posted 02-07-2002 09:51 AM               

Isn't military strength military strength? If you don't have the strength to project force whatever the obstacle then are you really militarily strong? If you can't get the numbers together to accomplish a military objective are you really militarily strong?

And just because the prevalent theory among most historians right now says Europe was helpless and the Mongols unstoppable doesn't make that true.

True enough, however just because something is prevailing historical theory also does not make it false. I know that there is this tendency in some quarters to view something as suspect simply because it is common belief but in a lot of case common belief is right.

I also don't believe that the authors/historians that Felix mentions are exactly lightweights.

The Mongol empire began to fragment immediately after Genghis' death in 1227, more than a decade before Batu's campaign. Yet it had no immediate negative effect on the Mongol expansionism whatsoever. I'm afraid you still don't quite realize that there was no united Mongol empire as such after Genghis' death, at least not anything in the sense of the (early) Roman empire. With Genghis gone, several large Mongol groups emerged, each under their own dynasty.

Thanks for the refresher, but I was actually well aware of that.

Yet it had no immediate negative effect on the Mongol expansionism whatsoever.

The whole point of what I am saying is that rather then "having no negative impact" it in fact did have an impact in that it kept Batu closer to home. Unlike the other Khanates in China who were much more secure Batu was politically in a less stable position. He did not have the time for large scale foriegn adventures.

The conquest of the Middle East took place at the same time as Batu's raid

Right but it wasn't carried out by Batu.

Also, your last statement shows considerable ignorance. No large Western European army had ever faced the Mongols in battle.

I can only assume you are referring to this statement:

That of course doesn't mean that it is the only possible explanation, but is probably a more realistic one then a fear of Western European armies that may or may not have materialized and in any respect had never decisively defeated the Mongols.

If that is the case I think rather then demonstrating my ignorance it demonstrates your misunderstanding of my point. That point being that the idea that somehow Western Europe would suddenly forget all of its age old squabbling, fueding, backstabbing, and infighting and rise up in righteous anger to destroy the Mongols is probably a bit far fetched. It's doubtful that anything like a united western army would have ever materialized (the first part of what I said) and beyond that it is doubtful that the Mongols would fear something (a western army) that had never beaten them. Notice I didn't say that the Mongols had beaten a western army , I did not. (the second part of what I said).

Another fact which you don't seem to be aware of is that Europe strenghtened its defense on the eastern border considerably as a result of the Mongol raid

I can't say that I was particularly aware of that, but I'm not sure how much of a difference it would have made. The Mongols seem to have been singularly undaunted by fortifications in all of their previous campaigns.

If we compare the Europeans to the Mongols - the richest to the richest, the average to the average and the poorest to the poorest - it's pretty obvious that the Europeans generally had superior equipment.

I won't argue that their equipment was in a general way superior, however I don't see that equipment being a decisive advantage it was not that much superior, i.e. enough to give a decided tactical advantage.

Let me see: Alexander managed to take over Greece, destroy the mighty Persia, travel through the snowy passes of Hindu Kush, seize Egypt and the entire Middle East and wreak havoc on the Indian border. All that with an army made up mostly of infantry. During the 16th c. it took ridiculously small warbands of Spaniards only a few decades to destroy huge empires in South America. Then the tiny insular nation of English conquered vast territories in America, Africa, Asia and Australia, all that despite fierce opposition of the contemporary superpowers, most notably France and Spain. What about Napoleon? He terrorized Europe for several decades, fighting all the major powers of the day (today's equivalent of fighting China, Russia and the USA simultaneously).

All true of course but all irelevant I was not saying that there were no other great conquerer ever I was saying that no one else managed to conquer a huge percentage of the Eurasian land mass at the time the Mongols did it. If the Europeans or the Mamelukes were so much stronger then the Mongols why didn't they do it?

Second, the Mamelukes had the strongest military during the 2nd half of the 13th c. - even stronger than Europe. This should answer the rest of your rhetorical question.

Actually no it doesn't. If the mamelukes were the check that kept the Europeans out of the middle east then why didn't the Mamelukes themselves start carving out their own empire all the way to China? That also doesn't explain why Western Europe didn't expand into Russia if they were so powerful.

I really get tired of hearing all this ivory tower nonsense about the supposedly unstoppable Mongols on the one hand and helpless primitive onion-eating Europeans on the other.

I don't know that anyone is saying that they were unstoppable, no one is invincible rather they are saying that they were unstopped (except by Babyars) by military means. We can draw conjecture all day long about what Western Europe "would have done" if only it would have come to grips with the Mongols the fact of the matter is that it did not so in the end all we have is the conjecture.

posted 02-07-2002 12:11 PM               

quote:

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I believe most larger fortifications in Europe could withstand any siege, be it Mongol or European.

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My point about Acre is that whether or not it could withstand a siege, it didn't. The Mongols did know something about sieges: "in the Mongol armies' first sweep across the north China plain in 1212-13, they left ninety-odd cities in rubble" (Ebrey, Cambridge illustrated history of China). That was the first attack into China, and the Mongols gained a bit of experience in the next thirty years. In fact, Nicolle's Arms and Armor of the Crudading Era says "From the early days of their conquests the Mongols were renowned for their skill in siege warfare" and "the Mongol army which invaded Eastern Europe and the Middle East clearly had Chinese artillerymen in its ranks".

Add Maurice Keen's Medieval Warfare to those who believe that Europe was lucky the Mongols turned around. And "turned around" is the correct term, I think. It should be noted the Mongols suffered so severely at the hands of the Hungarians, and were so intmidated, that they overwhelmed the forces of Serbia and Bulgaria in their haste to leave Europe.

I cannot accept the assertion that the Mongols faced only feeble opponents. The enemy in north China was the Jurchen (Jin) dynasty, who were Manchurian "barbarians" themselves, and chased the native Sung dynasty out of Kaifeng (defended by 48,000 troops). The Jurchen realm was technologically advanced, densely populated, with 40 million inhabitants, and richer than any realm in Europe. To the west, the Mongols smashed the Khwarezmian empire in 6 years. This empire included modern Iran, Afghanistan, much of Pakistan, and most of the Central Asian republics. The warriors were Turkish horsemen and archers, not notably inferior to Mongols, and the sultan raised armies of 100,000 and more -- not a pushover.

As for comparison with other conquests: Alexander conquered less than half of what the Mongols did: add Egypt, but subtract all of China, all of Central Asia and Mongolia itself), and European Russia. The European expansion of the 16th century and thereafter was accomplished with immense technological superiority in many cases, and with biological weapons (smallpox, diphtheria, whooping cough, Tb, malaria) in almost all cases. Napoleon is a fair comparison: but he couldn't even control Iberia, let alone European Russia (and we won't talk about the island of shopkeepers).

In terms of equipment, one should distinguish light equipment from poor gear. The majority of Mongols were lightly armed, true, but whether it was poor quality is less clear. There is also a thread on about semi-rigid armor on this forum, which argues that lamellar (the form used by the Mongols) was superior in many ways to mail, which contemporary knights wore.

posted 02-07-2002 06:23 PM            

quote:

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Originally posted by Felix:
The European expansion of the 16th century and thereafter was accomplished with immense technological superiority in many cases, and with biological weapons (smallpox, diphtheria, whooping cough, Tb, malaria) in almost all cases.

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?

posted 02-08-2002 04:54 AM               

Triton - I'm not Marshal but I think I'll try to answer that question anyway because it's of vital importance to our argument. Pure military strength does not necessarily win wars. Equally important is the ability (and desire) to project force when and where it counts the most. Napoleon's armies were far outnumbered and outgunned by the Coalition forces. However, Napoleon was able to retain the initiative because he was capable to outmaneuver the enemy and strike the weakest spots. Much the same could be said about the German blitzkrieg of WWII. At the start of the war, German tanks were on the whole no better than their Allied counterparts. In fact, the largest proportion of Hitler's armored forces comprised of antiquated PzKpfw I and II tanks, vehicles which were designed for training rather than war. During the invasion of France the Germans were outnumbered 2:1 in tanks, yet they won decisively because they used their armor en masse against the openings in Allied defense.

Fighting an offensive war requires means to project power; sheer military power in itself cannot suffice. And no army can ever project all its military power as long as it has a homeland to defend and only limited means of transportation. This is why steppe nomads were such feared enemies before the technological advance of sedentary peoples made their ways of waging war obsolete. Being nomads they had no homeland to worry about while at the same time they were highly mobile. Which enabled them to project virtually all of their comparatively limited military power, maximizing their effectiveness.

"True enough, however just because something is prevailing historical theory also does not make it false."

I don't recall ever saying that...

"I know that there is this tendency in some quarters to view something as suspect simply because it is common belief but in a lot of case common belief is right."

In a lot of cases yes, but not always. I have no intention to play a devil's advocate just to keep this debate going. However, as being something of a historian myself, it's both my right and duty to view every theory with a certain degree of skepticism.

Even the most prominent scholars have been known to make embarassing mistakes. Just take a look at Encyclopaedia Britannica and read the articles about medieval weaponry and fencing - but beware, it's likely to make you sick. What's written there is essentially still Victorian rubbish. How is that possible given that Encyclopaedia Britannica is constantly being updated by the elite of world's most eminent experts? I don't see any reason why I should trust them when it comes to the Mongols. Particularly when the facts clearly contradicts their fancy theories.

This is why I insist to stick to evidence. And scholarly texts in themselves are no evidence. I refuse to take any historian's word for true without seeing how he bases his conclusions. And if those conclusions seem suspect, I reserve the right to disagree with them even if proposed by a distinguished scholar. After all, we're all just humans. Multiple M.A. and Ph.D. titles don't make a good historian, only lenghty research does.

"The whole point of what I am saying is that rather then "having no negative impact" it in fact did have an impact in that it kept Batu closer to home."

Did it? Surely it wasn't Ogadai's death that kept the Golden Horde passively waiting in southern Russia for decades while the rest of the Mongols were busy raiding and conquering territories in China and the Middle East.

I mean, I'd be ready to accept any other sensible argument - perhaps a sudden spread of religious pacifism from the Buddhist areas or maybe mass abuse of cannabis and opium imported from Indochina and the Middle East. But seriously, that the death of a khan who ruled eastern Asia stopped the advance of the Golden Horde (which was, for the umpteenth time, an independent military entity) without having the slightest effect on the other Mongol groups (which were at the time happily thrashing their enemies in China and the Middle East) is just a little too much to swallow.

In any case, Batu did not sink in permanent inactivity after Ogadai's death. He returned to Volga after his failed raid and established his seat there, subduing the local Russian rulers and ocassionaly leading military expeditions against the disobedient. I'm not exactly sure if that was what the Golden Horde was after, though. Given that the rich regions of Western, Central and South Europe were virtually at their doorstep, the temptation must have been hard for the Mongols to raid there. But they didn't. Now, is it just my imagination or does that tell something?

"Unlike the other Khanates in China who were much more secure Batu was politically in a less stable position. He did not have the time for large scale foriegn adventures"

???

