdom the great Chinggis Khan had understood that mounted archers were not enough to defeat sedentary societies, and his successors ensured that all metalworkers, carpenters and gunpowder makers in northern China were registered as p’ao-shou catapult operators. We know that Batu had brought a train of minghan engineers, since he was able to field seven ho p’ao catapults to hurl firebombs against the unfortunate Hungarians at the Sajo bridge, teaching them a deadly lesson in the tactical use of artillery. But events showed that these weren’t heavy enough to breach the high stone walls of the Hungarian castles, which Batu had to skirt. Gunpowder wasn’t used during the Mongol campaigns in Russia and Europe, and the primitive projectile technology then in use wouldn’t have made much of an impression. On a later campaign it would take Hülegü three years to transport a thousand crews of Chinese artillerymen and their siege equipment two and a half thousand miles from the steppes of western Mongolia in 1253 to Khurasan in 1256, and another two years before they could topple the walls of Baghdad a thousand miles farther west”

Yes, european fortifications were numerous and well sited. What is not considered is that pre-gunpowder artillery was rarely transported. It was usually made on site, or nearby. Even early artillery was sometimes made on site, as the bombards were too heavy to transport. Chinese artillerymen and engineers were quite capable of making larger siege engines than they had on hand at the Sajo River, if they had been told to do so. Again, the end of the paragraph reinforces the idea that the key defense of Europe was its distance, and not any intrinsic feature of European society. Of course, if the Mongols had been united and really wanted to conquer Europe, mere distance alone would probably have not sufficed. The author alludes to, but does not clearly acknowledge this when he says:

“After the initial attack of 1241 there was a series of political crises within the Mongolian Empire which made it impossible to concentrate in Kipchak territory an invasion force capable of threatening Europe”

In other words, the Mongols were preoccupied with other areas, and their own squabbles.

Now, we get to horses.

“Horse-power required pasture, superabundant in the great pastoral belts of Mongolia, China, Russia and the Middle East, but almost non-existent in the dark forests and arable lands of Europe. While the tough Mongol horse of the thirteenth century was between thirteen and fourteen hands high, rather larger than the twelve hands of the wild Przhevalsky, and requiring a heavier dietary intake, as a pony it still would have cropped grass more closely and exhausted the habitat at a faster rate than its heavier European counterpart.

First of all, China does not have “great pastoral belts”. It has always been heavily farmed, with forests and marshes and mountains everywhere else. The second half of the quote is new to me: while Mongol horses might have been harder on the environment than European horses, this also allows them to survive where European mounts can’t. Environmental degradation probably wasn’t high on the list of Mongol ecological issues, unless the degradation is so fast it would preclude an army riding through the area. This is not demonstrated by the author.

The area of Shandong: Area 153,300 sq km (59,200 sq mi); (www.freegk.com)
The area of modern Hungary: 93,030 sq. km (35,919 sq mi)

The author apparently is not aware of these facts

. “Undoubtedly the killer fact generally overlooked by advocates of the Mongol conquest scenario is that nomadic warfare was incompatible with the forest vegetation and agronomy of mediaeval Europe, which had a much more densely wooded landscape from This means a smaller Mongol force for the invasion of Europe than the two tüman recorded in Möngke’s 1252 census for the single small north Chinese province of Shantung. That’s also less than a third of Batu’s total ordu of six tüman which had won victories in Poland and Hungary, dry, thinly-settled, semi-Asiatic pastoral plains with only a fraction of the military strength available to the vast populations supported by the agricultural economies of the West.

The “small” province of Shandong is larger than Hungary: which gives one an idea of how large China really is. Two tumans were supported (!) in this area, suggesting they were permanently posted, despite the lack of vast pastures in this area. The author also thinks Poland and Hungary are “dry, thinly-settled (which may have been true), semi-Asiatic pastoral plains”. The Poles would be delighted to know they are semi-asian.

posted 09-05-2002 05:03 PM               

When did the those monarchs ever needed an army in Europe, that big, in those days? Later, yes in France during the Hundred years war? again yes. But in the thirteenth century ? Who would the have needed that many man for except against the Mongols.
Spear and shield infantry of limited value? That’s a new one for me. And I guess that those infantry men supported with enough crossbow men would have given those horse archers a whole lot of grief.

