posted 02-15-2002 09:29 PM               

To this last I must say "Eh?". The Mongols had fully plate-armoured lancers on heavy destriers? This is news to me.

No of course not, however all all your units did not have to be so equipped to be on par with other armies of the time. The simple fact of the matter is that all of the Western army wasn't so equiped either, only the most wealthy and/or professional would have had full suits of plate and even a full suit of plate was no guarantee of victory against the Mongol. There were no huge technological advantages enjoyed by Western armies. technological advantages yes, huge one or decisive ones no.

I'm not sure it renders his knowledge of Mongol history less credible...

I am, a persons world view has a lot to do with how they interpret history (witness Tomaz or myself for that matter).

Difficult to find evidence for something that didn't happen, one way or the other. What is the "good bit of evidence" that there would have been no united defense of which you speak?

The evidence that I am referring to does not refer to what happened during a Mongol raid that as you correctly point out never happened but rather a general look at the politics of Europe during the middle ages. It's one big story of internicine warfare, squabbling, backstabbing etc. There is no evidence that this would have all suddenly stopped when confronted by an outside threat. It didn't happen during the Viking invasions, it didn't happen during the crusades so I'm not sure how it can be concluded that when faced with the Mongols everyone was going to play nice. They sure didn't bother to help out their easter neighbors. What was the dividing line that said after they attack "XXXXX" we will suddenly unite and throw out the invaders?

To be sure, speculation that the Mongols would have "divided and conquered" is as valid as the opposite view, but both are still speculations, no?

Sure, this whole debate is completely speculative, however I believe that my viewpoint is better supported by the actual events that did take place.

Do we in fact know that they consciously did this? Were they fully aware of the scope of the threat and affirmatively decided to sacrifice eastern Europe, or did they perhaps either not know or not understand completely what was happening ( in an era of slow, difficult communication and intelligence-gathering )? And if so, can we assume they'd have done the same when the threat was in their own back yard, so to speak?

No we don't know that, but neither do we know that the French wouldn't have unconsciously let the hated Germans get clobbered by the Mongols or some Germans let other Germans get clobbered by the Mongols. In fact that seems more likely.

Triton - Oh boy... So we're still where we started?
Pretty much. So far as I can tell you've not really mentioned anything really compelling. Felix on the other hand...

I'm afraid you aren't particularly fond of intelligently discussing matters. Developing a siege mentality and dismissing every new argument that runs contrary to your belief with vague statements and silly overgeneralizations isn't a very effective way of presenting your opinion.

It would seem that makes two of us if that is the case. So far as I can tell you have completely dismissed every other arguement presented because it does not coincide with your world view. Your perogative of course but hardly what I'd call a reasoned scholarly approach. Calling me unintelligent because I don't agree with what your saying although no doubt very ego satisfying doesn't make you any more likely to be correct. I'm very sorry that I've wasted your valuable time. Or not.

I thought we had discussed this matter in enough detail to show that Ogadai's death can't possibly have been the cause of the Mongol halt in Hungary, quite simply because that halt took place 8 months before Ogadai's death and about 10 months before the news of his death reached the Balkans.

No, we were discussing why the Mongols didn't come back far more then we were discussing that one raid.

Instead of resorting to demagogism and dilettantism, let's operate with facts, please.
I really doubt that would do you much good, you seem to be quite capable of knowing the facts and still spinning your own theories anyway.

Based on the hints we do have at hand, I think it's fair to say that chances of Germany or perhaps even a coalition of France and Germany successfully fighting against the Mongols would've been fairly high. Anti-Mongol sentiments were certainly there.

Based on the history that did happen I'd say there was a better chance that someone might have seen an opportunity presented by Mongol invasions and taken it.

And Western Europe was capable of united military effort against aggressive infidels. Two such examples - both of them brilliant failures mainly due to the initial overzealousness and the subsequent loss of interest after the defeat - were Nicopolis and Mohacs, both fought against the Turks.

Proof that Europe could band together and defeat the Mongols consists of two defeats at the hands of the Turks?

And to answer your suggestion: an alliance signed between France and the Mongols against the German empire would've been an extremely unlikely move.

Perhaps, although it didn't stop the Russians, however the French deciding to take advantage of a German Empire fighting the Mongols is an extremely likely move or for that matter Germans taking advantage of Mongols attacking other Germans was also an extremely likely move.

France surely wouldn't have wanted to replace one great opponent - the German empire - with an even more dangerous one - a Mongol empire stretching from southern Russia to the Rhine.

Oh I don't know if the French armies were capable of defeating the Mongols on their own why couldn't they do it after the Mongols kicked the crap out of the Germans?

This is new to me. So it was the Mongols who destroyed Outremer?
No it was some other Saracen "horse archers." Oh except the Mamelukes weren't horse archers. I guess that they wore full plate... No? Come to think of it I don't think they did. Wait, the Mongols weren't trained for close quarters combat... or were they?

First of all, Poland and Hungary were two independent, sovereign states. And independent states must generally take care of themselves.
Except that everyone was going to band together to throw out the Mongols... er no wait they were soveriegn independent states that must take care of themselves... no wait...

Third, unlike you, I'm not saying I know what would have happened in case of a Mongol invasion of Western Europe. Consequently, I can't tell whether France and the German empire would've united their strength. However, I don't think any such coalition would've been necessary to halt the Mongols. The resources and military potential available to Frederick II were great and when employed correctly, they should've sufficed to stop a steppe army the size of the Golden Horde. Hungary seems to have almost achieved that very same goal with much more limited resources.

I don't believe I have said that I know what would have happened rather I have said what I think would likely have happened. However if I said the former I was incorrect and should have said the latter.

Perhaps the Mongols were no serious threat to Western Europe in 1241...

Well as it turned out that was exactly correct but there is no way they could have known that at the time.

Western Europe viewed the Mongols with antipathy.

There is nothing to say that would not have continued as the states of Europe fell one by one.

I think we are about done here, I think we are going in circles a bit.

posted 02-16-2002 01:06 AM            

quote:

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Originally posted by Triton2:

The simple fact of the matter is that all of the Western army wasn't so equiped either, only the most wealthy and/or professional would have had full suits of plate and even a full suit of plate was no guarantee of victory against the Mongol.

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Did they have the equivalent of the fully mailed knight on a heavy destrier, then? The sort of heavy cavalry that swept everything in Europe and the Holy Land before it for a number of centuries? What exactly WAS the panoply, mounting and tactics of the Mongol heavy cavalry?

quote:

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a persons world view has a lot to do with how they interpret history (witness Tomaz or myself for that matter).

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We'd better stop reading history, then, because I doubt that the author without opinions, biases and a world view ever lived...and we cannot know how that may have colored their theories. However, empirical fact is still empirical fact, even if reported by a loon or a dunce; those at least are easy enough to check, to make sure they aren't concocted or altered to slant a conclusion. That's why I don't worry too much about an author's, er, eccentricities, only about his credentials and his logic...

quote:

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The evidence that I am referring to does not refer to what happened during a Mongol raid that as you correctly point out never happened but rather a general look at the politics of Europe during the middle ages. It's one big story of internicine warfare, squabbling, backstabbing etc. There is no evidence that this would have all suddenly stopped when confronted by an outside threat. It didn't happen during the Viking invasions, it didn't happen during the crusades

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True enough, although political conditions were somewhat different during the time of the Norse incursions, and even the high Crusading period. It wouldn't have needed what we'd think of as "cooperation", anyway, only that they all fight the same enemy independently, and defend their own territories...

Oops, gotta go. More anon ( perhaps ).

posted 02-16-2002 07:04 PM               

There is a moderate sized Afghan refugee population here in California, so I have had a chance to listen to interviews with these people. They seem to believe that their country has been very severely damaged, even if you don’t believe it. My interest is in whether the Mongols could have inflicted such severe damage to Europe. That kind of damage, and the possible repercussions in the history of the West, does not require several generations of Mongol rule over France, England, Italy, etc.