If anything, China and Central Asia were the least stable regions under Mongol control. Backstabbing, feuding, personal rivalries and the like were not limited to Europe. Genghis' descendants were great at fragmenting the empire. Every election of a khan involved a good deal of petty quarrels, sometimes open hostilities. And China was a very volatile territory. By the mid-13th c. it was only partly under Mongol control. The rest (mainly the south) was ruled by the Song dinasty which Kublai only subdued in 1279... Just another fact you've forgotten to add to the equation.

"All true of course but all irelevant I was not saying that there were no other great conquerer ever I was saying that no one else managed to conquer a huge percentage of the Eurasian land mass at the time the Mongols did it. If the Europeans or the Mamelukes were so much stronger then the Mongols why didn't they do it?"

"Actually no it doesn't. If the mamelukes were the check that kept the Europeans out of the middle east then why didn't the Mamelukes themselves start carving out their own empire all the way to China? That also doesn't explain why Western Europe didn't expand into Russia if they were so powerful."

Why would they? The Roman empire was the strongest state at one point, yet it covered only the Mediterannean. If the Romans wished they could expand the borders further. But they somehow didn't feel any need for it. They were satisfied with holding the entire known world.

The US is currently the most powerful "empire" on Earth, considerably more powerful economically and militarily than any other single state. Yet it's not trying to massively expand further by force (at least not just yet). Why? because it has reached an equilibrium. Any new conquests would inevitably lead to a series of conflicts which the US, despite its strength, would ultimately be unable to win.

There is one thing known as balance of power. An empire can only expand to a certain point before the territory under its control becomes too huge to be controlled efficiently. A lot depends on the system. A well managed state with thought-out bureaucracy like the early Roman empire could efficiently control territories that were vast by contemporary standards. On the other hand, empires that expanded too quickly and without conscious management soon collapsed - empires of Genghis and Alexander being the two most famous examples.

Mameluke Egypt and Europe were both great military powers. They were more than capable of defending themselves from foreign aggression and both were already in control of large thriving territories. However, none of them was capable of creating a huge all-Eurasian empire. The Mamelukes pushed east after defeating the Mongols, but only to strengthen their borders. Any larger expansion would demand huge efforts and only uncertain benefits. Similarly, medieval Germany occupied large territories previously under Slav control, but never seriously tried to invade Russia for much the same reasons.

"I don't know that anyone is saying that they were unstoppable, no one is invincible rather they are saying that they were unstopped (except by Babyars) by military means. We can draw conjecture all day long about what Western Europe "would have done" if only it would have come to grips with the Mongols the fact of the matter is that it did not so in the end all we have is the conjecture."

posted 02-08-2002 05:03 AM               

Very funny indeed Felix, but careful, you're getting really close to my ground here The truth is, the parts that were affected by the Mongol raid were Bosnia, Dalmatia and part of Serbia - all comparatively poor regions. None of them had a strong military. None of them territories tried to seriously oppose the Mongols with force. Their raid was so fast that gathering the troops was hardly possible anyway. I don't recall any Mongol force overwhelming Bulgaria, though. And it's really interesting that no attempt was made by the Mongols to pass our (Slovenian) territory to plunder the wealthy lands of Italy...

To get back to your argument, I'm inclined to believe that the Mongol push to the Adriatic was a fairly senseless move, perhaps done out of anger or frustration. It brought no significant gains whatsoever. It almost seems as if the Mongols needed to vent their anger by attacking the unprotected population of the fragmented Balkan states before returning east. And they did all that in extremely close proximity to Italy, which was at the time one of the richest parts of Europe. From Zagreb or the Dalmatian coast it's only a one or two days' ride to Italy. many other invaders including the Goths, Huns, Avars and Magyars used the same route on their raids. The Mongols did not. Why, oh why?

It's interesting to note that the Ottoman advance stopped at pretty much the same line. The Ottomans succeeded in conquering the Balkans and most of Hungary, but they could never seize the territories of modern-day Slovenia, northern Croatia and Austria. Of course, the defense organized by the German empire or more accurately, Austria, was several light years ahead of anything known in the Balkans at the time.

"I cannot accept the assertion that the Mongols faced only feeble opponents. The enemy in north China was the Jurchen (Jin) dynasty, who were Manchurian "barbarians" themselves, and chased the native Sung dynasty out of Kaifeng (defended by 48,000 troops). The Jurchen realm was technologically advanced, densely populated, with 40 million inhabitants, and richer than any realm in Europe."

Exactly, except that the Chin empire was so militarily weak, fragmented and busy fighting the Song dynasty that it was terribly vulnerable to a stab in the back, a fact which the Mongols were quick to exploit. And even then, it took them several decades to conquer China. It was definitely no pushover.

"To the west, the Mongols smashed the Khwarezmian empire in 6 years."

Just as one would expect. Khoresm was already in a decline long before the Mongols came. With Genghis' military genius and a large force of highly disciplined troops the outcome was never in doubt. The decadent society of Khoresm was unable to put up any real defense. With forces committed to battle piecemeal, without having a clear strategy, the Mongols had no difficulty winning the war. Annihilating the population of a few cities like Bukhoro and Samarkand was an effective psychological weapon against the Khoresmians, too.

"As for comparison with other conquests: Alexander conquered less than half of what the Mongols did: add Egypt, but subtract all of China, all of Central Asia and Mongolia itself), and European Russia."

Of course, Alexander did all that with an army that advanced at infantry pace. And unlike the Mongols Alexander had to fight Persia, which was the superpower of the day, as well as several other warlike nations with extremely strong armies (like the Indians with their war elephants).

And while the territories Alexander conquered were indeed much smaller than the ones occupied by the Mongols, they were by and large far more prosperous, more advanced and more densely populated. I don't think conquering a million sq km of steppe can ever be equal to seizing Egypt, Syria or even Greece. Give me a rifle platoon and a couple of helicopters and I'll capture Antarctica in a week. Would that make me a conqueror on par with Caesar or Napoleon?

"The European expansion of the 16th century and thereafter was accomplished with immense technological superiority in many cases, and with biological weapons (smallpox, diphtheria, whooping cough, Tb, malaria) in almost all cases."

Very true, except that the bands of European invaders were extremely small when compared to the armed forces of native Americans. Cortez conquered Mexico with about 300 soldiers if I recall correctly. How heavily were they outnumbered? 1000 to 1? Maybe 10.000 to 1? Muskets, swords and iron armor were certainly a major advantage, but if you pit 100 naked, unarmed men against a single plate-clad, sword-wielding, musket-firing Spaniard, who would you bet your money on?

"Napoleon is a fair comparison: but he couldn't even control Iberia, let alone European Russia (and we won't talk about the island of shopkeepers)."

No, of course not. Napoleon fought all the world's superpowers at the same time. Nobody could ever win a fight like that. But it's a wonder that Napoleon managed to accomplish what he did - he essentially conquered most of Europe and kept all the other major powers at bay until the debacle in Russia.

"One request, if I may. My books refer to a battle in Hungary on the Sajo river. Is this the same as Mohi? I have not seen anything to indicate that the Hungarians came near to winning the battle, or that they inflicted severe losses on the Mongols. It is clear this was a tougher battle than Liegnitz (which did included stat-of the art knights in the Teutonic Order)."

Yes, it's the same battle. It was fought near the Sajo river, on the Mohi plain (or heath) on 11th April 1241. The battle is remarkable from many aspects. The Mongols initially crossed Sajo over a stone bridge and camped there on the east bank. The Hungarian army reached the river and encamped on the west bank, taking control of the bridge and a small bridgehead on the east bank. At night, one part of the Mongol force crossed the river at a location north of the bridge. The idea was to attack the Hungarians from both sides simultaneously.

On the next morning, the part of the Mongol army that stayed back in the camp attacked the Hungarian bridgehead. The Mongols pushed all the way over the bridge and attacked the Hungarian camp. But they got their timing wrong and were virtually destroyed in a two-hour battle. Only when the Hungarians were basically mopping up the battlefield did the second part of the Mongol army finally arrive. The Hungarians were taken by surprise, yet still managed to hold ground for some time, withdrawing to their camp. Finally, the decimated Hungarians fled via the escape route which the Mongols intentionally left open. The Mongols then pursued and the remains of the Hungarian army were scattered. Unfortunately, we don't know the exact bodycount, but it's apparent that both sides took very heavy casualties.

The aftermath is just as interesting. King Bela IV panicked and fled, leaving Hungary unprotected. The Mongols crossed the Danube but were unable to score any further victories. Moreover, several major Hungarian strongholds resisted multiple Mongol attacks (so the value of fortifications was in fact very significant), thus spreading the belief that fortifications could stop the Mongol invasion.

Friedrich of Austria seized the initiative, imprisoned Bela (but soon released him for a ransom) and conquered some territories in Hungary. By this stage, however, the Mongols seem to have abandoned their strategy altogether. Perhaps in an attempt to find king Bela they went west to the Adriatic coast, then back east through Bosnia, occasionally plundering and wreaking havoc, but all that without any clear purpose. And they never even tried to oppose Friedrich nor raid Italy, which is extremely difficult to explain unless we accept that the battle of Mohi and the failed sieges of Hungarian fortresses indeed bleeded the Mongol force.

I'm not surprised if you weren't aware of numerus facts regarding the Mongol raids in Europe. English historiography has never been at home with Central and Eastern Europe. Try to locate any modern, preferably Hungarian works for a deeper study. Too bad I'm not sufficiently familiar with modern Hungarian historiography to give preciser recomendations. The only distinguished Hungarian author whose works I know are available in English is Zoltan Halasz. It would really help if Anna Kovacs could help us on this one, too bad she doesn't post here too often any more.

"I should also posit that, since the Hungarian forces included horse archers of their own (Cumans), and that the Hungarians were familiar with this form of warfare, that they constituted the best European army to possibly face the Mongols. No army of Danes, Flemings, Milanese or Scots could be expected to know how to handle a light cavalry attack (with feints, false retreat, flank attacks all a matter or routine). Why would any other European force have done better?"

The best way to fight a tank is to use a tank. Right? Wrong. An asymmetrical approach usually works far better. What really destroyed tanks more efficiently than any Panther or Tiger during WWII was the Panzerfaust in hands of German infantrymen.

Entire Europe had plenty of opportunity to familiarize itself with the tactics you mention. The Carolingians learned about them when fighting the Avars, Lombards and Byzantines. The Germans picked up a thing or two from the Magyars. Add a fair number of European mercenaries who served in the Byzantine or Muslim armies (in Spain or the Middle East). Then there were of course the Crusades.

Central and Western Europe had the best arm to counter light cavalry, namely well armored heavy infantry that was becoming increasingly more disciplined. Town militias of northern Italy were already a truly formidable force by the 1170's. And the tradition of infantry combat was always very strong in Germany.