Clearly, the author is not familiar with the Mongol effort to conquer China, which was several large realms (as we already know, and the author documents with a map), and took about 70 years. NOT “the stroke of a sword”.

70 years even worse for the Mongols in Europe, because this would give the Europeans more time to learn how to fight against the Mongols. Europe was a far more martial civilization than the Chinese in those day’s. Not that the Chinese were wimps.

This is an unusual argument: that disunity and fragmentation strengthen a society. The notion that medieval folk were “free peoples” is an anachronism of the first order. They were serfs, guild members, vassals, all bound to each other. To speak of the political leadership of “Italy” is itself a joke – hasn’t he heard of the Guelfs and Ghibellines? He already noted that: “For their part we all know that the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire could allow no mere Tatar apocalypse to intrude on their own struggles for power”

Disunity and fragmentation no, but a sharing of authority as a check and balance of the power of kings ? Yes.
Serf free men? No. But that institution lived longer and was more wide spread in eastern Europe then in western Europe were it was disappearing quickly. And the rest were free men, who took the duties of a guild member or that of a vassal freely on his or her shoulder. And if he or she thought, enough, they could always leave.

Chinese artillerymen and engineers were quite capable of making larger siege engines than they had on hand at the Sajo River, if they had been told to do so. Again, the end of the paragraph reinforces the idea that the key defense of Europe was its distance, and not any intrinsic feature of European society. Of course, if the Mongols had been united and really wanted to conquer Europe, mere distance alone would probably have not sufficed.

And building bigger and better catapults capable of razing the walls of those stone castles would have taken how long ? And what would those 30000 Mongols and there horses have eaten while those catapults where being build and then the walls were razed ? There was a reason that European monarchs used small armies when they could get away with it. Logistics is always going to be a millstone around the military neck. The lack of resources for huge armies for long campaigns was a intrinsic feature of the European society of those days.

In other words, the Mongols were preoccupied with other areas, and their own squabbles.

That’s also called “having bitten more than one can chew” Batu recognized that.

First of all, China does not have “great pastoral belts”. It has always been heavily farmed, with forests and marshes and mountains everywhere else. The second half of the quote is new to me: while Mongol horses might have been harder on the environment than European horses, this also allows them to survive where European mounts can’t. Environmental degradation probably wasn’t high on the list of Mongol ecological issues, unless the degradation is so fast it would preclude an army riding through the area. This is not demonstrated by the author.

If it is vegetable and a human can eat it then so can a horse. And china was more heavily farmed than Europe. And the degradation would have been fast enough. 30000 times 5 is still a 150000 horses, and that number would have been a plague on the land. Stripping everything bare to the ground. No horse army would have been capable of taking the same route the next year. Not enough horse fodder.

The “small” province of Shandong is larger than Hungary: which gives one an idea of how large China really is. Two tumans were supported (!) in this area, suggesting they were permanently posted, despite the lack of vast pastures in this area.

posted 09-05-2002 11:21 PM               

Back to the short-cropping Mongol horses: this sounded plausible, albeit irrelevant for the duration of most military campaigns. However, this does rather ignore the short-cropping sheep that were the mainstay of the late Medieval English foreign trade, and the Merino sheep from Spain. According to the thesis of the author, East Anglia should have been reduced to a barren dust bowl by centuries of sheep raising. Last I was there, it looked pretty green to me. Of course, I forget that according to the author, there was no pasturage of any size in Western Europe. The English sheep must have lived on something else.

Now, back to army size again. The author cites the size of the forces and length of time it took to subdue the Southern Sung dynasty of China.

“. In 1275 Chia Ssu-tao’s great army defending Yangchow mustered 130,000 men under arms, indicating that late Sung military strength was comparable to that of 13th-century France, where in theory between 285,000 and 380,000 men could have been raised for the defence of the Capetian, Plantagenet, Burgundian and Provencal territories. Logistical restrictions dictated that of these a full third, about 100,000, should have been deployable outside of France, on crusade in Italy to meet the Mongol advance, with the remainder as garrison”

The fact that the Sung could concentrate and support 130,000 men in one city (and still cover the rest of the Yangtze river front line) says a lot about Chinese military and logistical capablilities. No European force of that size would exist until the 17th century, and even Rome in its heyday rarely if ever assembled that many troops at one time and place. The author then expects a 100,000 man expeditionary force to advance into Italy – much larger than either of the armies Napoleon Bonaparte took from France into Italy. He supposes that French medieval logistics could support 100,000 men in a foreign land. The last line also has a valuable clue buried in it: garrisons. Any computation of European forces has to include garrisoning all of those formidable castles and walled cities that have been discussed. This greatly reduces the field armies’ strength. If the fortresses are not garrisoned, they have no value at all.