Re the losses at Mohi: please provide the sources that indicate the Mongols did indeed suffer severe losses – aside from your interpretation of their subsequent actions. Those actions can be interpreted is more than one way. I have been thinking about this battle, and do not see when the Mongols would have suffered crippling losses. The initial action was the Hungarian attack on the Mongol bridgehead on the Sajo river. The Mongol force that was defeated was presumably a small part of the Mongol force. If it was the major part, then you must concede that the second half of the battle was a victory of a small part of the Mongols over the whole Hungarian force. So, a fraction (1/3, ¼, perhaps?) was driven out of the bridgehead. It does not seem that they were totally destroyed, because of two things: to totally destroy a mostly light cavalry force which is retreating, there must be a thorough pursuit, and there is no indication that a significant pursuit force went chasing the defeated Mongols; second, the Hungarians do not seem to have had control of both banks of the Sajo river when the outflanking Mongol force arrived. If they had had full control of the opposite bank of the Sajo, the Hungarians could have withdrawn across the river and avoided destruction. Since the Hungarians didn’t try to retreat across the river, that path of retreat must have been closed. Therefore, the Mongol bridgehead force cannot have been totally destroyed.

So, the Mongol bridgehead force was driven across the Sajo, and the second Mongol force then appears behind, and mostly surrounds the Hungarians. The Mongols then attack. I do not see how the Mongols suffered severe losses while conducting a successful assault upon the Hungarians from two (or three) sides. As you know, the vast majority of casualties in battle are suffered when the losers are routed, and the Mongols were not routed. Furthermore, as lighter cavalry than most of the Hungarians, they could not have been successfully slaughtered unless (as above) there was a very vigorous pursuit. So when does the victorious second portion of the Mongol force suffer crippling losses?

About the warfare in Outremer, I have two observations. First, the Crusaders promptly split into four separate states, if I recall correctly: Jerusalem, Antioch, Tripoli, and Edessa. They did not always maintain the same policy; and there are examples of discord: the dissension over strategy before Hattin, which Smail discusses in some detail; and the actions of Renaud de Chataillon, whose attacks on the Muslim pilgrims to Mecca precipitated the catastrophic war with Saladin. Second, the much discussed ability of the Frankish armies to resist Saracen forces did not guarantee that they could defeat the Muslim armies, just that the Franks might not lose. The issue I hope we are discussing is whether or not the Europeans could drive the Mongols out, without suffering great damage. Being able to march close to a Mongol army is not guarantee of being able to destroy it.

(Marshal, I know you will understand the next point). The confrontations of the U.S. military with the nomadic Plains Indians clearly showed that being to march through the region of the nomads was not related to defeating them. It also showed that infantry-heavy forces vs. nomad light cavalry was not a winning formula. It was when large numbers (usually vastly superior numbers) of more-or-less equally mobile US cavalry were deployed for long periods that the nomads could be beaten. Of course, a Mongol force was not traveling with its women and children or herds. Also, if they were being chased about Europe, they would have been looting and killing Europeans the whole time.

Concerning Persia after the Peloponnesian war, what you (Tomaz) show is that the Persians could manipulate the Greek states against each other. It does not show that Persia could itself beaten either the Spartans or the Athenians. You might as well argue that since the Ottomans in the 19th c. could play off Western Europe and Austria against the Russians, that Turkey was still a great military power.

About the Europeans hating the Mongols: this no doubt is why St. Louis sent an embassy to the “King of the Tatars” searching for an alliance against the Muslims. (from Joinville) That action also implies that Louis IX thought the Tatars would be useful allies. He didn’t despise their military worth.

quote:

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Poland and Hungary sure are great places to learn about Western European geography and key communication routes.

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quote:

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Western Europe didn't feel obliged to assist the Poles and Hungarians

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About the Mongols pulling back, it should be pointed out that the retreat of an army can be due to circumstances back home. Two examples: Hernan Cortez invaded Mexico despite the authorities in Cuba. A force was sent to capture him and bring him back. If they had succeeded, would that have proven the Mexican warriors superiority to the Spaniards? In 1762, Frederick the Great was almost annihilated: his control of Prussia was confined to the camp his remaining forces occupied, and the whole country overrun. The Tsarina Elisabeth died. Her heir, Peter, was an admirer of Frederick, and switched sides, saving the house of Hohenzollern. This was not due to any prowess of the Prussian army, but a matter of pure deus ex machina. (Ruler in the East dies, the maruading Eastern armies miraculously stop their devastation. Sounds familiar? )

To: Marshal

You are right, the Mongols didn’t have plate-armored lancers on heavy destriers. On the other hand, in 1241 no European had plate armor, and their steeds may not have been as heavy as they were later. In the "semi-rigid armor" thread, Tomaz has been making the point that (Mongol) lamellar was superior to mail.

One last note:

quote:

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A Franco-Mongol alliance would also have contradicted common sense

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during the subsequent great infidel invasion of Europe, it should be recalled that the ally of the Ottomans while they surrounded Vienna was His Most Catholic Majesty, the King of France. So much for hating infidels, or France helping to defend the HRE.

posted 02-17-2002 10:48 AM               

Another case of a winning army pulling back: Napoleon's first Italian campaign. I hope everyone will agree that the Army of Italy was not defeated by the Austrians. It is also well known that this army was in rags and half-starved when it started; for the men, plunder was necessary to stay alive. However, after smashing every Austrian force thrown against him, Napoleon moved into the Austro-Italian border, stopped, concluded a truce (later the treaty of Campo Formio) with the Austrians, and turned around. This was not due to any triumph of Austrian arms.

And then there is the experience of India facing Alexander the Great. From the point of view of an Indian prince on the Ganges, what he saw was a strange foreign army, which destroyed the vast Persian empire, subdued Bactria, entered into India, and crushed Porus on the Hydaspes. This army then turns around, goes home by another route, and are never heard from again. The resemblance to 1241 is striking. Of course, since we know about it from the Macedonian point of view, we are told that, regardless of the fabulous wealth of India, the Macedonians were homesick. Homesick! I haven't dared mention that reason for the Mongols not to advance; knowing the sarcasm and scorn that would be heaped upon it. Of course, you can try and make the case that Porus crippled the Macedonian army, but it will be difficult.

Re Crusader unity, I did stumble across the passage from Smail about the cohesion of the barons under the King of Jerusalem. I believe that Smail is referring to the battlefield and march cohesion, not necessarily to political cohesion. In turn, I would like to cite Maalouf's The Crusades through Arab Eyes:

quote:

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at the beginning of October 1108...two opposing armies offered an unusual spectacle.
In one camp stood Tancred of Antioch, ringed by fifteen hundred Frankish knights and foot soldiers...Alongside them stood six hundred long-haired turkish cavalry sent from Aleppo by Ridwan.
In the other camp stood Jawali, the emir of Mosul...His army was composed of two thousand men divided into three battalions: Arabs on the left, Turks on the right, and in the centre Frnakish knights, among the Baldwin of Edessa...

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The 8 month Mongol stay in Hungary may be puzzling if the Mongols were truly victorious, but it is idiotic if they were crippled. Not only would the Austrians, Bohemians, and Various Italian states all have be too stupid to realize the Mongols were beatable (and attack either singly or together), but the Mongols would have to be too stupid to realize they are 3/4 encircled by superior, unbeaten foes. The motivation for the europeans attacking have already been put forth: "hatred of infidels", not to mention it is always better to conduct a war on someone else's turf, liberating all of the loot the Mongols have gathered, the virtues of a preemptive strike. The motive for the Mongols leaving early is straightforward: light cavalry retreat better than any other force, and would have time to take all their plunder with them. For a group of nomads to be severely damaged, then sit around for 8 months waiting to be clobbered again (and deprived of their loot) would be completely inexplicable.

posted 02-18-2002 11:57 AM               

Gentlemen, this thread is a quagmire of cross-posts, and has gotten so convoluted that I'm going to take this statement as essentially true.