I think it's fair to expect that the standard European combination of heavy infantry, crossbowmen and knights could hold ground against any comparable Mongol force, just like they did during the Crusades. The Mongols were not particularly used to fighting any combination similar to that, after all. It would've been a shock for both sides, but just as serious for the Mongols as for the Europeans. And the latter would've been fighting on their own ground.

posted 02-09-2002 02:55 PM               

The spread of diseases from the Old World was enormously important for the conquest of the New World. Usually is was not intentional, as in the case of the Aztecs, but nonetheless effective. In at least one case in North America, smallpox-infected blankets were deliberately traded to Indians to destroy them.

Tomaz, I’ m afraid I must disagree with the following:

quote:

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The best way to fight a tank is to use a tank. Right? Wrong. An asymmetrical approach usually works far better. What really destroyed tanks more efficiently than any Panther or Tiger during WWII was the Panzerfaust in hands of German infantrymen.
Entire Europe had plenty of opportunity to familiarize itself with the tactics you mention. The Carolingians learned about them when fighting the Avars, Lombards and Byzantines. The Germans picked up a thing or two from the Magyars. Add a fair number of European mercenaries who served in the Byzantine or Muslim armies (in Spain or the Middle East). Then there were of course the Crusades.
Central and Western Europe had the best arm to counter light cavalry, namely well armored heavy infantry that was becoming increasingly more disciplined. Town militias of northern Italy were already a truly formidable force by the 1170's. And the tradition of infantry combat was always very strong in Germany.

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Moving on, I would seriously disagree about the condition of the Khwarezmian and
the Jin state at the time of the Mongol conquest, and incidentally, about the state of Persia when Alexander invaded . Please cite the sources indicating the Jin were falling apart – no state in Europe had 40 million inhabitants, technologically sophisticated, and how many European states could have mounted a siege comparable to Kaifeng, which was defended by 48,000 troops? The same is true of the Khwarezmians: it is clear that they lost, but show me that it was because they were weak. Their empire had only been in existence 70 years, hardly long enough for a “long decline”. In fact, your description of decline and disunity perfectly describes the Persian “superpower” you claim faced Alexander the Great. That realm was comparatively militarily inept: its best troops were greek mercenaries (at Cunaxa, before Alexander’s time, and Granicus); and Macedonians were superior to standard hoplites as shown at Chaeronea. It was not unified: the Egyptians welcomed Alexander with open arms, and after Gaugamela, when Darius III fled, he was assassinated by his own nobles. It had been wracked by civil war (see Cunaxa, above).

The discussion of the Mongols not invading Italy is off of the point. If they were recalled (as I understand it) to Asia, Italy was in the wrong direction. If they were fleeing Europe, Italy was still the wrong direction. If the Mongols actually lost at Mohi, then Italy was the wrong direction (and I find no one to make that claim).

[This message has been edited by Felix (edited 02-09-2002).]

On the Mongols in Hungary:

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The country remained the easy prey of the Tatars -let us call them this now; after all, it is the notion of the Tatar invasion that is ineradicable from Hungarian memory. Even if some cities did not fall, and some of the population escaped into the depths of the marshes and forests, the devastation was enormous. After the battle at Muhi, where the Tatars' arrows killed most of the Hungarians retiring to the protection of their baggage wagons before hand-to-hand combat could occur, Béla IV himself fled to Dalmatia with his entire family. The Tatar horsemen even pursued him there, and he finally had to sail from the city of Trau (Trogir) on the Adriatic coast to the Island of Ciovo simply to save his life. Now we were at the receiving end of the lessons we ourselves had handed to a Europe farther west during the age of the marauding raids.
It is customary to say repeatedly that this was the first massive pagan attack on Europe against which the Hungarians cast their own bodies. Thus the western "investment" which converted the eastern Hungarians to Christianity began to bear fruit... Undoubtedly, the Carpathian Basin (and the Balkans) was the most western area the Tatars reached during their military campaign of several years. But the fact that their attack broke off here was not attributable to the scattered and weak opposition of the Hungarians. Then to what? At news of the death of Great Khan Ogedei, Batu, interested in the succession, turned his armies around and headed home.

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quote:

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In December 1240 Kiev was laid in ashes, and now the way to Poland and Hungary lay open.
Béla - almost the only man in his country who took the danger at its full value - had organised a system of defences on the passes and had tried to collect an army inside Hungary. But when the Tatars moved again, in the spring of 1241, they easily overran the frontier posts, and on 11 April outmanoeuvered the Hungarian army which met them at Mohi, on the Sajó, and almost destroyed it. Béla himself barely escaped with his life to the Austrian frontier, where Frederick of Austria could find nothing better to do than to blackmail him for an indemnity, extort three counties from him as security for the payment of it, and even invade them himself. The Tatars ravaged central Hungary at their leisure all summer and autumn, then, the Danube having frozen hard, crossed it on Christmas Day and spread destruction in the Dunántúl, while Béla, pursued by their light cavalry, fled ingloriously enough to an island off the Dalmatian coast. Hungary was saved from complete destruction only by the death of the Great Khan Ogotai in far-away Karakorum. Batu Khan, commander of the Tatar armies in the west, led them back to take part in the contest for the succession, and in March 1242 the Tatars quitted Hungary as suddenly as they had entered it just a year before.
But they left total devastation behind them. Even of Hungary's walled places, not all had escaped. Székesfehérvár had been saved by the marshes round it, and the citadel of Esztergom had held out. But the town had fallen, as had Buda and many another. When they took a town the Tatars commonly reduced it to ashes and slaughtered all its inhabitants.

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Neither Lazar (1989) nor the older Macartney (1962) describe the pyrrhic victory Tomaz alludes to. I realize neither of these sources is an current academic Hungarian medieval military historian, but the sources need refutation.

Last link: a map of the Mongol incursion, showing their "withdrawl" through Serbia and Bulgaria (large file): http://historicaltextarchive.com/hungary/hu13.gif

[This message has been edited by Felix (edited 02-09-2002).]

posted 02-09-2002 07:39 PM            

To my knowledge, the earliest documented incident, however, occurred in the mid-eighteenth century, in the form of the Amherst/Bouquet communications:

While there was a smallpox epidemic among the western tribes who had sent warriors east about this time, it's questionable as to whether it was a result of this plan, and even whether the plan was put into effect. Any such attempt would have been very much of a two-edged sword, as Bouquet's caveat that he not get infected himself in the initial communication implies.

What is often lost in references to the effects of these epidemics among the Indians is the devestating effect they could have among the European settlers as well. Where the Indian population might suffer a 50+% loss, the native 'Europeans' could lose 30% in a virulent epidemic, and it terrified them.

Losses were particularly severe under wartime conditions. One of my ancestors perished during the Revolution in one of the early Northern campaigns not at the hands of the British, but from smallpox. And he had lots of company.

In any event, the Amherst incident was considerabley removed from the sixteenth century.

posted 02-10-2002 07:28 AM               

This is perfectly true as long as we confine ourselves to the regular, linear thinking. However, it's not the only way to tackle a problem nor the most efficient one. Instead of playing according to the rules, a wise commander might opt for an assymetric strategy. Such an approach works particularly well when fighting a superior force.

A perfect example of such military thinking is Napoleon's invasion of Russia. By the start of the campaign, Napoleon has the strongest army in the world. Not even the Coalition is strong enough to stop him.

So what do the Russians do? They take Napoleon's military superiority out of the equation by simply refusing to fight. Instead of tackling the French forces head on, they enforce the scorched-earth policy accompanied by constant harassment of the French supply lines. It's an expensive strategy initially, but it really turns out the least costly option in the end because Napoleon's army is routed and France is never again able to fully recover.

"The tank vs. infantry analogy works in passive defense in rough terrain; but show me a case where infantry with antitank arms went on the offensive in open country against an armored or mixed defense."

Of course there never was any such instance because it couldn't possibly work. But what the Germans frequently did was to lure the enemy force into carefully selected, heavily defended ground. Panzerfaust-armed infantry could then take a heavy toll on the enemy armor, thus enabling the massively outnumbered German armor to execute a counterattack. The Panzergrenadiere could not act as the primary offensive element, but they were able to destroy the enemy armor and pave the way for a counterattack. For evidence, you need look no further than the Eastern front albeit similar situations occured frequently in Europe as well.

"Second, the Muslims in Spain were not strong in horse archers (minor detail), although they did have light horse. The Spaniards countered these light horse with their own light horse, the jinetes."

I'm not sure if this is of much relevance. Neither Muslim Spain nor Egypt were particularly strong in archery, but the Turks were definitely renowned for it. Even if we leave the Avars and Magyars aside, medieval Europe learned a lot about horse archery during the Crusades - and that was before Batu's raid. It's probably fair to say that the Europeans knew more about the tactics used by the Mongols than vice versa.

"Third, heavy infantry is a dubious counter to light horse."

This is a very severe overgeneralization, I'm afraid. Heavy infantry could come in all shapes and sizes. The Roman legion had extremely little in common with 13th c. European heavy infantry. The armament and tactics were entirely different.

The Roman legion was developed as a response to the phalanx, but it wasn't optimized for use against cavalry - be it light, heavy or horse archers. The pilum makes a very poor spear. Missile troops weren't sufficiently integrated into the legions, either.

But heavy infantry of the high middle ages was developed with cavalry in mind from start. As early as the 1170's, there were instances when Italian town militias held ground against charges of mounted knights. The combination of heavy armor, polearms and crossbows made such infantry an extremely potent adversary against light cavalry:

Baha' al-Din Ibn Shaddad in his Al-Nawadir al-Sultaniyah, describing the Third Crusade as it marched south along the coast:

"The enemy was formed in order of battle, the infantry drawn up in front of the cavalry, firm like a wall and every foot soldier wore a coat of thick felt and a coat of mail so strong that our arrows (shot from a distance) made no impression on them. But they shot at us with their great crossbows, wounding the Muslims' horses and their riders."

- David Nicolle: The Crusades (Essential Histories), © Osprey 2001

It's clear that the European combination of heavy infantry, crossbowmen and mounted knights worked well against light cavalry and horse archers. We have every reason to expect that a European force organized along these same lines could stand ground against any comparable Mongol force.

Superior mobility on part of the Mongols might not have been of particular value in an all-out invasion of Europe. Given the limited amout of grazing, the Mongols would have needed to seek a decisive battle. And even in case of victory, there would still have been hundreds if not thousands of heavily defended strongholds to take.

"The Crusader army in Outremer was able to cope for a time with horse archer opponents, but had several advantages. They fought in a small, very heavily fortified, rough country. They also were extraordinarily experienced, both foot and horse; and had the benefit of the severely disciplined military orders."

How greater would have been the advantage of fighting on the home turf, equally well defended and in terrain just as rough as Outremer... And by the 13th c. the military orders (which were still thriving in Europe, by the way) were no longer the only disciplined troops around.

"As you know, Avar and Magyar light horse caused 200-odd years of trouble for their neighbors; if heavy forces were effective against light horse, this would probably not have happened."