The author then falls into a trap which we discussed earlier:

“Consequently there was no possibility that the West could have supported the sudden introduction of hundreds of thousands of new grazing animals from the steppes that a nomadic invasion would have required.”

He blithely assumes that Mongols would behave as civilized Western horsemen. In all likelihood, a Mongol with hungry horses, looking at a village with sheep and cattle, would simply kill the livestock (and eat some) and make pasturage available for his horses. There would be no excess of animals to support. If the peasants protested, they would be killed too.

The next section also contains a trap:

“This had compelled the Huns, Avars and Magyars to settle down and make the transition to a much more complex social organisation based on mixed farming on the open field system with three-year crop rotations on the wooded plains and valleys. Reducing the numbers of mounts to boost total troop strength in agricultural conditions would have meant Europeanising, diluting and assimilating the Mongols, robbing them of their mobility in terrain where military manoeuvres were already heavily restricted by the rivers, mountain valleys and the vert, and decisively limiting their destructive potential. To fight in European conditions the Mongols would have to leave their unique advantages behind them when they quit the steppes, bring an end to their nomadic existence, and reinvent themselves as a small conventional force on European lines, a process which would have been as self-defeating for the 13th-century invaders as it had been for earlier nomads from the East. “

Here the trap is simple – he assumes that the Mongols would want to colonize Europe, and live among the locals. Or, he assumes the conquest of Europe would take generations. He neglects the example of Russia, where the Mongols conquered but did not occupy, and administered from afar, through the Grand Dukes of Moscow (hence responsible in part for the rise of Moscow in Russian affairs). Even if the conquest took years, much of it could have been done with annual expeditions from the Ukrainian steppe. Admittedly conquering Ireland would have been a bit difficult, but it was not a critical part of Europe.

Then comes the pompous part: “The Carpathian mountains marked the end of horse warfare and Mongol military supremacy. They were the mighty rock against which the nomad waves must always crash in vain. “

He apparently believes that the Huns didn’t make it into central France, and the Mongols to Vienna, or that the Avars raided into France, and the Magyars into Italy. My assertion, to reiterate, is not that Europe was steppe pony-resistant (which seems to be a new passion among some), but that Europe was so far away that by the time the Mongols got there, their discipline, lust for conquest, and unity were sapped by 2 generations of victories. One could just as well argue that the Picts of Scotland stopped the Roman legions in their tracks (or the Scottish terrain was somehow incompatible with legion tactics). The facts are the same: the all-conquering host reaches a remote territory, probes it with some success, then turns around, leaves and never returns. Pictish historians would have concluded they, alone among all peoples, defeated the Romans.

To: Walther

The fact is, no Medieval monarch ever assembled an army of 65,000 men. If they could have, they would have done so.

Spearmen are purely a passive target against horse archers: ask Crassus at Carrhae. Europe didn't have that many crossbowmen: they were professionals, mostly mercenaries, and expensive.

Next, you miss my point about China - that it was not easy to conquer: in part because it had a strong central government. Continuing to the next section, "checks and balances" is a sacred phrase for Anglo-American constitutional historians. For medieval governments, this wasn't the case. The very first step in sharing power, the Magna carta, had only been signed some 26 years before, and was controversial even in England at this time. It was totally ignored in the rest of Europe. You will have to show me that serfdom was disappearing in 1241 in Western and Central Europe. Guildsmen and vassals were not free, they were bound by regulations, traditions, and rules - and leaving the protection of a lord, city, or association like a guild meant you were easy prey for the first bullies to come around (including your former associates). You didn't just "leave" when you felt like it.

posted 09-06-2002 03:46 AM               

I cannot speak for the author of the article, but I suspect you've misunderstood his point. He does not imply that the conquest of China was easy but rather that the feudal system of medieval Europe was inhenrently more resistant than the Chinese or Persian dynasties or the rule of the Baghdad caliph.