If it is, there's a pretty simple answer. They DID come back, and Ladislas "the Cuman" stomped their asses flat.

I have to go back and re-read all of this, as I'm entirely uncertain why I'm reading discussions of plate armor and the like in a thread on the Mongol invasions...
-----edit begins----
Okay, have rechecked the thread...

1. Fortifications: the Hungarian experience showed that the Mongols could easily overwhelm fortifications on low terrain, or made of wood, but large stone fortifications on hilltops proved resistant.

The Magyars were indeed behind at castle-building, and their dominant defensive military strategy was to suck an invader into the country's interior, using their superior mobility and inherently shorter supply lines to nibble and ambush the invader to death once there... tactics obviously not suited to campaigning against the Mongols, but which had been quite successful against western incursions.

2. Western Europe was perfectly willing to let the Magyars and Poles get flattened. It was familial ties, a lull in the Hundred Years' War, and his hallmark extremely shrewd diplomacy, that allowed Sigismund of Luxembourg to generate sufficient interest that a crusade could be preached.

3. Methodologically speaking, it is a serious error to equate gear to military success or failure, except in obviously egregious circumstances. In some terrain, heavy equipment and strong fortifications is the proper first step to success: in the more open terrain that characterizes much of east-central and eastern Europe, such factors become militarily irrelevant if light, fast horsemen succeed in raiding one's economy to death. Killing the enemy's soldiers is handy, but thrashing his food supply while choking him with refugees is a good way to guarantee that you don't have to, and that it'll be a lot easier if you do.

posted 02-18-2002 12:54 PM               

The point I was trying to make was that Afghanistan of the 70s was not exactly a paradise. It may have been a popular stop on the Hippie trail, but it was not exactly a thriving country. Undoubtedly the two decades of war did bring great carnage and destruction. However, I think it would be erroneous to claim that it was solely the Soviet invasion that caused all the trouble. The price paid by the Afghan people in that war was enormous, just as one would expect from a third-world country fighting against a superpower. But what ultimately caused even more suffering was the civil war that broke out after the Soviet withdrawal. I think the Afghan strategy against the Soviet invaders was successful; while seemingly costly, it brought strategic victory against an infinitely more powerful enemy. No conventional strategy could ever achieve that goal.

"My interest is in whether the Mongols could have inflicted such severe damage to Europe. That kind of damage, and the possible repercussions in the history of the West, does not require several generations of Mongol rule over France, England, Italy, etc."

I think this is a flawed parallel from start. You're trying to explain the conflict between the Mongols and Europe with the conflict between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. But I don't think anyone would dare to speak in favor of such a bold comparison. The Soviet Union was a far bigger country than Afghanistan. It had almost limitless resources at hand, including advanced technology far surpassing anything available to the Afghans. There never was any such disparity between medieval Europe and the Mongols. For all the Mongol expertise in strategy, strict discipline and total commitment, they were heavily outnumbered against the population of Europe and were not on any higher technological level (more like the opposite was the truth). This is why I think any further debate in that direction would be quite moot.

"Re the losses at Mohi: please provide the sources that indicate the Mongols did indeed suffer severe losses – aside from your interpretation of their subsequent actions."

I've already provided the sources (see my post from 02-08-2002). Please check your books for any detailed description of the battle. One of the best sources in English as far as Mohi is concerned is the US Army field manual 3-90 Tactics (Chapter 13, Reconaissance).

It's evident from your post that your understanding of the battle contradicts the evidence, so I'll try to address this issue once again. What we're told is that the Mongols split their force in two parts. One part (probably the larger one, albeit this is by no means sure - FM 3-90 implies it comprised two thirds of the entire force) was sent to cross the river some distance to the north. For one reason or another, the Mongols decided to build an improvised bridge there (maybe the river didn't permit safe fording?), which may have slowed down their advance considerably. The second part (probably the smaller one - one third?) remained near the bridge on the east bank.

At this point, the Hungarians were encamped on the west bank but appear to have taken control of the bridge and a small bridgehead on the east bank. On the next morning, the remainder of the Mongol force overran the Hungarian bridgehead on the east bank, crossed the bridge and attacked the Hungarian camp on the west bank. In the battle the Hungarians were initially victorious until the second part of the Mongol force arrived with some 2-hour delay.

I'm not at all implying that the Mongol force was "totally destroyed". It's clear the Mongols won the battle tactically. They inflicted very heavy casualties on the Hungarian army and eventually routed it. However, it's also apparent that the Mongol plan wasn't executed properly. The timing was incorrect. The smaller part of the Mongol force was committed to batle too quickly and was very hard-pressed by the Hungarians. It must've taken heavy casualties as it was caught between the river and the Hungarian army (perhaps the least desirable situation a medieval commander could think of). The only route of escape was the bridge - but it's very difficult for a large army, even if just light cavalry, to escape through such a narrow corridor in time.

The arrival of the second part of the Mongol army was of course decisive. However, I believe the evidence at hand makes it quite clear that the victory was hard-won. We don't have the exact bodycount and any attempts to estimate the number of losses on the Mongol side are inevitably speculative. It was the smaller Mongol contingent that took most casualties - it seems it was almost destroyed in the fighting. If we accept that this contingent formed about one third of the entire force, the overall Mongol losses may have approached one third of the army. This is a very substantial figure for an army so far from home, with little chance to receive reinforcements quickly.

"About the warfare in Outremer, I have two observations. First, the Crusaders promptly split into four separate states, if I recall correctly: Jerusalem, Antioch, Tripoli, and Edessa. They did not always maintain the same policy; and there are examples of discord: the dissension over strategy before Hattin, which Smail discusses in some detail; and the actions of Renaud de Chataillon, whose attacks on the Muslim pilgrims to Mecca precipitated the catastrophic war with Saladin."

Of course, but the fact remains that the first six kings of Jerusalem were generally able to unite the crusader states to respond to a common threat. Whenever one of the states was invaded, the king would summon all available forces to assist.

There were several instances when crusader states fought each other. Edessa and Antioch under Tancred and Balduin were particularly notorious. However, it should be noted that neither of the two states involved was of significant meaning to the cause of the Crusades. the states of Edessa and Antioch were formed largely as a private enterprise. They did not have the (religious) importance of Jerusalem and were essentially semi-independent. Allying oneself with a local Saracen ruler was never a particulary popular move in Outremer because it was invariably seen as a shameful act. There were noblemen who broke that rule for personal gain, but never for a cause that could openly threaten the existence of the Kingdom of Jerusalem.

To quote Smail:

"The sources of recruitment just surveyed provided the armies which were among the main foundations of latin power in Syria. At the same time they engendered certain weaknesses in military organization which reduced the effectiveness of the Franks in warfare, and which must be considered here.
No Christian ruler of the twelfth century had an army at his disposal which met his needs in full. In most parts of Europe knight service was, by feudal custom, limited in duration and even, on occasion, confined to a certain territory. Thus circumscribed, it served the purposes of raiding and private warfare far more effectively than those of protracted campaigns fought on a large scale. the arriere ban, or any form of popular levy, however useful in a crisis, was unsuitable for normal requirements, since it produced troops who were likely to be inexperienced and ill equipped. Mercenaries had none of these defects. They were often seasoned veterans who would serve for as long as they received pay or could reasonably expect it ; but the organization of such a force in any strength and for a prolonged period imposed too severe a strain on the rudimentary financial organization of the medieval state.
Most of these weaknesses were apparent in Latin Syria, and modern historians have emphasized as well that the Frankish rulers, and in particular the kings of Jerusalem, did not enjoy full authority as commanders of their military forces. So far as the twelfth century goes, this point has been overstressed. Dodu quotes in support of it a number of occasions on which the kings of Jerusalem failed to control ruling princes and magnates from western Europe who brought forces to fight in Syria for a season at the side of the Franks. La Monte refers as well to the Templars' refusal to co-operate with Amalric in his invasion of Egypt.
These examples show only that the Latin kings lacked control in particular circumstances. Distinguished pilgrims were not, after all, bound in subjection to them, and the military Orders only to a limited extent. Dodu quotes no instance of Latin rulers failing to control their own vassals in war. There were such occasions, and the absence of effective military leadership was especially evident during the five years which culminated in the tragedy of Hattin. But this was a period during which Baldwin IV was overcome by the progress of his leprosity, and was succeeded first by an infant and then by a sister. Problems of regency and succession bred faction and so reduced royal authority. Viewed against the background of the three preceding generations, the defiance encountered by Guy de Lusignan was an exception. As a rule the first six kings of Jerusalem seem to have enjoyed a full measure of authority over feudal and military forces, and this is borne out by the analysis of military events in the following chapter. It remains true, however, that they had not the same command over pilgrims and the military Orders. To that extent they were handicapped in war by lack of control."