Dear Felix, may I remind you that no European country had anything like true heavy infantry at the time? The Carolingians may have come close to that (and that was in fact one of the main factors behind their military successes), but there was no equivalent of the well equipped, disciplined heavy infantry of the 13th c. in the early medieval Europe.

"Please cite the sources indicating the Jin were falling apart"

I'm afraid I can't because I never claimed that.

China was a huge country at the time, technologically advanced and with a prospering economy, but it was not particularly strong militarily. This seems particularly true in case of the Song dynasty.

The Jurchen may have been a great force in the early 12th c. when they took Kaifeng and captured the emperor. However, their expansion was short-lived as all the further attacks south against the Southern Sung failed. Logistical problems played a major role, but equally important seems to have been the sedentary way of life to which the Jurchen succumbed after their first conquest. This view seems common in the books I generally use for reference, including Die Weltgeschichte; main editor Günther Böing (Herder K. G., 1971).

Then there was the disunity among the Jurchen, which in fact enabled Genghis to traverse the Great Wall with such ease:

"In AD 1211, Genghis Khan held a khuriltai (assembly) and advanced into northern China. At that time, Mongols, with aid from the Khitans and Chinese who served in Jurchen army, notably with the help of a Jurchen general called Ming'an, took over Juyongguan Pass of the Great Wall (near Beijing)."

(Click here to read the entire article: http://www.uglychinese.org/jurchen.htm )

"...and how many European states could have mounted a siege comparable to Kaifeng, which was defended by 48,000 troops?"

Europe differed greatly from the rest of the world inasmuch its military system relied on a huge number of comparatively small fortifications scattered throughout the land. In China and the Middle East, the military system was generally more centralized, with a limited number of huge strongholds that served as springboards for military operations.

The siege of Kaifeng was by all means a major achievement, but the Mongols would've faced a very different situation in Europe. There was no single fortress whose capture would have meant the conquest of a large territory as it was the case in northern China. Instead, the Mongol force would've needed to scatter and take castle after castle, town after town. And all that in a territory which was decidedly unfriendly to their methods of warfare.

"The same is true of the Khwarezmians: it is clear that they lost, but show me that it was because they were weak."

Khoresm was an extremely unstable empire during its last decades of existence. In many ways, Khoresm was similar to the Byzantine empire. The existence of several large aristocratic families, each having its own selfish interest, meant the ruler was far from independent. Shah Mohammed was a weak ruler, far removed from reality and hated by his people. Worse yet, his ambitious mother was constantly interferring with political matters.

The Khoresmian army was large but extremely varied, generally unreliable and in a poor shape. It apparently looked good on paper, though, which fueled Mohammed's dreams of carving up a huge Eurasian empire stretching all the way to the Sea of Japan - something his mother had been proposing all along. The mercenaries who formed the bulk of Khoresmian forces were not paid regularly, so they helped themselves by plundering the countryside. This separated the Shah from his people even further.

With the general decline setting in, the Shah's most capable son Jalal al-Din tried to reform the country. Mohammed's mother disliked Jalal al-Din, however, choose another of her grandsons as a heir and formed her own court. Mohammed himself was by this stage only a puppet. He provoked a conflict with the Mongols by killing a group of Genghis' diplomats, which was a weird move because the two countries previously had good relations. The Mongols attacked and Mohammed gathered his army. But his strategy was deeply flawed, relying on the major strongholds rather than active defense, and the Khoresmian army was too disinterested and falling to pieces that it couldn't seriously oppose the invaders anyway.

(I don't have any book at hand right now, but you might consider this webpage: http://www.coldsiberia.org/webdoc3.htm ; while written from the Russian perspective, it contains excellent information on Khoresm)

Oh, and by the way, this little excerpt from Microsoft Encarta '96 (not much, I know, but it's handy for quick reference anyway):

"The neighbouring Chin empire of northern China and the Central Asian states, both militarily weak and fragmented, inevitably surrendered, as did the decaying Arab-Turkish society of the Middle East, to the Mongol hordes racing over Asia."

"...and incidentally, about the state of Persia when Alexander invaded"

Your comment regarding Persia is somewhat misleading. By Alexander's time, Persia may have been a decadent empire characterized by internal strife. Yet despite all that, it was still the superpower of the day. It was in control of the Middle East and Asia Minor, economically strong enough to maintain large, well equipped armies and was politically influential enough that Greek states essentially became puppets in hands of the Persian rulers.

The fact that Greek mercenaries constituted the strongest part of the Persian army doesn't seem to show any particular weakness in my opinion. The Greeks who fought under the Persian flag were highly skilled professionals who were at least as reliable as any Persian troops. In fact, it seems that Darius was the weakest link in the Persian defense. Alexander's army may have been much more powerful pound for pound, but the Persians had the advantage in numbers and knowledge of terrain. A ruler more familiar with military matters and less prone to panic might have repulsed Alexander's invasion with the forces and resources at hand. But Darius wasn't quite of Alexander's caliber.

"The discussion of the Mongols not invading Italy is off of the point."

No, it's not. Even if we stick to the supposition that the Mongols were recalled, they were not recalled immediately after Mohi. They still had enough time to roam the Balkans, so I'd expect a quick trip to Italy would have been perfectly acceptable.

The texts you quote are entirely in accordance with the commonly accepted view. I guess you could easily find heaps of similar excerpts written in a sometimes more, sometimes less dramatic tone.

But if you allow me, let's just analyze the several key facts that seem to be universally accepted:

- the Mongols arrive to Central Europe in February 1241; several skirmishes
- March 1, Mongol army group under Baidar and Kaidu travels north to Poland, sack Sandomir on the following day and win the battle of Krakow on March 3
- March 12, the main force under Batu enters Hungary while a smaller contingent is sent to Transylvania
- March 18, the Mongols win the battle of Chmielnik
- March 24, Krakow is taken
- March 27, the Mongols attack Wroclaw but their assault fails; the Mongols retreat
- April 9, Liegnitz; the largest Mongol victory in Europe
- April 11, Batu's force engages the Hungarians at Mohi; Mongol victory, Bela flees
- December 11, Ogadai's death

Now, let's take a deep breath and think about all this. No need to go into the details, just consider the immense Mongol activity within March 1 and April 11 - which is barely 40 days or less than a month and a half. Within this short period of time, the Mongols took much of Eastern Europe and fought a number of battles.

But in sharp contrast to that period of activity are the eight months spent uselessly in Hungary and the poor regions of the Balkans - and that's 8 months before Ogadai's death! Not to mention that Batu didn't learn about it right away. It must've taken several weeks at least for the news to arrive to the Balkans.

How can you or any other proponents of the commonly accepted hypothesis sensibly explain that? Eight months of pointless waiting with the riches of Italy just a two days' ride away? Ogadai's death was obviously not the issue because the old khan was still alive at that time. I'm afraid this changes the whole scope of things quite drastically. Clearly the string of Mongol successes wasn't rapidly broken by the death of Ogadai as the prevalent hypothesis would have us believe.

So we're back to the argument. The only reasonable explanation that I can think of - and also the one that seems in accordance with a careful analysis of the evidence at hand - is that the fighting in Hungary had put too much strain on the Mongol force to continue the conquest. Also not to be dismissed was the role of fortifications.

Just so if we quote Keen's Medieval Warfare let's hear what Andrew Ayton has to say about that:

"Towns, castles, and river crossings could be taken by surprise by a mounted force, just as besieged garrisons could be more rapidly relieved. Yet armies so dependent on the horse tended to be less adept at siege warfare. Indeed, chevauchee-style warfare encouraged fortification. The flame of Hungarian resistance to the Mongols was maintained in a handful of stone fortresses, while the energy of many an English expedition in France was sapped by the frustrations of siege warfare."

Interestingly enough, perhaps the most detailed description of the battle of Mohi I've been able to find to this date can be found in the US Army field manual 3-90 Tactics.

posted 02-10-2002 08:12 PM               

To take comments in turn: my discussion is of a mobile enemy, not a comparably equiped, superior one. Both the Napoleonic and WWII cases you cite are attempts to deal with very superior but essentially similar army. Obviously, the defender's response requires some twist or variation other than meeting superior strength with inferior strength. What to do if the enemy is not similar, and is much more mobile? That is a very different situation.

You brought up Medieval Spain, I was merely responding; and pointing out that light horse was met with light horse in Iberia.

We agree on the situation in the field armies in Outremer. I will still assert that the terrain there is rougher than most of Europe - not the Balkans nor the Alps, but more so than the land further north. (minor detail) As for the military orders, one of them was at Liegnitz, as you know. That didn't seem to make too much difference.

Next line: if you look at the line you quoted, I used the word "forces" not "infantry". The point was about relative mobility, and no I didn't claim true heavy infantry existed in the 10th century.

The next section is best responded to by your own assertion: ". By Alexander's time, Persia may have been a decadent empire characterized by internal strife. Yet despite all that, it was still the superpower of the day"

You want this to be true of Persia, but not of the Jin, nor the Khwarezmians? If decadence and internal strife weaken one empire, then they weaken all empires. Persia's intrinsic technological inferiority to the Greeks was a problem, insofar as the Persians could only have as many of its best troops as it could import - so once Macedon controlled Greece, the supply was cut off. Which is why the Persian army at Gaugamela didn't have a strong infantry center. At least the Jin and Khwarezmians were essentially comparable warriors - horse archers in the steppe tradition. In China, there were a lot of fortifications, although most were probably not up to Krak des Chevaliers (neither were most European ones): recalling an earlier quote, 90 cities were destroyed by the Mongols first attack on China. Like Europe at the time, a city was defined by its walls, so 90 fortified cities were destroyed in one onslaught. I don't think that a comparitively small number. Indeed, the site you linked to: http://www.uglychinese.org/jurchen.htm clearly indicates there were many cities in north China that had to be dealt with - note that this happened in the campaign when Beijing was besieged, for perhaps a year-long siege.

As for the other site, I have some reservations. Unlike my prior quotes, it is not a published historical text. Indeed, the very first portion of it is a mystical-religion discussion quite alien to most historical conventions. http://www.coldsiberia.org/webdoc3.htm

Beyond that, it does indeed describe the limitations of the Khwarezmian state. It also says the following:

quote:

---

Chingis Khan invades the mighty Chin empire, whose capital was Peking. This marks a very important milestone in the history of Chingis Khan and his Mongol empire. When Temuchin became Chingis Khan in 1206, he was the leader of a traditional nomad army whose main weapon was the albeit very advanced compound bow described elsewhere in these pages. Later he and his Mongols would be able to do what former nomad warlords could not do; to actually defeat the great civilizations. During the Chinese war and even more during the later campaigns in Khwarezm, the Mongols were equipped with advanced siege weaponry like mangonels, battering-rams, and other of the technologically advanced weapons of the time

---

The author clearly is not implying these states are easy prey. The site then goes on to describe the European adventure of the Mongols as follows:

quote:

---

1241: April: The Mongols fought with most excellent skill against several Hungarian armies, which were all defeated, 80,000 died in one battle and another 100,000 in consequent battles for Pest at the Sajo river, where Batu feigned a crossing during the evening of April 10, while Subedei crossed the river elsewhere covered by the dark of night. At Liegnitz 20,000 were killed including the Teutonic knights. This means that the victorious Mongols wiped out several large armies and killed more than 200 000 of the finest European warriors during some few weeks in 1241.