In that respect I agree wholeheartedly. European feudalism was not at all an absolute rule of an almighty king whose death would invariably shake the intengrity of the country. Even the loss of a ruling dynasty was not necessarily fatal in itself, particularly not on a local level. If necessary, any part of feudal Europe could function as a self-sufficient and militarily capable entity in times of crisis. This was an inherent benefit of European feudalism.

As for freedom, the contemporary Europeans generally viewed themselves as free men and were very proud about it. Serfdom does not equal slavery. In fact, many European observers were appaled at the lack of personal freedom under the Mongol rule, stressing their own independence.

"According to the thesis of the author, East Anglia should have been reduced to a barren dust bowl by centuries of sheep raising. Last I was there, it looked pretty green to me. Of course, I forget that according to the author, there was no pasturage of any size in Western Europe. The English sheep must have lived on something else."

I'm not sure if this is relevant to the main discussion. The real issue is, could the European environment actually support a sudden injection of several hundred thousand, possibly a few million ponies in addition to the existing human and animal population that was already close to repleting the available resources?

"The fact is, no Medieval monarch ever assembled an army of 65,000 men. If they could have, they would have done so."

Really? Perhaps the matter would be better approached from a different angle. To take 13th c. France as an example, the French king could probably call on as much as half a million fighting men, depending on the seriousness of the situation and the thoroughness of the levy. Yet at no time did he ever assemble even 10% of that number for a single campaign. Why?

I believe the real reason lies in logistics. Medieval Europe had considerable reserves of manpower, but the limitations of terrain, communications and agriculture meant that no really large army could operate in Europe for any extended period. Of course, that would also have held true for the Mongols. If the Europeans themselves, being familiar with the terrain, enjoying support of the local population and relying heavily on infantry could not sustain armies of 65.000 men I am double sure that the Mongols, lacking the advantages of the defenders and using such a large, inefficient pool of remounts would not have been able to campaign in Europe in such numbers.

"And a 30,000 man medieval army undoubtedly had a lot of spear and shield infantry, of limited value on the battlefield (especially against horse archers)."

Sorry Felix, but this seems extremely strange in light of exhaustive debates on crusading warfare. Are we again returning to the theories of Delbrück and Oman?

posted 09-06-2002 05:08 AM               

I agree with him that it was hard given European infrastructure to support large armies. The Mongols would have faced this problem too. By the time the Mongols penetrated further West than Hungary they would be forced to split into smaller and smaller groups to find forage, etc. Even in Hungary they advanced in several columns and hoped to re-convene at Budapest. I believe this was due to logistics more than tactics. If I am not wrong they even always advanced across the steppes in widely separated groups in order to support themselves.

The resulting groups would have resembled the one that went south from Hungary through the Balkans and out to the East. Large, but not invulnerable.

Could such a group have penerated into the heart of Europe and wreaked havoc? Yes, they could have. Would this have been a mortal blow to Europe, or ended in conquest, or even, as Cherryfunk put it, seriously F'ed up Europe No, I don't think so.

Indeed, I would say it would have been harder for the Mongols in the 13th c as it was for the Avars and Huns earlier (more castles and cities, better arms, etc by the 13th c.). And, neither of them conquered Europe either. They caused damage but they really just did protracted raids or chevaucees.

I would say that the result would have been similar to that of the English tactics in the 15th c. portion of the Hundred Years ar when Edward II and the Black Prince ran amok across parts of France but made no real strategic impression.

What I suspect is that these Mongls groups wold never have made it out again the way the Huns and Avars did, the way Edward II made it to Flanders and the Black Prince to back to Guienne. The distance back, assuming they penetrated to say rance, was so far and the mobilization capability of Europe so good, castles and cities which would have been bypassed intact so numerous that they would be wiped out on the return trip.

On short aside, Mongol arms and armour are almost indistinguishable from 7th century Avars gear. Compare the French knight of 1241 with a Merovingan horseman ...

posted 09-06-2002 11:16 AM               

But not one of those groups, so far as we know, was seriously interested in conquest that far west. The Hun, the Avar, Bulgar, the Magyar, all chose a homeland in east-central europe, where they could plunder the Byzantines, or maintain connections to areas further east.