- R.C. Smail, Crusading Warfare, p. 97-98

"Second, the much discussed ability of the Frankish armies to resist Saracen forces did not guarantee that they could defeat the Muslim armies, just that the Franks might not lose."

And as long as the Franks survived, they were the winners in Outremer. This is an effective defensive strategy when facing a stronger enemy. Sun Tzu himself discusses it at length. As long as the Franks maintained their army in the field, they could shadow the Saracen force, minimizing the damage done to the countryside. The Franks were also able to raise sieges if necessary, preventing the Saracens from gaining secure foothold in the country. Fighting a pitched battle was generally not desirable as a failure could bring utter devastation and victory would've meant only temporary gain. By the end of the year it was always the Saracens who needed to retreat. As long as the Franks sticked to that strategy, they were able to keep the much stronger enemy at bay. It was exactly the kind of limited war so common in the middle ages.

"The issue I hope we are discussing is whether or not the Europeans could drive the Mongols out, without suffering great damage. Being able to march close to a Mongol army is not guarantee of being able to destroy it."

You don't need to destroy the opponent's army in battle to win a war. Shadowing the opposing army could bring very real benefits. One such relevant example was the Hundred Years War. By evading pitched battles and constantly staying near the English army, the French were able to defeat the chevauchee strategy in a very economical manner. Consequently, the English offensives soon ran out of steam due to logistical problems and low morale. A similar approach could work even better against the Mongols due to logistical constraints. The Mongols would've needed to gain foothold quickly due to limited grazing required for their horses. By using an evasive strategy, European armies could prevent the Mongols from securing any major victories, thus forcing them to withdraw.

"The confrontations of the U.S. military with the nomadic Plains Indians clearly showed that being to march through the region of the nomads was not related to defeating them."

How does this pertain to our discussion? Medieval Europe was not a region of the nomads. In fact, it was densely populated and not at all suitable to the steppe nomad tactics.

"Concerning Persia after the Peloponnesian war, what you (Tomaz) show is that the Persians could manipulate the Greek states against each other. It does not show that Persia could itself beaten either the Spartans or the Athenians. You might as well argue that since the Ottomans in the 19th c. could play off Western Europe and Austria against the Russians, that Turkey was still a great military power."

I'm afraid this doesn't make any sense at all. Just when did the Ottomans play off Western Europe against Russia? I really wouldn't want to discuss this in detail because it has nothing to do with the main topic, but the Ottoman empire was by the 19th c. (and even about a hundred years before that) merely a toy in hands of the major European powers. It definitely wasn't the Ottomans who dictated European foreign policy. If anything, they were the victim of it. And the ones who really played off Russia against Austria were the Serbs...

"About the Europeans hating the Mongols: this no doubt is why St. Louis sent an embassy to the “King of the Tatars” searching for an alliance against the Muslims."

But you're missing the whole point - King Louis toyed with the idea of a Franco-Mongol alliance against the Muslims, not fellow Europeans. It makes a world of difference. The Middle East far far from Europe and any major Mongol territorial expansion there wouldn't have been of immediate concern to the safety of Europe. But what would the poor Louis think of the Mongols conquering the neighbouring lands of the German empire? Not to mention that while he may have thought about an alliance with the Mongols, he never signed any such treaty.

"It is perfectly possible to learn about a country without walking there oneself."

Your point here is self-contradictory. If you can learn about a country without walking there yourself, why on Earth did the Mongols attack Eastern Europe if reconaissance was their goal?

Napoleon's example is also a very poor one. By 19th c. any library of some size had detailed maps of Europe, making planning much easier. During the mid-13th c. few people were well travelled and even fewer had access to the rudimentary (read useless) maps of the day. And I can't see how the Cumans might've been so beneficial to the Mongol cause. They may have originated from the steppe, but that certainly didn't make them natural allies of the Mongols. If anything, the Cumans were quite hostile against the Mongol raiders and generally not willing to assist them.

"In the "semi-rigid armor" thread, Tomaz has been making the point that (Mongol) lamellar was superior to mail."

No need to place words in my mouth, Felix. We were discussing the relative merits of lamellar and mail, but never came to decide which was inherently better. Lamellar is certainly better in some respects than mail, but it has deficiencies as well. And what's more important, how many Mongol combatants were anything like fully armored? The proportion of lightly armored or unarmored troops seems to have been dangerously high.

"during the subsequent great infidel invasion of Europe, it should be recalled that the ally of the Ottomans while they surrounded Vienna was His Most Catholic Majesty, the King of France. So much for hating infidels, or France helping to defend the HRE."

What you're ignoring here is that Europe in 1529 was very different from Europe in 1241. The Turco-French alliance in 1529 was possible because the Habsburg empire had expanded to enormous proportions by the early 16th c., encompassing almost the entire continental Europe with the exception of France. The Habsburgs were at the peak of their power and busy fighting the French. France was in a fairly desperate situation, badly needing allies. The Ottomans were simply the only option. Moreover, while the Ottomans were infidels they were no longer a truly serious global threat to Europe by that stage. Ironically, they won some of the greatest territorial gains with the battle of Mohacs and the following campaigns in Hungary, but that was as far as they could come. Further north lay the Austrian empire, which was becoming an increasingly powerful entity.

The situation in 1241 was very much different. The struggle between France and the Empire was latent. There was no immediate danger of the Empire swallowing France in its expansion. And moreover, the Mongols were a largely unknown enemy whose military capabilities were still shrouded in mystery. For these reasons I don't think the parallel to the Viennese War of 1529 is of particular help to our debate.

"The 8 month Mongol stay in Hungary may be puzzling if the Mongols were truly victorious, but it is idiotic if they were crippled. Not only would the Austrians, Bohemians, and Various Italian states all have be too stupid to realize the Mongols were beatable (and attack either singly or together), but the Mongols would have to be too stupid to realize they are 3/4 encircled by superior, unbeaten foes."

If the Mongols were indeed superior, unbeaten and had encircled the afforementioned parts of the German empire on three quarters of the border, one would expect the superior Mongols to swiftly strike and occupy those lands defended by our inferior Untermensch ancestors. As a matter of fact, I find it strange that Batu didn't mercifully depose the German emperor and king of France, bringing the primitive Europeans under the enlightened Mongol rule.

"The motivation for the europeans attacking have already been put forth: "hatred of infidels", not to mention it is always better to conduct a war on someone else's turf, liberating all of the loot the Mongols have gathered, the virtues of a preemptive strike."