1241, December: The Mongols Crossed Danube but consolidated gains before invading Austria. During the whole campaign, the European countries were incapable of resolving their differences to fight a common enemy (Austria seized parts of Hungary and the pope was rumored to be trying to induce the Mongols to attack his rivals and enemies)

1241, December 11: Ogodei, Chingis Khan's son and first successor, dies in Mongolia. The regency is taken over by his widow Toregene. Toregene was to be the ruler of the Mongol Empire from 1241 to 1246, when her son Guyuk was elected Grand Khan.

1242, February: A messenger arrives with news that Ogodei had died in Mongolia on December 11, 1241. With Ogodei dead, the position of Great Khan was vacant, and the Mongol custom was to return in order to face the new political situation, that is to elect a new khan. This was a decision that proved to be fateful for the Mongols. If the Mongols had not been bound by tradition, but continued the European campaign in accordance with the original guidelines of Subedei (and as already mentioned it is very likely that Chingis Khan himself had masterminded the plan), Batu and Subedei might have conquered all of Europe to the Atlantic Ocean. As it happened, the adherence to custom prevented that from happening. Because of subsequent disruptive developments, the Mongols never returned to fulfill their European mission.

---

Besides this all, a coherent state and effective military defense didn't always seem to go together at this time. The Mameluke state was one of foreign, slave mercenaries who had no connection to the people they ruled, and engaged in violent transitions of government frequently - in Joinville, the emirs massacre their sultan in the midst of a campaign against the French crusaders in Egypt. Yet these same unstable foreign mercenaries stopped the Mongols; and everyone on this thread has agreed that, at this time, the Mamelukes were a formidable force.

posted 02-12-2002 07:58 AM               

One such recent example was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviet army was far superior to the mujahedeen and much more mobile thanks to motorized, mechanized and air mobile units. What the Afghan resistance did was avoid large-scale confrontation and lure the enemy into difficult ground to negate his superior mobility. The Soviet force gradually spent itself and was forced to retreat.

A similar strategy might've worked well in case of the Mongol onslaught. The superior mobility on part of the Mongols could easily be exploited as a fundamental weakness. An army so reliant on horses would've been at a significant disadvantage if deprived of them and being forced to fight on foot. Then there was the terrain. Much of Europe at the time was heavily wooded and most medieval fortifications were deliberately built in extremely difficult terrain. To take them, the Mongols would've needed to alter their tactics and strategy considerably.

"You want this to be true of Persia, but not of the Jin, nor the Khwarezmians? If decadence and internal strife weaken one empire, then they weaken all empires."

What's bad for one empire is bad for all the rest, of course. But I disagree with ther implications of your statement as they lead in self-contradictory generalization. Persia was not the same as Jin and Jin was never equal to Khoresm. Each of those empires was special in its own right. Comparing them directly is like comparing apples and oranges.

In any case, I think it's perfectly clear that Persia was by far the strongest power in the Middle East and the Mediterannean by the time Alexander ascended to the Macedonian throne. Its influence was enormous. Most Greek states became Persian subordinates and Macedonia, while a major regional power by Phillip's time, was like a midget compared to Persia. Persian resources far surpassed those available to Macedonia or any other Greek state.

On the other hand, the Chin empire was by the early 13th c. nothing more than a second-rate power. It was incapable of finishing off the Southern Song and its army, as it should've been clear by now, was made up of highly unreliable elements. Unlike Persia, the Chin had no influence over the neighboring countries.

"...90 cities were destroyed by the Mongols first attack on China..."

True, and I wonder just how many of those cities could actually put up any major resistance at all. Marshal is spot on; Europe was far more militarized than China. And Ming'an's case demonstrates that the Jurchen were not loved by the subdued Chinese. Even the army of the Chin empire was far from an efficient instrument under Jurchen control. This shows the Mongol conquest in a very different light.

Khoresm was a poweful state at one point, but Mohammed's rule brought decline. Like Chin - and unlike Persia - Khoresm was too weak to interfere with any other country's policies. Persia may have had occasional problems with rebellious satraps, but that was like a drop in the ocean compared to Khoresm under Mohammed when there were in effect several rulers simultaneously - Mohammed, his mother and Jalal al-Din.

"As for the other site, I have some reservations. Unlike my prior quotes, it is not a published historical text. Indeed, the very first portion of it is a mystical-religion discussion quite alien to most historical conventions."

That second site is a compilation of numerous works. In case you overlooked the link at the bottom of the page, here's the bibliography (and it looks solid enough to see the author did a fair amount of research): http://www.coldsiberia.org/webdoc2.htm

It does not begin with any "mystical-religion discussion", though, but rather a romantic intro into the famous Mongol history. Nothing "alien" to serious historiography (how many histories of the Roman empire begin with that tale of Romulus and Remus?), at least not any more alien than the pompously dramatic tone of Istvan Lazar's dangerously brief history book, to be honest.

I think the basic facts mentioned there stand even if their interpretation may not always be correct. At any rate, I'll try to locate more book titles to please you - but in the meantime, please present any counterevidence and refute the points you find suspicious.

"Besides this all, a coherent state and effective military defense didn't always seem to go together at this time. The Mameluke state was one of foreign, slave mercenaries who had no connection to the people they ruled, and engaged in violent transitions of government frequently - in Joinville, the emirs massacre their sultan in the midst of a campaign against the French crusaders in Egypt. Yet these same unstable foreign mercenaries stopped the Mongols; and everyone on this thread has agreed that, at this time, the Mamelukes were a formidable force."

Generally true, but a coherent army is certainly necessary for effective military defense. And a coherent army usually goes hand in hand with a strong government.

The Mameluke state was essentially a military dictatorship (like so many other empires in history). It was the warrior class that ruled the country, not necessarily the sultan himself. Sultans may have been deposed by force, but as long as the warrior class remained united, the country was strong.

"We agree that "a handful of stone fortresses" held out in Hungary, to quote Ayton. Your description of Europe in general implies there were many - what of the rest?"

See the previous posts - Hungary was not yet as saturated with fortifications as Western Europe. The massive building program in Eastern Europe and the Balkans only began after the Mongol raid - as a direct consequence of it, in fact. However, most castles and fortified towns in Western Europe were already built by 1240 and the countryside was certainly much better covered.

"As for invading Italy, as there was still some Hungarian resistance, the Mongols might have decided not to venture further for that reason."

You're beginning to prove my point for you. If that "handful of stone fortresses" was enough to seriously hamper the Mongol advance, this casts considerable doubt on the Mongol abilities in siege warfare. If the Mongols were unable to subdue that small number of relatively inferior fortifications in Hungary - and they weren't able to take Wroclaw, either - how would they fare in Western Europe where there actually were numerous strongholds on par with Krak des Chevaliers?

"Or Subotai may have felt they had enough booty for one mission (the Mongols were not mindlessly greedy)."

Really? Time to reverse roles now - show me that Subotai and Batu indeed gathered enough plunder to fulfill their expectations. Or at least show me that the Mongol army gathered any major quantities of plunder on their raid.

Eastern Europe was economically much weaker than the West at the time. If plunder was the Mongol main objective, Batu's raid clearly fell short of the objective. Plundering Eastern Europe but neglecting to invade Italy, which was terribly close at the time, seems almost like robbing a bank but only snatching a 50$ bill from the counter and refusing to take a few hundred thousand bucks in the safe. It just doesn't make any sense.

If we conversely assume that their goal was primarily reconaissance, we may equally conclude that the expedition was a failure. The Mongols failed to penetrate the borders of the German empire. They also failed to identify and scout the main communication lines necessary to invade Western Europe.

"One thing is clear, is that in those 8 months when the Mongols were in Hungary, supposedly severely weakened, no one in Europe tried to drive them out."

posted 02-12-2002 12:18 PM               

Most certainly, but how does that prove your argument? Hungary and Poland were quite isolated at the time. It was in nobody's interest to come to assistance. As long as the Mongols limited themselves to thrashing the Poles and Hungarians, their incursion had no ill effects on the German empire,

Which really goes to prove one of my main points that being that the chances that all of Europe was going to band together to repulse the invaders were slim to none. In fact if history is any guide the Europeans were more likely to side with the Mongols against other Europeans then anything else. If the Mongols would have decided to Thrash the Germans what would the French have done? Most likey thrashed some Germans as well, and so on and so forth. Are you seriously stating that any European state (and even that is a misnomer) could have stood up against the Mongols and whatever allies they could have had?

posted 02-13-2002 02:16 AM               

Even if we disregard the possibility of a large outside threat uniting the former rivals (which wouldn't have been unrealistic even at that point as Marshal correctly points out), how does this prove your argument?

You're implying that it would take a united Europe to ward off the Mongol threat. I most certainly don't think so. The two great powers on the Continent were France and the German empire. France was already a well-run centralized state by the mid-13th c. and very strong militarily as well as economically. The German empire was territorially huge and the emperor's authority was beginning to weaken its grip. However, the German empire was still a mighty power by the time of the Mongol raid and had great resources at hand, both in manpower and material.

The Mongols ran into difficulty in Hungary, which was a second-rate power. I don't think they ever stood a realistic chance of defeating the armies of the German empire, let alone the combined power of France and Germany if the two states ever decided to cooperate.

posted 02-13-2002 08:00 AM               

It's funny how to people can look at the same thing and see things that are totally different. If you look at the Greek/Persian wars you will in fact see that a lot of the Greek states did ban together but there was also a significant number that fought on the side of the Persians if I remember correctly. I also certainly wouldn't have picked the Crusades as monuments to cooperative European effort since there seemed to be huge amounts of back stabbing going on, i.e. the sacking of Constantinople the holding of Richard the Lion Hearted for ransom by one of his "allies" etc.

You're implying that it would take a united Europe to ward off the Mongol threat. I most certainly don't think so. The two great powers on the Continent were France and the German empire. France was already a well-run centralized state by the mid-13th c. and very strong militarily as well as economically. The German empire was territorially huge and the emperor's authority was beginning to weaken its grip. However, the German empire was still a mighty power by the time of the Mongol raid and had great resources at hand, both in manpower and material.

So you are attempting to say that either France or Germany could have defeated the Mongols all by their lonesomes? I'd say that by itself is extremely problematic but even assuming it's true could either one have held off both the Mongols and the other "great power" in question?