Now, in terms of arms, the late Avar was actually just as heavily equipped, if not more so, than the Merovingian, so that example is a wee bit sketchy... but the point remains: tactically the thirteenth-century french and the inhabitants of the HRE were leagues more capable tactically than the pre-Ottonian footman the magyars slaughtered in the field. It's not equipment that counts here -- look at the Mamluks, but tactics.

But this is one of those "stupid questions of history," wherein we compare whether the knight could have acted like the bishops we're familiar with had it only decided to move six spaces over in a diagonal line... so far as we know, the Mongols simply didn't care about western europe. It was a tough nut militarily, but compared to Persia, Byzantium, and the middle east, an economic backwater that simply wasn't worth the effort.. and the one time they did return later, after teh Mamluk defeat, Ladislas teh Cuman (King of Hungary) destroyed their army almost to a man.

posted 09-06-2002 08:31 PM               

To: Tomaz

On the strength of a fragmented, disorganized society when it comes to waging war: firstly, I should like to see concrete examples of how being disunited was a positive benefit in wartime. Not merely examples where the death of a king won a war - those are as common in European history as any other part of the world. Second, Europe was not organized into a single feudal system, and kings ignored those relationships whenever it suited them. Look at the relationship between the kings of France and England both in the HYW and also the Anglo-Norman periods. The HRE had no legal or real authority over either the French, English, Spanish (several) and Scottish kings. In Spain, the relations between the kings of Aragon, Castile (and Leon), Portugual, Navarre were a tangled mess. The fragmented nature of feudal Europe guaranteed there would be no united European front (which the author assumes, by the way). The Europeans never acted together. The closest parallels would be the first three crusades; and the fractious history of those efforts needs no summary here, I hope. Incidentally, one of the characteristic responses of modern democracies to a war threat is the establishment of "governments of national unity" or the putting aside of the "checks and balances" and political disunity which the author supposes to be a strength. Fourth, how many wars are better prosecuted by commitee? With the Emperor and Pope at loggerheads, no single authority could have even claimed nominal leadership of an anti-mongol league. Alliances have succeeded sometimes (WW II) but there are usually problems.

Next point - the environment. As I pointed out, the Mongols would probably have made room for their horses, by eliminating the local livestock (and people) if need be. When did the Mongol army become "several hundred thousand" men? I have not seen any serious argument that a force of that size would have been needed.

Which brings up the size of European armies. We agree, I hope, that 30,000 was about the largest size of any medieval army. You agree that logistics meant that larger forces could not be sustained. The author of the cited posts clearly disagrees with you (and me!). He blithely talks about a 100,000 man French expeditionary force to Italy.

posted 09-06-2002 11:15 PM               

quote:

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He blithely talks about a 100,000 man French expeditionary force to Italy.

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posted 09-07-2002 06:24 AM               

In regard to steppe warfare in Europe I have made my opinion clear. Even Strategikon notes the uselessness of the contemporary cavalry in wooded, hilly terrain.

Avar and Magyar raids are not a good gauge by which to judge the efficacy of steppe warfare in Europe. Most of those raids were limited in duration and relied on speed. It is true that the Magyars reached as far West as France on their incursions, but always as raiders rather than a massed army ready for a full-scale engagement.

The only time when a body of steppe horsemen of any real size attempted to operate in Western Europe was the Hunnish campaign that catastrophically ended on the Catalaunian fields. There has been some indication that the Huns were seriously hampered by the lack of grazing, which may well have undermined their mobility. This was even more apparent on the subsequent push towards Rome. The Hunnish army got bogged down in the swamps on the Po plain, decimated by disease and forced to return without accomplishing the goal. These events demonstrate that while small, dispersed groups of steppe raiders could pester Western Europe no large army of steppe horsemen stood the chance of operating there on a prolonged campaign.

Then the notion that medieval Europe was so poor and backwaters that it wasn't worth seizing. This is an idea which I'm not buying. Medieval Europe may not have been as rich as some parts of China and Persia. It was still much richer than many regions which steppe nomads conquered or sought to conquer, though. Moreover, the relative richness of a certain region is not the only reason for conquest. What about the natural resources and communications? Europe was by all means a desirable target. It was economically reasonably well off, it had rich ore deposits, advanced metalworking technologies (vital for arms production, possibly a major reason for the Mongol invasion of Persia!) and contained a reservoir of manpower that simply couldn't be ignored.