Seriously, though - you're seeing the matter from modern perspective, not to mention the advantage of hindsight. Medieval European rulers did not necessarily think in terms of modern strategy, preemptive strikes and global balance. Hatred of infidels was great for propaganda, but it wasn't sufficient in itself to mobilize the armies of Europe for some abstract goal. It's quite natural for a country that doesn't feel immediately threatened to wait instead of launching preemptive strikes (not all rulers act like Mr. Bush ). War is always a risky business. An offensive war even more so. The medieval military organization was developed for defense rather than offense as that quote from Smail nicely explains. There were no truly compelling reasons for the armies of the German empire to go on the offensive without even being provoked to fight. Medieval rulers sometimes had trouble gathering their men to fight a defensive war. An offensive war was even far less desirable.

"The motive for the Mongols leaving early is straightforward: light cavalry retreat better than any other force, and would have time to take all their plunder with them. For a group of nomads to be severely damaged, then sit around for 8 months waiting to be clobbered again (and deprived of their loot) would be completely inexplicable."

I don't quite know what to think of this. If the Mongols wished to retreat early, why did they wait for 10 months? You're now implying their main objective was plunder. So we're back to that old question: if plunder was really what they were after, why didn't the Mongols choose to raid the richer parts of Europe?

posted 02-18-2002 08:48 PM            

quote:

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Originally posted by Felix:

About the warfare in Outremer, I have two observations. First, the Crusaders promptly split into four separate states, if I recall correctly: Jerusalem, Antioch, Tripoli, and Edessa. They did not always maintain the same policy; and there are examples of discord

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Naturally enough, that is true. I cannot think of any time or situation in which the rulers of disparate peoples with different agendas acted in perfect harmony. Rivalries and personal animosities and selfishness were the rule rather than the exception. This doesn't vitiate the fact that the various Frankish peoples were able to cooperate closely enough to "get the job done", as it were. When you have French, German and English armies all marching together over the great distances necessary for a Crusade, even if the national forces kept to themselves and their leaders were often at odds, this is still a remarkable thing. When they then live together in a far foreign land that they have conquered, even though separated into the feudal states they were accustomed to in Europe, and still come together in self-defense when necessary, this is even more remarkable...and shows I think that self-preservation is a powerful incentive to "hanging together to avoid hanging separately". Could they have repeated this feat in the face of the Mongol threat? Perhaps, perhaps not---but I do not think we can dismiss the idea as an impossibility...

quote:

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]b]
Second, the much discussed ability of the Frankish armies to resist Saracen forces did not guarantee that they could defeat the Muslim armies, just that the Franks might not lose. The issue I hope we are discussing is whether or not the Europeans could drive the Mongols out, without suffering great damage.[/b]

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As Tomaz says, simply not losing is often as good as winning, in the long run. How many battles and armies did Rome lose during the second Punic War? Yet ultimately, despite his genius and his superlative army, Hannibal could not win---he could not take all of the fortified cities with the forces at his disposal; he could not hold them if he could have taken them; he could not be reinforced or resupplied sufficiently from the great distance to Carthage. All the Romans had to do was outlast his depredations ( and had generals such as Quintus Fabius Maximus been trusted further their losses would have been far lighter and their occupation ended earlier ). I think this situation has some striking parallels to the discussion at hand---both in regard to the Europeans conducting a war of attrition against the invading Mongols and in regard to the Frankish situation in Outremer ( where they were in the role of the Carthaginians, albeit they occupied part of the Holy Land and lasted there for generations ).

I thought we were in fact discussing only the question of whether the Mongols could have been frustrated in their invasion. Certainly they could have wrought a great deal of havoc, militarily and socially. It might even be that they could have done to Europe what they did to China...but I'm dubious. As we've agreed, this is all conjecture either way. But I'd still have to second Tomaz's skepticism about whether the Mongols were the perfect invincible warriors some insist they were...just as I would never say that defeat would never have come to Alexander had his army not mutinied but continued on with him to who knows where.

quote:

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The confrontations of the U.S. military with the nomadic Plains Indians clearly showed that being to march through the region of the nomads was not related to defeating them.

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Yes, but I'm not clear on the point you're making here. This would seem to apply more to a putative invasion by the Europeans of the Mongol lands, no?

quote:

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It also showed that infantry-heavy forces vs. nomad light cavalry was not a winning formula.

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Not on the Plains ( or the Eurasian steppes ), certainly: mobility is key. However, the number of US troops that successfully took, held and gradually expanded federal control of the Indian Territories was tiny in comparison to the number of native peoples in those territories. In fact this could be better used, I think, to support your points about the difficulties of uniting disparate, squabbling peoples against an invader---for it was only when the Plains Indians managed this feat that they won significant military victories, as at Little Bighorn.

But there were social and technological factors at play in the conquest of the American West that differ greatly from the situation we're discussing here---the Plains Indians, for instance, were not a militaristic people as we would think of them. Their "wars" often consisted of counting coup or stealing horses, not of killing large numbers of their enemies or of taking land. Their ordnance was almost always vastly inadequate compared to that of their enemies. Their numbers, though greater locally, were not great enough to stem the tide of immigration from Europe. Etc...

quote:

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[/b]
It was when large numbers (usually vastly superior numbers) of more-or-less equally mobile US cavalry were deployed for long periods that the nomads could be beaten.[/b]

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Yes, although the soldiery very often dismounted to fight when it came to it. I disagree about the "vastly superior numbers", though---it's my understanding that the truth was closer to the reverse. The Little Bighorn campaign, for instance, a major offensive, employed rather few troops in comparison to the Indian Nation's available forces ( a situation exacerbated by the fragmenting of the US Army units )...

quote:

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Of course, a Mongol force was not traveling with its women and children or herds. Also, if they were being chased about Europe, they would have been looting and killing Europeans the whole time.

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True enough, and I would expect any such incursions to have created significant damage to the areas in which they moved---and no doubt defeats of the European forces. But would they have been able to defeat them ALL, and overcome all of the relevant fortifications, and HOLD the ground they took? Again, I am dubious.

posted 02-18-2002 09:15 PM            

quote:

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Originally posted by Tomaz:
Triton - While there are still many relevant issues that need to be discussed, you're obviously not fit for a serious debate. Therefore, I must respectfully decline to continue our discourse on such ground.

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I must respectfully submit Tomaz, that while you may regard this debate as of some importance, I believe that what is of utmost importance are the folks here in this room.

NetSword members.

In my opinion, you've treated one of them rather shabbily.

And I'm disappointed that Marshal chose to continue the conversation without acknowledging the elephant in the room.

Frankly, I think the Mongols and Europeans can get along very well without us.

But the integrity of the board is another matter.

posted 02-18-2002 09:40 PM            

quote:

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You are right, the Mongols didn’t have plate-armored lancers on heavy destriers. On the other hand, in 1241 no European had plate armor, and their steeds may not have been as heavy as they were later.

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You are right, of course. It goes to show how scant and fuzzyis my knowledge of the Mongol invasion---I even got the era wrong!

However, in my defense I will point out that isolated items of plate, such as schynbalds, primitive coudes, and ( depending upon whether period depictions shoe quilted textile/leather or metal ) even cuisses with poleyns begin to appear in the very last years of the 12th century. Then there are those mysterious iron breastplates supposedly worn under the hauberk even earlier.

By 1241 I think that we are into the so-called Transition Period with regard to armour, albeit in the case of some items the first surviving examples are a decade or two in the future.

Anyway, I will rephrase: did the Mongols have troops equivalent to the knight in mail from head to foot, with iron helm and shield and perhaps some few of these new plate defenses, on their large destriers?

( The destrier too was not of the size it was ultimately to reach...but I think in terms of armour-to-weight ratio there was still a very great disparity. )

Re your point about later Crusader forces fighting alongside Saracens on opposing sides, this is the telling point, I think:

quote:

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This was less than ten years after the fall of Jerusalem.