As for:
The Mongols ran into difficulty in Hungary, which was a second-rate power.
I'd say that Felix's points in that regard are far more convincing then yours.

posted 02-13-2002 07:05 PM               

Afghanistan is not a very convincing example of a truly successful assymetric defense; yes the Soviets are not there, but consider the state of the country now (or in 1990, for that matter). If the Mongol incursion of 1241 had been the one and only army of the Mongols, then the type of resistance you describe might have won the same kind of victory. You have overlooked one of my fundamental statements: that the Mongol incursion was a probe or recon in force. The Mongols often did not conquer in one, irresistable onslaught. Both in the Jin campaigns and the Kharezmian war, Genghis Khan attacked in several stages. There is no reason to believe that the one strike into Europe would have been the only one, if they had intended to stay. We agree that logistical difficulties would have made true conquest and permamnent rule extremely difficult for the Mongols. However, if they had done to Europe what the Soviets did to Afghanistan, I think the course of history would likely have been changed. As I understand it, our discussion is about whether the European armies could have stopped the ravaging of their continent. I think this would have been difficult withou light horse, and using heavy infantry would not have been an adequate substitute.

Concerning Persia, I don't recall that "most Greek states became Persian subordinates" at any time after Plataea, when the Greeks expelled Xerxes' army from Greece. And by the way that was with significant numbers of Greeks (the Boeotians, among others) on the Persian side. Ionia was under Persian domination, yes, but not Greece itself. You know the story: Greeks won Marathon, the Persians were stymied at Thermopylae by a handful of Spartans and Thespians, the Persians lost 2 naval battles at different places named Salamis, the Persians lost Plataea, the Greeks took the offensive, liberating the rest of Greece, then Cyprus and Byzantium. The Persian "superpower" was unable to exploit the intraGreek immolation of the Peloponnesian War. When Cyrus the younger revolted against Artaxerxes II, his best men were Greek - they were the only part of his army that won their section of the battle of Cunaxa. Stranded in the midst of Persia, these 10,000 cut their way out of the "superpower" to freedom.

Forgive the long quote:

quote:

---

…the deep symbolism inherent in the fact that the wolf and deer are mates. This signifies a symbolic union between the masculine attributes represented by the wolf: strength, courage and outgoing power, and the qualities imparted by the feminine nature of the deer: Softness, fine sensitivity and intuition. This setup, however, is much more complex than might be revealed by a superficial look. It is however clear that the wolf is seen as the primary active force in the Mongolian ancestry. Further: An extraordinarily significant message of the utmost subtlety is given to us in this Mongolian creation myth: Even though the wolf and the deer are the factual and archetypal predator and prey respectively, they here mate with each other. …The wolf, though it plays the masculine role in the union described above, has many distinctively feminine qualities, and in Siberian and Inner Asian Shamanistic belief it is believed to be an intrinsically feminine animal…, the reddish-brown deer stands for the principles of Mother Earth, without which no fertilization, growth or birth of new things can take place. Those principles are receptive and less active, …Both principles are, according to the Old Mongol spiritual understanding, equally indispensable forces in Universe.
…These symbolic images further illustrate the essential position of feminine qualities in the spiritual universe of the Mongols. …Water, as already mentioned, stands for feminine principles, fertility, renewal and birth…Thereafter Mount Burkhan Khaldun is introduced. The mountain is part of female Earth, but because it stretches itself to Heaven, it becomes a male aspect of the Earth, …All this means that the Mongols possessed a spiritual treasury wherein was contained the insight in the need for joining the qualities of the feminine and of the masculine, or to put it in another terminology: Yin and Yang…The masculine Heaven acts upon the feminine Earth, and initiates fruitful action and change.
Simultaneously the Mongols kept the feminine side of their spiritual consciousness…Since these passages are placed on the opening lines of the secret history of the Mongols, constituting the story of their creation, it reveals much about their spiritual foundation, and indeed of the spiritual foundations of Chingis Khan. …
Now a basis for discussion may be put forward: A crucial shift of spiritual emphasis took place, when the Mongols and other Inner Asian peoples gradually changed from mostly worshipping essentially female Earth and forest spirits/deities into becoming worshippers of the Tengri, that is masculine Air and Sky spirits, and this coincided with the development of aggressive energy and expansionist policies. …
Thus we see a geopolitical illustration of the spiritual principles described before. These two main groups of Mongolian people represented respectively the feminine Siberian forest, and the masculine steppe element. It was the work of the genius of Chingis Khan to combine these two worlds, so as to harness the full power of that unification…
Another noteworthy detail is Duua the one-eyed, who was equipped with a great eye in the middle of his forehead. This is the third eye, also known as the third eye of Shiva and Buddha, (In Sanskrit: Urna.) because these were said to possess a third eye and the qualities that go with it. Not that the Mongols were Hindus or Buddhists, this parallelism reflects a shared collective unconscious within Asian cultures. It is stated that Duua was "one-eyed." Probably this is a literary effect, included to emphasize the predominance of the qualities of the
this is a literary effect, included to emphasize the predominance of the qualities of the Third Eye as a spiritual possession of the Mongols. The third eye manifests itself on sculptures of Shiva as a bony, almond-shaped appearance protruding exactly in the middle of the forehead. …When the Third Eye is described as a component in the ancestry of the Mongols it tells us that the awareness of the necessity of, and the concomitant ability, to see everything from the viewpoint of Eternity is part of the heritage of the Mongols and of Chingis Khan.

---

Concerning the Jin, you repeatedly cite as proof of their weakness that they had conquered the Southern Sung. Why are you so sure the Sung were a pushover? The dynasty itself was not made up of warrrior-kings, true. However, if one looks at the size of that state, its technology, its centralized organization, and its defense barriers (principally the Yangtze river, and associated lakes, canals, etc.), it was a very strong state. Your statement that"Persian resources far surpassed those available to Macedonia or any other Greek state." applies to any discussion of either the Jin or the Southern Sung when compared with European states. (and the Khwarzemians, too.)

As for taking the few Hungarian fortresses holding out, if this mission had been one of outright conquest, that would be logical. If a reconaissance, tying down your troops in a siege would have been stupid. As for dealing with a multitude of fortifications, the plan of the Mamelukes in Outrmer worked well: take one (Acre) city with ruthlessness, then ask the rest if they want the same. The other forts will often surrender. This was well known in Europe, as the French mopped up the English rule in Normandy and Gascony in a similar fashion: show you can take a few castles and forts without getting bogged down or frustrated, and the remainder gave up pretty quietly.

As far as why the Mongols didn't attack Italy, see the assertion above. If the Mongols were on a brainless pillaging expedition, they should have attacked. If they really had a strategic plan, it might not have fit in. Supposing Europe was to be attacked later, Italy would still be there to pillage. Considering the incursion as a reconaissance, did the Mongols have to physically overrun the HRE to learn about it? No. They were very good at collecting intelligence, and could have learned about its geography and politics from their position in Poland and Hungary. Its warriors were not so different from the ones they already encountered and beaten, except they would have been weaker in horse archers and less familiar with that kind of warfare.

quote:

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Hungary and Poland were quite isolated at the time. It was in nobody's interest to come to assistance. As long as the Mongols limited themselves to thrashing the Poles and Hungarians, their incursion had no ill effects on the German empire, even less Western Europe in general. For Austria, it was even a welcome coincidence. While the West was not particularly interested in tackling the Mongol raiders happily pillaging foreign territories, they made preparations to ensure any incursion on their soil could be met with force. Friedrich of Austria definitely had substantial forces ready at his disposal and was able to intervene if necessary. But as long as the Mongols didn't threaten him directly, there was no point in starting a war first.

---

You make Triton's point for him. Even the immediately threatened border states of Hungary and Poland didn't react in any coordinated fashion. If each had waited until it was invaded itself, the chances of successful resistance would be far less. I should point out that Poland was in a mess at that time, but not completely isolated. The king of Bohemia was in fact marching to add his forces to those at Liegnitz when that army was destroyed. He turned around and marched home.

Could France or the HRE alone taken on the Mongols? France was at least somewhat united and centralized. The HRE was something else. As I mentioned in an earlier post, in 1240 Frederick II was at war with Pope Gregory IX (so much for unity in the face of the Mongols). He would be at war with Innocent IV in 1244-47; Innocent would encourage both Henry of Thuringia and William of Holland to rebel against Frederick (1247-56) and his son Conrad IV. Could Frederick have beaten the Mongols while also fighting the Pope, and with disloyal vassals in his rear? Frederick was a polymath, brilliant but also reviled as the antichrist in his time. There is no evidence at all that France (under the pious Louis IX) would have lifted a finger to help such a godless man, let alone to preserve the HRE from destruction. France and the HRE/Germany had a long history, and mutual assistance plays no role in that relationship (this starts with the death of Charlemagne, and ends, more or less, with the founding of NATO) .

posted 02-13-2002 11:44 PM               

Tomaz,

As our resident skeptic about all things Asian you really ought to go check the latest developements in this thread out. The powers of the east are ummmm interesting.
http://netsword.com/ubb/Forum1/HTML/001344-2.html

now back to your regularly scheduled arguement...

posted 02-14-2002 07:13 AM               

Yet you're ingoring the fact that the first six kings of Jerusalem enjoyed virtually complete authority over their subordinates. And that the crusader states were generally quick to unite in the face of common danger...

"So you are attempting to say that either France or Germany could have defeated the Mongols all by their lonesomes?"

No, I'm not attempting anything, I'm merely saying that the military potential of France and the German empire (which then encompassed far more than just Germany) were great and might well have sufficed to ward off the Mongol threat.

"As our resident skeptic about all things Asian..."

posted 02-14-2002 07:27 AM               

From the perspective of an armchair soldier, perhaps. In my opinion, the Afghan strategy was a very successful one, though. It got the job done. I can't think of any other strategy that could've achieved the same effect in the given situation. Mind you, we're talking about lightly armed guerillas vs. the most powerful army in the world. It was a war against all the odds for the Afghans. There was no way they could've opposed the Soviets in a conventional war. So they used their strategy which worked in the end. Sure, it was costly - but the price of freedom makes human lives seem cheap in comparison. Also, the state of the country in 1990 wasn't that much worse than prior to the Soviet invasion, actually. The Afghan democracy wasn't such a thriving modern state, after all, and it would be naive to claim that the situation before the Soviet invasion was so much better.

"You have overlooked one of my fundamental statements: that the Mongol incursion was a probe or recon in force."

No, I haven't overlooked that at all - what bothers me is that the conclusions which you've drawn from that statement are highly self-contradictory. On the one hand, you're trying to convince me that Batu's expedition was a reconaissance mission (or recon-in-force, to be more specific). On the other, you've failed to present a single believable explanation for that 8-month delay in Hungary.

Now, you may disagree with me on all points, but I think you'll concur that reconaissance missions on such a scale are best done quickly. The Mongols certainly kept to that strategy for the first 40 days. They covered a lot of ground in Eastern Europe, fought several important battles and sacked a few cities.

However, I don't think anyone could negate that the Mongol advance ground to a halt after Liegnitz and Mohi - and very abrupty, actually. This is not in accordance with any reasonable strategy. You're apparently of opinion that the resistance encountered by the Mongols did not hinder them to any significant extent. The argument regarding Ogadai's death has also been refuted, I think. So if you're not willing to concede that the losses suffered at Mohi and elsewhere were the deciding factor - just what happened in mid-April 1241 that the Mongols got stuck in Hungary? If reconaissance was the main goal (which it probably was), there was plenty of ground left to explore. In fact, the key routes to Western Europe lay within easy reach of the Mongol force stationed in Hungary. If conquest of Europe was the ultimate goal, the Mongols would've needed to at least locate those routes in order to make a full-scale invasion of Western Europe possible.