The Huns certainly tried extremely hard to invade Western Europe. For a multitude of reasons their greatest two attempts failed utterly despite the chaotic political situation in the West. The later "Byzantine" orientation of the Avars and Bulgars is understandable given the weak economy of contemporary Western Europe and the relative prosperity (and vulnerability) of the Byzantine empire at the time.

But to claim the Mongols were disinterested in Europe entirely would be grossly incorrect. First of all, their desire for world domination is clear. This meant that all unconquered nations were treated as targets. The bravado expressed in the Mongol answers to the Pope indicates that Western Europe was consiered a major target.

Secondly, the Mongols invaded a number of regions which were poor by any standards. Compare the commitment of the Golden Horde in Eastern Europe and even in the Balkans. The Mongols were for some reason very active in the Russian and Balkan Realpolitik, which was a really petty affair. Yet at the same time some are arguing that these same Mongols considered Western Europe unworthy even of a raid. The very same Mongols by the way who returned from the second invasion of Poland and Hungary with a bloody nose...

There is obviously something badly wrong with the theory of "unworthy" Europe as presented by some forumites on this thread. Calmly considering all the facts I can only conclude that the actual military potential of the Mongols available for an invasion of Europe was grossly inadequate for any permanent conquest. Logistical considerations must also be taken into account.

posted 09-07-2002 06:29 AM               

On the issue of logistics, there is a flaw in your theory about "making room" for horses. It just doesn't work that way. Sure, you can have your army disperse around the countryside and try to annihilate the civilian population. This might or might not work. It would definitely slow you down and bring considerable casualties, not to mention wearing the horses out. But even if you succeed, what do you end up with? A large desolate country with no people to cultivate it. Your ponies will feed on grass for a year, then the meadows and fields will gradually be overgrown with weed and bushes. In three of four years the entire country will be wilderness with no infrastructure to support an army, no wells to provide a safe source of water, no grazing, no fodder of any kind. I don't think this is a viable strategy. It already backfired in Persia where the senseless slaughter perpetuated by the Mongols transformed once thriving land into desert.

There can be little doubt that the European feudalism was very strong on defense. Just consider the HYW. The English invade France and defeat the royal army decisively in battle. Yet an English conquest of France surprisingly never happens. Some of the French noblemen see they might be better off signing an alliance with the English, which is what they eventually do. But being such half-hearted allies they are not reliable and still retain their independence.

This is the intrinsic strength of fedualism which I've been referring to. Field armies could come and go, kings could be deposed and killed, but at the local level there were still knights with their troops, holed up in nearly impregnable fortresses and always capable of allying themselves together, particularly in case of a common threat. Destroying such resistance was virtually impossible with the contemporary technology.

The point regarding the lack of a united front is valid to some extent, but it must be observed that an impulse sufficiently strong could actually bring vastly different people together. This is what happened during the Crusades and came close to repeating once again in 1241. Disturbing reports of Mongol atrocities were widespread among the general population. They could easily have incited religious fervor all over the continent. The German emperor and his subordinates in the HRE were also working in that direction, trying to settle the disputes with the pope (even if at least temporarily).

It must be noted that feudal factionism is often exaggerated, though, for it was essentially limited to the most powerful noble families. These were the ones that were busy with internal rivalries, but the vast majority of the population and even the subordinate knights really played no independent role in all that and sometimes downright resented the squabbles. An example: after the siege of Antioch every leader was busy with his own personal ambitions. But the massive response from the knightly class and common troops forced them to forget their interests and launch an attack on Jerusalem.