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At this time ( post-Hattin ) the Crusader kingdoms were in very deep trouble indeed, and were doing whatever they could to cling on in the absence of reinforcements to restore their depleted numbers. The milieu in which I was talking of Frankish unity was during their earlier, successful period, when armies of all nationalities marched together to the Holy Land, a journey of months if things went well, fought together, conquered together and only later fell to carving up fiefdoms ( though even here there was no real argument as to who should be overall suzerain, King of Jerusalem---and no factions stubbornly insisting on "a Frenchman", "a German", etc. ).

posted 02-18-2002 09:50 PM            

quote:

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Originally posted by Sikandur:

In my opinion, you've treated one of them rather shabbily.

And I'm disappointed that Marshal chose to continue the conversation without acknowledging the elephant in the room.

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Umm, Sikandur, I'm not sure which elephant you're talking about.

I have merely been about answering arguments addressed at me, whether from Felix, Triton, or whoever. As far as the courtesy issue goes, I tend to let people fight their own battles, as I fight mine; for instance, Tomaz and I have had some sharp things to say to each other in the past. That is water under the bridge at this point, though. If I haven't leapt to Triton's defense, it's because I consider him perfectly capable of doing so himself, as I'm sure he'll be along to do presently, and quite capably.

If it's some other elephant you mean, can you be more specific? I have been known to miss the ocasional subtlety.

posted 02-18-2002 10:25 PM            

The question is: Why should he have to?

If Tomaz had attacked his argument, I would have had no problem.

But this wasn't the case.

posted 02-19-2002 08:12 AM               

Triton's last post was rude enough to justify a response much harsher than mine. I'm pretty sure most people would have responded in a more inflammatory manner than I did. I believe my reply was sufficiently courteous; it was certainly not my intention to arouse hostilities.

As every forumite, I have the right not to continue a fruitless debate. The exchange of thoughts between Triton and me obviously wasn't going in the right direction. I've tried to present my views in the clearest way I could, supporting them with real evidence instead of gross generalizations. But it got somewhat tiresome to see Triton dismiss all that evidence out of hand while at the same time failing to come up with any relevant material himself. So my patience gradually ran out. I quite simply let Triton know that I wasn't going to respond to his posts any longer. I don't think there's anything insulting about that.

posted 02-19-2002 08:49 PM               

Thanks to Russ for chiming in with some details.

Sikandur, I appreciate your concern (and impressed that you are still following this!).

I will put Afghanistan aside, as that was merely an attempted analogy, and is clearly going astray.

Taking Tomaz's analysis of Mohi at face value, substantial Mongol losses may have been taken, although far less than the Hungarians.

In re Outremer, I know what Smail said. This does not change the instances when the "semi-independent" states of Edessa, Antioch, and Tripoli went their own ways. Smail acknowledges the military orders sometimes refused cooperation, and Western crusaders certainly could refuse. (The example I cited from 1108 is ten years after the fall of Jerusalem to the Christians, or if you like the "liberation" of Jerusalem from infidel hands.)

quote:

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Shadowing the opposing army could bring very real benefits.

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Persia at the time Alexander invaded was large, but not an effective military power. That is why I mentioned the 19th c. Ottomans. Clearly, that analogy is also not working, so I will leave it aside.

quote:

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During the mid-13th c. few people were well travelled

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quote:

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Ironically, they won some of the greatest territorial gains with the battle of Mohacs and the following campaigns in Hungary, but that was as far as they could come

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quote:

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The situation in 1241 was very much different. The struggle between France and the Empire was latent.

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quote:

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Medieval European rulers did not necessarily think in terms of modern strategy, preemptive strikes and global balance

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quote:

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There were no truly compelling reasons for the armies of the German empire to go on the offensive without even being provoked to fight

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posted 02-20-2002 06:49 AM               

In regard to your first post: I don't think anyone here equates gear to military success. However, I'm quite confident that the typical Mongol gear and tactics wouldn't have worked well in Western Europe because it was developed for a totally different environment, the steppe. It has been suggested that the Europeans would've had a hard time countering the Mongol tactics. To this I can only say that the Mongols would've needed to dramatically alter their approach, too. Since the Europeans had some experience fighting cavalry-heavy armies with horse archers, it's fair to expect that they could develop effective countermeasures against a hypothetical Mongol invasion relatively quickly. On the other hand, the Mongols weren't used to fighting in largely wooded, hilly terrain dominated by numerous stone fortifications nor had they ever encountered such a highly militarized continent as Europe - not to mention the shortage of grazing.

You might be more familiar with modern Hungarian historiography than most of us. Do you have any further detailed information regarding the Mongol campaign in Hungary? I'm particularly interested in those 8 months the Mongols spent there. This is a chapter most history books don't discuss at any length, which is quite frustrating. It might also help shed light on the Mongol decisions.

It apppears that the Mongols made some attempts to conquer Hungary during their stay, but failed to destroy a number of important Hungarian fortresses. How seriously did the Mongols try to subdue them?

Another question: how seriously did Bela take the Mongol threat? The Mongols sent friar Julianus to the Hungarian court with a threatening letter in 1237, but Bela apparently did not react. At this point the Mongols were already in control of Russia and Western Europe was aware of their conquest.

Then in 1239 another letter was sent by the Mongols if my memory serves me right. At about the same time, the Cumans were attacked by the Mongols and pushed all the way into Hungary, uniting themselves with Bela. Then in late 1240 the Golden Horde issued an ultimatum which Bela again refused to answer. So the Mongols launched the raid in February.

What was Bela doing all that time apart from asking the pope for assistance (which he couldn't realistically expect anyway)? Perhaps the alliance with the Cumans encouraged him to adopt a tougher stance against the Mongol blackmailing.

posted 02-20-2002 06:55 AM               

"Taking Tomaz's analysis of Mohi at face value, substantial Mongol losses may have been taken, although far less than the Hungarians."

Absolutely. The Hungarian army was nearly obliterated in the fighting whereas the Mongols apparently still had some strength left by the end of the day. But the important thing is, Batu's losses were not easily replaceable. During the battle of Kursk the Germans inflicted much heavier casualties on the Red Army than they took. But it didn't really matter because the German losses were quite simply irreplaceable and the Soviet Union still had plenty of reserves left. In such an instance a tactical victory can in fact mean a strategic defeat.

"Very true, but it is not easy to shadow an all cavalry army with armies with large numbers of infantry and few or no light cavalry."

I completely agree. But the large Mongol cavalry armies would not have been able to operate in Western Europe for any extended period. Batu's army has been estimated at 50.000-100.000 men. This means some 150.000-400.000 horses if we take into account that every Mongol horseman had 2 or 3 remounts (a conservative estimate). It doesn't take very long to realize that only a small portion of those horses could survive in Europe, particularly if the defenders resorted to a scorched earth strategy. With their horses gone, what could the Mongols have achieved?

Another critical issue - medieval Europe was far from an ideal battlefield for a cavalry army. It's possible to traverse ground in any direction in the steppe. In Europe there was only a limited number of communication routes. That would've inevitably channeled the Mongol advance, exposing them to ambush and largely negating their superior mobility (which wouldn't have lasted long anyway due to logistical problems).

During the Habsburg vs. Valois conflict, Austria was merely a sideshow. Charles V was more interested in Spain and Western Europe, leaving his brother Ferdinand to take care of Austria. The combined resources available to Charles V were enormous at the time (colonial possesions!). If used against the Ottomans, the results could be very decisive. The problem was, the Turkish wars were seen largely as an Austrian domestic affair. Ferdinand basically had to defend Austria only with local resources against the military might of the entire Ottoman empire. Even that was enough to achieve a general balance, though. In 1529 the Ottoman attempt to take Vienna was repulsed with little outside help from the rest of the Empire. By the time of the battle of Sisak in 1593, Austria was fully capable of defending its borders and confidently keeping the Ottomans at bay. Aside from the brief spell of Ottoman military activity in 1683 - which was in fact followed by a very vigorous Austrian counteroffensive that "liberated" Hungary and, temporarily, even Serbia - it was generally Austria that maintained the upper hand in the conflict.