But they didn't. In fact, they were stuck in Hungary for 8 months, made a quick tour through the Balkans and retreated in early 1242. These are facts. And in my humble opinion, the commonly accepted interpretation to which you're sticking fails to explain them in a believable and satisfactory manner.

"We agree that logistical difficulties would have made true conquest and permamnent rule extremely difficult for the Mongols. However, if they had done to Europe what the Soviets did to Afghanistan, I think the course of history would likely have been changed."

Sorry, but this analogy is completely flawed. So you're now comparing third-world guerillas to medieval Europe? The Mongols weren't exactly an equivalent to the Soviet Union, either.

"As I understand it, our discussion is about whether the European armies could have stopped the ravaging of their continent."

Ravaging is not really what I would call an invasion. Raids executed by nimble, lightly armed units can be very difficult to defend against, but they don't win wars, either. I thought the real question was whether Western Europe could've warded off a Mongol invasion or not.

"I think this would have been difficult withou light horse, and using heavy infantry would not have been an adequate substitute."

Clearly, but the Mongol horse archers wouldn't have worked particularly well against the Western European heavy infantry and mounted knights, either, so your point is moot.

"Concerning Persia, I don't recall that "most Greek states became Persian subordinates" at any time after Plataea, when the Greeks expelled Xerxes' army from Greece."

Faulty memory perhaps, so a little refreshing might be in order.

After the end of the Peloponnesian War, Sparta emerged as the victor. It was too weak to control entire Greece, though. The Greek states soon began turning against the Spartan hegemony. Thebes, Athens, Argos and Corynthus secured Persian assistance, statrting the so-called Corinthian War in 395. The Boeotian alliance was very successful initially, so the Spartans were forced to recall their contingent from Asia Minor, effectively surrendering it to Persia. In 394, Sparta defeated the Boeotian alliance in two battles, but its naval force was destroyed by the Persian fleet at Knydos.

At that point, the Persians siezed control of much of Ionia. With military contingents stationed in a number of Greek cities, strengthening the Persian influence in Greece. Persia was in control of the Aegean Sea and Persian funds were used to rebuild the Athenian Long Wall.

With the roles reversed, Athens and Sparta returned to the negotiating table in 392. This time it was the Athens that dictated the peace treaty. However, the real victor and the one who really pulled the strings was Persia. The negotiations failed twice. The treaty was finally signed on Persian dictate in 387. The Persians took a considerable share: all Greek cities in Asia Minor as well as the island of Cyprus.

When war broke out again between the quarrelling Greek states in 370, it was again Persia that negotiated the truce (in 367), supporting Thebes against Sparta. Throughout the following decades until the rise of Macedonia after the battle of Chaeronea it was essentially Persia that controlled the Eastern Mediterannean.

Regarding that Mongol site - I don't see any mysticism in that introduction. The author was apparently trying to cover the aspects of Mongol religion and philosophy, applying them to a nation as a whole. This is nothing new. Historians a famous as Mommsen have been known to commit far greater "sins" when it comes to the more subjective parts of history. But this does not change one fundamental thing: disregard the intro if you wish, but prove me that the historical facts listed on that page are wrong. The author, regardless of his somewhat romantic approach, appears to have done a lot of research on the subject. I linked to his article mainly because it contains more information than any other single source currently at my disposal. And the reason why I don't feel bad about it is that the facts the author refers to seem to be correct even if their interpretation is sometimes weak.

"As for taking the few Hungarian fortresses holding out, if this mission had been one of outright conquest, that would be logical. If a reconaissance, tying down your troops in a siege would have been stupid."

I agree. So why did the Mongols bother with sacking Sandomierz and Krakow? Krakow was apparently assaulted twice, but the first attack was unsuccessful. Wroclaw was attacked but not taken. If the Mongols were on a recon mission, why all those efforts?

"As for dealing with a multitude of fortifications, the plan of the Mamelukes in Outrmer worked well: take one (Acre) city with ruthlessness, then ask the rest if they want the same."

Sure, and it worked in Outremer of the late 13th c. when Western Europe had already lost all hopes of holding the Holy Land. In the early 12th c., such a strategy would only have provoked anger and decisive response among the Franks.

Also, you mention the HYW. This is again about as similar as apples and oranges. The HYW was fought between france and England. It was a limited war (fought by limited means and with limited objectives in mind) between two Christian, Western European nations. The territory over which the war was fought was neither entirely English nor entirely French. For the people involved, there wasn't much difference.

However, a war with the Mongols would've been of a different kind. There was much hatred in Europe back then against infidels, particularly the aggressive ones. The Mongols had quickly acquired a terrible reputation even in Western Europe, which never experienced the effects of their raid. It would've been a total war in all respects, a clash of two different peoples and two different religions. Potentially a huge boost for a united Western Europe.

"As far as why the Mongols didn't attack Italy, see the assertion above. If the Mongols were on a brainless pillaging expedition, they should have attacked. If they really had a strategic plan, it might not have fit in."

Did the 8-month wait in Hungary fit in the strategic plan? If it did, Batu and Subotai were the least competent Mongol leaders of all times.

"Considering the incursion as a reconaissance, did the Mongols have to physically overrun the HRE to learn about it? No. They were very good at collecting intelligence, and could have learned about its geography and politics from their position in Poland and Hungary."

Really? Poland and Hungary sure are great places to learn about Western European geography and key communication routes.

"Its warriors were not so different from the ones they already encountered and beaten, except they would have been weaker in horse archers and less familiar with that kind of warfare."

Except that Western Europeans had been fighting horse archers in the Holy Land for nearly 150 years and they had the best heavy cavalry (and perhaps the best heavy infantry) in the world at the time...

"You make Triton's point for him. Even the immediately threatened border states of Hungary and Poland didn't react in any coordinated fashion. If each had waited until it was invaded itself, the chances of successful resistance would be far less."

No, I don't. By "Europe", I've been referring to the continental Western Europe (which I think should've been clear enough for those of you who have participated in our debate since the beginning) - meaning France and the German empire. Neither Poland nor Hungary have ever belonged to Western Europe.

During the middle ages, Eastern Europe was a specific entity that differed in numerous respects from Western Europe. It's no surprise that Western Europe didn't feel obliged to assist the Poles and Hungarians. After all, Germany and Poland have never gone well together and Hungary was something of an oddity as well (memories of the Magyars can't have been too good for establishing particularly close relations).

As for the "immediately threatened border states" not reacting is untrue. The only part of the German empire which was potentially threatened at the moment was Austria. And Friedrich was incidentally the one who raised substantial forces when the Mongols came closer to the border.

"Could France or the HRE alone taken on the Mongols? France was at least somewhat united and centralized. The HRE was something else."

posted 02-14-2002 08:18 AM               

I don't believe that arguement has been refuted at all. Simply positing an alternate theory (and a much less legitimate one in my opinion) in no way refutes an arguement.

Clearly, but the Mongol horse archers wouldn't have worked particularly well against the Western European heavy infantry and mounted knights, either, so your point is moot.

Except that the Mongols weren't simply horse archers. They had both light and heavy cavalry units with armament that was probably on par or close to it with anything they would have faced.

Regarding that Mongol site - I don't see any mysticism in that introduction.

You don't? I see a whole lot of analysis of Mongol mysticism combined with a bunch of psychoanalytic drivel. I love it when an author trys to "analyze" someone in history based on historical records. It tells me that the author can almost certainly be safely dismissed.

However, a war with the Mongols would've been of a different kind. There was much hatred in Europe back then against infidels, particularly the aggressive ones. The Mongols had quickly acquired a terrible reputation even in Western Europe, which never experienced the effects of their raid. It would've been a total war in all respects, a clash of two different peoples and two different religions. Potentially a huge boost for a united Western Europe.

You have absolutely no historical support for that conclusion (and in fact posted information that opposes this viewpoint in your last post). If that was true the crusades also against "the infidel" who enjoyed a fearsome reputation would have had a whole lot less squabbling and would have enjoyed a whole lot more support. Also if there was this abiding hatred for the Mongols and a desire to stand as a united front against them why not stand with Bela of Hungary?

Except that Western Europeans had been fighting horse archers in the Holy Land for nearly 150 years and they had the best heavy cavalry (and perhaps the best heavy infantry) in the world at the time

Except that those same Europeans eventually were kicked out of the Holy Land by those same "horse archers" that you disparage so much. Also once again in your version of history you think that there would have been a united European effort despite no evidence to support that idea and a good bit of evidence to the contrary.

Neither Poland nor Hungary have ever belonged to Western Europe.

So what? If western rulers were so short sighted as to think that it was fine to throw Poland or Hungary to the Mongol wolves why would the French for instance suddenly take the long view when the Mongols decided to invade Germany? You are also ignoring the conflicts going on within Germany itself that Felix mentioned. Why would all those combatants suddenly decide to forget all their differences when an alliance with the Mongols could potentially be to their advantage ala Alexander Nevsky?

posted 02-14-2002 06:54 PM            

quote:

---

Originally posted by Triton2:

... the Mongols...had both light and heavy cavalry units with armament that was probably on par or close to it with anything they would have faced.

---

To this last I must say "Eh?". The Mongols had fully plate-armoured lancers on heavy destriers? This is news to me. ( Admittedly, a great deal about the Mongols would come as news to me, I am sure; but surely something like this would have managed to find its way into even my limited knowledge. It seems a notable enough fact if true. )

quote:

---

I see a whole lot of analysis of Mongol mysticism combined with a bunch of psychoanalytic drivel. I love it when an author trys to "analyze" someone in history based on historical records. It tells me that the author can almost certainly be safely dismissed.

---

Have to agree with you there, my eyebrows went up at "the wolf and the deer are mates" and didn't come back down until near the end of the passage. I hate to see historiographic scholarship intermingled with, um, "cross-disciplinary philosophy", myself. Still, while to me it weakens the discourse to wander off into flights of religious fancy like that, I can't entirely dismiss an author on that basis alone. I mean, Isaac Newton spent the last years of his life diligently indulging in the study of alchemy---but does that vitiate his theory of gravity? Bill Shockley has published some rather dilettantish ( and borderline racist ) twaddle in the field of eugenics---but does that tarnish his contributions to physics ot make less valuable his co-invention of the transistor? If the author wants to read mystical meanings into Mongol behaviour, I shrug my shoulders and skim over it, for it doesn't particularly interest me; but I'm not sure it renders his knowledge of Mongol history less credible...

quote:

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Except that those same Europeans eventually were kicked out of the Holy Land by those same "horse archers" that you disparage so much.