Anyway, personal rivalries between hing-ranking leaders were not restricted merely to medieval Europe. Much the same events were unfolding elsewhere, most chronically in the Arab world during the late 11th c. and even among the Mongols after Genghis' death. Not even the modern society is proof against such things, to name just the bitter conflicts between Patton and Montgomery or Koniev and Zhukov or Rundstedt and Rommel for that matter.

posted 09-07-2002 11:41 PM               

If the author had put more effort into his research, I would have a higher opinion. I used the word "blithely" with full intent. He goes into poetic lengths over what would happen to Mongols in a Europe full of forests due to logistical failure. He then turns around and says

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military strength was comparable to that of 13th-century France, where in theory between 285,000 and 380,000 men could have been raised for the defence of the Capetian, Plantagenet, Burgundian and Provencal territories. Logistical restrictions dictated that of these a full third, about 100,000, should have been deployable outside of France, on crusade in Italy to meet the Mongol advance, with the remainder as garrison”

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To: Tomaz

We seem to be approaching some agreement. One key issue for any Mongol strategist would be cost vs. benefit. There is a relationship between the strength of European fortresses and European martial abilities vs. the potential wealth that could be obtained by conquering this area. If Europe had been clearly weaker, its conquest might have been worth attempting. If it had been much more wealthy, the risk of defeat might not have stopped the Mongols from trying. The debatable ground, I suggest, is the relative balance between European strength vs. it wealth (or if you like, between weakness and poverty).

As far as "making room" goes, I did not suggest the Mongols would deliberately and consistently annhilate the whole population of large areas. What I suggested is that much of the livestock of Europe might have been culled, if the Mongol horses were in need of fodder. Any peasant who resisted could expect to die. After one or two villages in a district are wiped out, the remainder probably won't resist.

posted 09-08-2002 04:14 AM               

You misunderstood my comment on arms and armour. The Avars were quite definitely better armed than the Merovingian troops. The point is that the Mongols were really no better armed than the Avars while the Western Europeans of the 13th century were beter armed than their 7th-8th century predecessors.

posted 09-08-2002 08:35 AM               

Well said. In my opinion, medieval Europe was, first and foremost, much too strong militarily to justify the potential risks of an all-out invasion from the Mongol perspective. There were other, richer and oftentimes less well defended regions which were certainly easier targets.

Still, this falls a little short of an explanation of the Mongol involvement in Eastern Europe. Apparently, the Golden horde was not satisfied with the gains already made by 1240, leading to the 1241/42 raid and the subsequent squabbling over the Balkans. Particularly the latter is intriguing. The gains it brought were meager at best, yet it must still have required some fairly energetic Mongol action. One wonders why those efforts weren't directed at some other, richer regions in the immediate neighborhood - that is, unless Europe was too strongly defended to permit any "easy" conquests.

"As far as "making room" goes, I did not suggest the Mongols would deliberately and consistently annhilate the whole population of large areas. What I suggested is that much of the livestock of Europe might have been culled, if the Mongol horses were in need of fodder. Any peasant who resisted could expect to die. After one or two villages in a district are wiped out, the remainder probably won't resist."

However, if a Mongol army of any size wanted to actually make room for all the mounts, that would have called for a very thorough cleaning of the local population and livestock. Besides, culling the livestock indiscriminately would have meant a demise of the population as well, depriving them of a valuable source of food. In either case, it would have been a battle for survival.

By the way, your last statement is a dangerous generalization that cannot be backed up. Europe was not China. The Europeans were warlike people and eager to resist, particularly if the invaders were seen as infidels. Compare the Turkish incursions in the Balkans in the 15th and 16th c. The local population stationed along the border was very keen to defend itself against the bands of Turkish raiders. That kind of fighting spirit would have been a serious obstacle for the Mongols.

"I should note that the author leaves one other hole in his analysis of horses in Europe. He utterly fails to explain, how the mounted knight came to be the dominant figure (not all-powerful, but dominant) in Medieval Europe if the whole continent was so horse-unfriendly. It would seem, from his description, that infantry armies would have not only persisted, but prospered in a region so inimicable to the equine."

Well, I thought that was quite obvious. Granted, both the mounted knight and the Mongol horseman fought from horseback. But this is also where all resemblance ends. The two military systems had extremely little to do with each other.

The mounted knight, having only two or three mounts, formed a fraction of a typical medieval army. On the other hand, essentially all Mongol warriors were horsemen, routinely bringing a dozen remounts or more along. This alone points out a key difference. A 13th c. European army 30.000 men strong would have had perhaps 5 to 8.000 knights with 15 to 24.000 horses. A Mongol army of the same size would have numbered 30.000 horsemen and several hundred thousand mounts. In regard to logistics, the difference is very clear.