"I would suggest that large amounts of loot, poorly guarded (if the Mongols suffered heavy casualties) was a pretty good motivator for medieval warriors. Plus the glory of defeating the Mongols when no one else could, plus maybe (if you are Duke of Austria or King of Bohemia) keeping a few castles and provinces from the edge of Hungary, once you liberated it..."

I'm just not sure about all this. It has been said the feudal society was organized for war. I'd say it was in fact organized for defensive war. Motivating the nobles to fight a war was always difficult, even when the cause was just and the potential benefits of victory great. However, very few nobles in 13th c. Europe were willing to provide military service for a large offensive campaign against an obviously dangerous enemy, particularly if the prospects of profit were relatively slim. The possibility of acquiring loot and glory could be used as a morale booster, but the risks associated with provoking war with a largely unknown, demonized enemy were perhaps even more important. As for territorial expansion, Austria achieved it without needing to confront the Mongols. From the perspective of contemporary European observers the "wait and see" strategy was perhaps preferable to the risks of battle.

posted 02-20-2002 09:20 AM               

2. The Mongols tried very hard to capture those fortresses. But having them up at hilltops, rather than on lower ground made all the difference. Until cannons, stone fortifications on hilltops are absolute deathtraps, as you should know from numerous Carinthian and Carniolan towers in your country. The Mongols were highly skilled at siegecraft, but failed to defeat a) stone castles b) in nasty terrain c) strongly defended.

3. Béla appealed for aid early and often, and was totally ignored. Period. You'll have to write my wife for more details, as I don't know the archival sources for the letters. In addition, the Austrians took the Hungarian Queen and her family hostage and held them for ransom when they tried to take refuge from the Mongols in that country. Basically, nobody cared. If you look at the number of Magyars who sided with the Ottomans against Austria, it will give you some idea of the great love the Hungarians felt for their western neighbors: basically, throughout known history, any time the Austrians could have helped Hungary, they chose not to do so unless they stood to gain directly at Hungary's expense. Sounds brutal, but it's the truth. There is also some evidence that the Austrians were involved in the murder of the Cuman prince that resulted in the latter fleeing Hungary for lands further south, at exactly the point when they were most needed.

4. The Mongols would have had trouble subduing much of the stronger western european fortresses, but moving at high speed, they could easily have gutted western europe's economies. The French plains and coastal cities and the Italian city-states would generally have been in deep and serious trouble had they come over the alps. To some extent, the Holy Roman Empire's geography would have given it better protection -- but the Urals are no piece of cake, either.

posted 02-20-2002 08:29 PM               

quote:

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It doesn't take very long to realize that only a small portion of those horses could survive in Europe, particularly if the defenders resorted to a scorched earth strategy.

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It seems we agree that the Austrians probably recognized the Mongols as "obviously dangerous...the prospects of profit were relatively slim". Clearly, the Mongols were not invincible: no has ever been that.

posted 02-21-2002 07:00 AM               

2. If the Mongols tried to capture those fortresses so hard, isn't it reasonable to expect that they took substantial casualties in the process? I'm not aware of any significant reinforcements arriving from the east. This could be of some importance for the decisions the Mongols took later on.

You confirm my thoughts about the Mongols not being used to taking fortifications built on hilltops. However, I'm not sure it was solely a technology issue. The trebuchet, which entered widespread use in Europe by the time of the Mongol raid, was far more effective than the earlier forms of artillery. If used properly, it could bring down just about any castle wall.

3. Much agreed, Austria and Hungary were mutual enemies right up until 1918.

4. Large parts of France and Italy were indeed quite well suited for the deployment light cavalry. However, both of these regions were also densely populated and heavily defended. Then there was the shortage of grazing. The only staging area from which the Mongols could launch any large-scale offensive of the West was Hungary. To raid Italy or France, the Mongols would have needed need to cross some difficult terrain first and they would always have the Alps between them and Hungary. Not a particularly desirable strategic situation, I'd say.

5. If the primary sources were available to me, I'd be more than happy to use them. Unfortunately, I don't have any such advantage. The description of the battle of Mohi in that field manual seems detailed and quite trustworthy. The other texts currently at my disposal discuss Mohi far more briefly, but they don't appear to contradict FM 3-90. This is why I've cited it. If you have any better description at hand, by all means quote it. I'd be most grateful - it's really hard to get that kind of detailed information around here (which is really ironic given the fact that Hungary is our neighbor ).

While your overview of Mongol tactics is sound, I'm somewhat skeptical about the success of their application at Mohi. The Mongols apparently made at least two serious tactical mistakes. First, the main body of their force arrived a bit late (about 2 hours if my sources are correct) to take advantage of any feigned retreat of the smaller Mongol contingent. Second, crossing a bridge only to get pressed between the enemy and the river is a classic example of what not to do on a medieval battlefield.

"Certainly they did take losses, but they were certainly not sufficiently severe to give them any trouble in totally controlling Hungary: had they come as occupiers, they could have remained there in total control."

This seems quite true. Regardless of the losses taken at Mohi the Mongols were holding most of Hungary. Bela's army was after all virtually annihilated and the king fled (even though the Mongols were by no means in "total control" of the country with all those fortifications still holding out). But the real question is: were the Mongols still strong enough after Mohi and their failed attempts to take the Hungarian strongholds to continue their expansion further west? And if the Mongols weren't actually interested in conquering Hungary, why did they try to destroy those fortresses so hard?

Felix - Even without a consistent scorched earth strategy I don't think any substantial concentration of Mongol horsemen could operated in Western Europe for long. The Mongol pony was a wonderful little beast, but it still needed fodder to survive. I'm not sufficiently familiar with medieval logistics (Brock H, your assistance would be most welcome! ), but as far as I know the amount of grazing available in Western Europe was downright minuscule when compared to the Eurasian steppe. It has been said that even the Hungarian plain could not sustain any truly large army of steppe nomads. The situation further west was much worse.

posted 02-21-2002 10:02 AM               

(2) If the Mongols tried to capture those fortresses so hard, isn't it reasonable to expect that they took substantial casualties in the process?

No. There is a strong difference between chronicle records indicating that bowmen and mercenary crossbowmen were able to defend a castle, and the same evidence indicating that the Mongols were literally thrown off the walls.

(2b)You confirm my thoughts about the Mongols not being used to taking fortifications built on hilltops. However, I'm not sure it was solely a technology issue. The trebuchet, which entered widespread use in Europe by the time of the Mongol raid, was far more effective than the earlier forms of artillery. If used properly, it could bring down just about any castle wall.

Re-read my post. Technology was not the issue, as the Mongols were adept at siegecraft. What was an issue was stone-walled castles (which cannot be fired, and stormed only with extreme difficulty) built on hilltops and similar high elevations. You’re from the region: you’ve seen how difficult it would be to approach these castles, with a dozen crossbowmen peppering you all the way up? At any rate, the trebuchet or other stone-thrower is irrelevant if it cannot be brought into an appropriate position.

(4.) Large parts of France and Italy were indeed quite well suited for the deployment light cavalry. However, both of these regions were also densely populated and heavily defended. Then there was the shortage of grazing. –snip for brevity-- Not a particularly desirable strategic situation, I'd say.

You need to remember that the Mongols also attacked Venice, and would have been able to approach Italy via the Istrian Peninsula. Grazing would be a potential problem, though the Mongols would have been likely to use the same kinds of raiding attacks used by Magyars three hundred years earlier. But much of those countrysides would have been very poorly defended against high-speed chevauchee, for which they were optimized. Whether they could have succeeded in a conquering mission is entirely up to speculation, but it is certain that they could have inflicted significant economic damage, which would have made round 2 much easier.

(5). If the primary sources were available to me, I'd be more than happy to use them. ….If you have any better description at hand, by all means quote it. I'd be most grateful - it's really hard to get that kind of detailed information around here (which is really ironic given the fact that Hungary is our neighbor ).

I may be able to help you with scholarly contacts, though I was under the impression that the German-language historiography on the Mongols was rather extensive. Do you not read German? Either way, F-MJ’s are clearly unacceptable historical sources for anything except absolutely bare facts.

(5a)While your overview of Mongol tactics is sound, I'm somewhat skeptical about the success of their application at Mohi. The Mongols apparently made at least two serious tactical mistakes.

Your response is also essentially sound, but since the Magyars wound up with their entire army caught in basically the same trap as they halfway caught the small contingent of Mongol troops… that’s chronicle-pulling time.

(5b) But the real question is: were the Mongols still strong enough after Mohi and their failed attempts to take the Hungarian strongholds to continue their expansion further west? And if the Mongols weren't actually interested in conquering Hungary, why did they try to destroy those fortresses so hard?

I believe so. You must remember that while they would certainly have wanted to own those fortresses, simply because they were points of resistance in an otherwise prostrate land, that’s all they were. The garrisons of those fortresses were able to do nothing but hold on, while ALL of the terrain supposedly controlled by those fortresses was solidly in Mongol hands.

On the other hand, this is one of the great unanswerables of history, because as soon as you change one variable, all the others slide around, too. It’s pure speculation. It is evident that the Mongols really wanted the Cumans, and pursued them south through other lands that were equally ripe for the looting – and there is no way that the Serbian despotate and Bulgaria can be considered even remotely less mountainous than the Alps. If anything, the Balkan terrain is even more difficult, and the military technology comparable to that used in the west in this period. Then again, when the Mongols did return to invade Hungary again, King Ladislas beat them back quite handily. So essentially I think that they (1) could have moved further west if they wanted to, and done serious economic and population damage, but (2) were relatively unlikely to conquer the entire European peninsula and hold it without serious reinforcements, unless that same Turkic pattern of constant raiding followed by invasion was to be carried out successfully. And judging the likelihood of that success is pure guesswork.

(5c)It has been said that even the Hungarian plain could not sustain any truly large army of steppe nomads. The situation further west was much worse.

Tomaz… the Hungarian Plain didn’t really exist at that time. That land was incredibly rivered swampland, moors, and grassland, but nothing remotely like the Great Hungarian Plain that exists now. The amount of open grazing land had always been relatively small compared to actual steppe terrain. I will grant you that this works in your argument’s favor in terms of the Mongols holding the Carpathian Basin – the Magyars are the exception, rather than the norm, in adapting their society and creating a state that could survive in this environment while retaining their culture.

(5d)Had the Mongols penetrated into Italy from lower Austria, the most sensible route of advance would be through modern-day Slovenian territory: down the Sava valley to Ljubljana, then SW to Postojna and finally W through the Vipava valley, passing by the southern fringes of the Julian Alps.

Again, don’t forget Istria. The Mongols had, one assumes already scouted the heck out of this region prior to launching their pursuit of the fleeing Cumans.

Edit: accidentally typed "Vienna" instead of Venice...

posted 02-22-2002 02:36 AM               

2b) Yes, I'm indeed familiar with this kind of rough, hilly terrain and I've spent a lot of time exploring medieval fortifications. Taking a well fortified castle built on an imposing hilltop would not have been easy. However, there were countless instances when such castles were actually taken. Sometimes by betrayal, sometimes by bombardment and assault, sometimes the defenders were simply starved out. Proper artillery, trebuchets for instance, could really make a world of difference, as demonstrated on a number of occasions in Western Europe. Bringing the artillery in position would often be difficult, but not impossible. All you need is to find (or build) a small platform within effective range of the catapult (300m or more in case of a trebuchet). Once you got the catapults in position, it's your turn to wreak havoc. There's very little crossbowmen could do against stone projectiles weighing several hundred kg raining from a position 300m away. And very few 13th c. castles had walls thick enough to survive such pounding for long. Sometimes the mere sight of siege engineers building catapults was enough for a fortress to surrender. That tells a lot.

4) "You need to remember that the Mongols also attacked Venice,"

Maybe I'm missing something, but this is the first time I hear the Mongols sacked Venice and I thought I was quite familiar with local history. Could you please elaborate on that?

"...and would have been able to approach Italy via the Istrian Peninsula."

There is a reason why I'm not at all enthusiastic about this idea: Istria is hell on Earth for a cavalry army. The climate is harsh, the terrain rocky and extremely difficult to negotiate (snake country of the worst kind). Grazing virtually non-existent. Water is hard to come by, vegetation is mainly limited to thorny scrub. Bad enough for infantry but absolute hell for horses.

"Grazing would be a potential problem, though the Mongols would have been likely to use the same kinds of raiding attacks used by Magyars three hundred years earlier."

Indeed, but that's the whole point - the Magyars never conquered any territories in Italy. I think the grazing issue is extremely important. Especially when we're talking armies the size of Batu's horde. When you have several hundred thousand horses together you need to be able to provide vast quantities of water and grazing every day. If you don't, the horses will die. And without horses a cavalry army is doomed.

"I may be able to help you with scholarly contacts, though I was under the impression that the German-language historiography on the Mongols was rather extensive. Do you not read German? Either way, F-MJ’s are clearly unacceptable historical sources for anything except absolutely bare facts."

Well, I'm not using that field manual for anything more than just absolutely bare facts. Even then, I wouldn't dismiss all that information out of hand just because the US Army decided to put it in the curriculum. In any case, it would be best to work with the primary sources. Do you perhaps know of any handy source of transcriptions?

I can read German all right, but getting the literature is another matter. Our libraries aren't well stocked - the people in charge tend to acquire new books on a largely hit-or-miss basis. Which means that only a few relevant titles are available. Getting the rest basically depends on the depth of one's wallet - and mine sadly doesn't permit too many extravagant expenses on Amazon.com...

"You must remember that while they would certainly have wanted to own those fortresses, simply because they were points of resistance in an otherwise prostrate land, that’s all they were."

After a careful reconsideration, I must say this is only half true within the medieval context. Fortresses were far more than mere points of resistance. They also served as rallying points and bases for launching offensive operations. The examples of Outremer and France during the HYW which have been discussed on this thread show quite clearly that the importance of fortifications was enormous even when facing a highly mobile enemy. An invading army was only in control of the land once all the strongholds had been taken. As you note, the role of the besieged garrisons in such cases was largely passive. However, they still represented a significant threat. As long as castles and fortified towns remained under the defender's control, they tied up huge quantities of the attacker's resources. If the attacker neglected taking those fortifications, he was in constant danger of being struck in the back. At the very least, the defending garrisons could harass his supply routes or overwhelm the scattered foraging troops.

"...and there is no way that the Serbian despotate and Bulgaria can be considered even remotely less mountainous than the Alps."

It only takes a quick look at the map to see that Serbia and Bulgaria are actually considerably less mountainous than the Alps. Much of the terrain was heavily wooded in the 13th c. and not at all ideal for cavalry. But at least there weren't any mountain peaks extending 3000, 4000m above sea level.

What's more important, neither Serbia nor Bulgaria were major powers in 1241. The military technology used there wasn't entirely on par with that of Western Europe, either. Resources available to the Serbian and Bulgarian rulers were quite modest. Serbia only grew into a power to be reckoned with during the reign of Stefan Dusan - but that was the first half of the 14th c., a hundred years after the Mongol raid.

"...unless that same Turkic pattern of constant raiding followed by invasion was to be carried out successfully. And judging the likelihood of that success is pure guesswork."

posted 02-23-2002 11:00 AM               

On the question of Balkan geography, "mountainous" is an ambiguous word. I think a distinction between height and difficulty of terrain should be made. High plateau can be relatively flat and good horse country: the land in far west China of Xinjiang. Land of low overall height can be difficult for horsemen due to its irregularity: Greece is a fair example.