---

Completely different situation. By the time this happened the Frankish kingdoms of Outremer had been all but abandoned to their fates by mainstream Europe, and the number of warrior there was even tinier and more insufficient than before Hattin...when they were scarcely equal to the task of holding on to territory, much less taking more. Apart from the military orders almost no fresh troops came to the Holy Land to stay---those that went did so as part of a short-term quest for glory and plunder and hastily returned to their homelands, or never got there at all. Financing a defense was similarly a problem---and there were others. But had the Franks been sufficiently reinforced, had they been in Outremer in anything like the numbers that they had in Europe---or indeed anything like the force the Mongols brought into eastern Europe---I doubt that they would have been thus expelled from the Holy Land by horse archers or anyone else...

quote:

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... you think that there would have been a united European effort despite no evidence to support that idea and a good bit of evidence to the contrary.

---

Difficult to find evidence for something that didn't happen, one way or the other. What is the "good bit of evidence" that there would have been no united defense of which you speak? Since the Mongols did not in fact go any further than the far fringes of Europe, I don't quite see what evidence there could be of what would or would not have happened if they had---only speculation on both sides. To be sure, speculation that the Mongols would have "divided and conquered" is as valid as the opposite view, but both are still speculations, no?

quote:

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If western rulers were so short sighted as to think that it was fine to throw Poland or Hungary to the Mongol wolves why would the French for instance suddenly take the long view when the Mongols decided to invade Germany?

---

Do we in fact know that they consciously did this? Were they fully aware of the scope of the threat and affirmatively decided to sacrifice eastern Europe, or did they perhaps either not know or not understand completely what was happening ( in an era of slow, difficult communication and intelligence-gathering )? And if so, can we assume they'd have done the same when the threat was in their own back yard, so to speak?

posted 02-15-2002 12:27 PM               

I'm afraid you aren't particularly fond of intelligently discussing matters. Developing a siege mentality and dismissing every new argument that runs contrary to your belief with vague statements and silly overgeneralizations isn't a very effective way of presenting your opinion.

The moment I got involved in this debate I knew my hypothesis would attract a lot of opposition because it contradicts the common views on the matter. However, I also expected some more intelligent, better informed opposition. With the notable exception of our friend Felix, I've encountered none so far.

"I don't believe that arguement has been refuted at all. Simply positing an alternate theory (and a much less legitimate one in my opinion) in no way refutes an arguement."

I thought we had discussed this matter in enough detail to show that Ogadai's death can't possibly have been the cause of the Mongol halt in Hungary, quite simply because that halt took place 8 months before Ogadai's death and about 10 months before the news of his death reached the Balkans.

"Except that the Mongols weren't simply horse archers. They had both light and heavy cavalry units with armament that was probably on par or close to it with anything they would have faced."

While Marshal's comment regarding knights in full plate isn't entirely appropriate given the timeline (the mid-13th c.), I nevertheless share his general disappointment at your statement.

Instead of resorting to demagogism and dilettantism, let's operate with facts, please. On what evidence do you base your assertion? We do know that the Mongols were poorly equipped by European standards (travel diaries). We do know that they had equipment inferior to that of the Mamelukes. And we do know on basis of archaeological evidence that the arms and armor used by the Mongols were generally of lower quality than those used in Europe and Mameluke Egypt. Even their composite bows were inferior to those used by the Turks (for further information, I again refer you to Nicolle and Ann Hyland).

Secondly, I don't think any nation in the world had heavy cavalry on par with Western Europe at the time. The Middle East was renowned for excellent cavalry, mainly light and horse archers, but none of them could rival the sheer offensive potential of mounted knights when it came to the charge. Muslims may have scoffed at the supposedly inferior European horses and horsemanship. However, the fact remains that they failed to develop heavy cavalry of similar capabilities. The Mongols were no match, either. Steppe ponies may have been great for covering huge distances on grazing alone, but in a charge they couldn't realistically compare to the destrier.

"You have absolutely no historical support for that conclusion (and in fact posted information that opposes this viewpoint in your last post). If that was true the crusades also against "the infidel" who enjoyed a fearsome reputation would have had a whole lot less squabbling and would have enjoyed a whole lot more support. Also if there was this abiding hatred for the Mongols and a desire to stand as a united front against them why not stand with Bela of Hungary?"

The scope of affairs in medieval Europe was a tad too complicated to be discussed on such a simplistic level, I'm afraid. Outremer was not the same as Europe. It was an enclave created during the First Crusade and its main purpose was defense of the Christian holy places.

Initially, Western Europe was very interested in the Holy Land. And as I noted, the first six kings of Jerusalem enjoyed virtually complete authority over the subordinate nobles. Once the religious zeal wore off and the papal authority became more questionable, holding Outremer became a tedious duty, though. It brought little gain but demanded a lot of effort. From the late 12th c. onwards Western Europe was no longer willing to provide support at all costs. That was one of the key reasons for the gradual decline. Outremer of the mid-13th c. was only a shadow of its former self - and its demise was caused more by internal trouble and lack of support from Europe than external threats.

However, Western Europe was, quite simply, home of the Western Europeans. While most Western Europeans weren't ready to risk their lives fighting for Outremer, I'm sure they would've fought hard to defend their homeland in times of need, particularly against a demonized enemy such as the Mongols. The military potential of Outremer was puny from start and grew even smaller with time - yet it kept Outremer alive for two centuries, which tells much about the European military prowess. But the military potential of Western Europe - and even of France and the German empire alone - was far greater and even more importantly, it was much more easily available. Reinforcements could arrive quickly, communication lines were far shorter.

These are facts. As it has already been noted, any speculation as to what would've happend in case of a Mongol invasion is of course just that, a speculation. Based on the hints we do have at hand, I think it's fair to say that chances of Germany or perhaps even a coalition of France and Germany successfully fighting against the Mongols would've been fairly high. Anti-Mongol sentiments were certainly there. Christian propaganda was great at spreading myths about "riders from hell" (hence the Tartars). And Western Europe was capable of united military effort against aggressive infidels. Two such examples - both of them brilliant failures mainly due to the initial overzealousness and the subsequent loss of interest after the defeat - were Nicopolis and Mohacs, both fought against the Turks. Even if those battles ended in a fiasco, they're still a proof that Western Europe was able to unite every now and then against a dangerous common enemy of the Christian world.

And to answer your suggestion: an alliance signed between France and the Mongols against the German empire would've been an extremely unlikely move. Down on the lowest level, some forms of cooperation between petty Christian nobles and their Muslim neighbors did take place in Outremer. But as Marshal wisely pointed out, there was no instance of one crusader state allying with Muslims against another crusader state. Cooperation between Christians and Muslims could be tolerated only to a certain extent. But on the whole, Christians and Muslims considered themselves common enemies. While the Mongols of the Golden Horde were not Muslims but pagans, they were infidels from the European perspective nevertheless. The prospects of one Christian state (France) signing an alliance with infidel invaders against another Christian state (Germany) would've been extremely slim and would surely have provoked nation-wide outrage. When one considers that Louis IX, who ruled France at the time, was a deeply religious person and an ardent crusader, such a move seems even far less probable.

A Franco-Mongol alliance would also have contradicted common sense. France surely wouldn't have wanted to replace one great opponent - the German empire - with an even more dangerous one - a Mongol empire stretching from southern Russia to the Rhine. It is in strategic interests of any nation to choose the lesser evil. Only a few states ever broke that rule and those that did usually soon regretted their decision. The Lombards for instance, who initially signed a treaty with the Avars, were in for a nasty surprise when the Avars, after having defeated their common enemies, turned against the former allies.

"Except that those same Europeans eventually were kicked out of the Holy Land by those same "horse archers" that you disparage so much."

This is new to me. So it was the Mongols who destroyed Outremer?

If it's the Mamelukes who you're referring to, then you're wrong. The Mameluke army did not consist exclusively of cavalry but included infantry as well. The Mameluke cavalry was quite unlike the Mongol horsemen in several respects. Archery, while practiced to some extent, was generally of less importance than shock action. Mameluke cavalrymen were highly trained for close-quarters combat, but not all of them were horse archers nor were they necessarily very proficient in archery from horseback.

It should be noted that horse archers as such were ineffective against the contemporary Western European armies. As long as the Europeans maintained a solid formation (infantry protecting the mounted knights), they were perfectly safe and their archers and crossbowmen could inflict significant losses on the enemy. There are numerous instances when heavily outnumbered crusader armies were able to march long distances through enemy-held territory despite being constantly harrassed by the Turks.

The only way the Turks could defeat a reasonably well led and disciplined Christian army was to break it into smaller parts and destroy those in hand-to-hand combat. Horse archery could sometimes achieve the first tactical goal (breaking the opposing army), but only if the Christian army was unusually undisciplined and/or caught in difficult terrain. But to achieve victory, Saracen horsemen needed to engage the Christians at close-quarters, which means that their horse archers had to temporarily assume the role of light cavalry. Even then, light cavalry was not ideal for assaulting enemy infantry and was prone to take heavy casualties in the process. Whenever the Turks commited themselves seriously to an assault, they also became vulnerable to the charge of the mounted knights.

The matter could be discussed in far greater detail, but I hope you realize that the Western European heavy infantry and mounted knights were an enemy to be reckoned with and that the standard steppe tactics relying on horse archery was not effective against them under normal circumstances. For further reading, please consult Smail's Crusading Warfare. While a fairly old work, it addresses these issues far more competently than most other books.

If western rulers were so short sighted as to think that it was fine to throw Poland or Hungary to the Mongol wolves why would the French for instance suddenly take the long view when the Mongols decided to invade Germany? You are also ignoring the conflicts going on within Germany itself that Felix mentioned. Why would all those combatants suddenly decide to forget all their differences when an alliance with the Mongols could potentially be to their advantage ala Alexander Nevsky?

First of all, Poland and Hungary were two independent, sovereign states. And independent states must generally take care of themselves. There was no equivalent of UN/NATO-sponsored peacekeeping forces in the middle ages that would rush to assistance every time a country was invaded.

Second, the western rulers did not throw Poland and Hungary to the "Mongol wolves". They had nothing to do with the Mongol raid nor was there any reason for immediate assistance. While both Poland and Hungary were badly shaken by the raids, they did not cease to exist as Christian states. In Hungary, a number of major strongholds were still holding out and the Mongols were unable to destroy them. Poland recovered even faster. From the Western European perspective, the trouble in Eastern Europe was probably seen as a temporary setback and an internal affair.

The only part of the German empire that did mobilize its armies was also the only one which was really threatened - Austria. Friedrich was certainly aware of the Mongol threat, but he doesn't seem to have been too concerned about it. He took advantage of Bela's infamous flight to expand his territory. But he also wisely let the Mongol attack run out of steam. A very typical medieval European strategy that worked time and again in Outremer (especially against Saladin).

Batu's force was not particularly large at the start of the campaign and its number had definitely dwindled with the fighting (all fuss and disagreement aside, it cannot be disputed that the Mongols did take some losses during the campaign and those suffered at Mohi were substantial). As long as Friedrich had a strong army in the field and plenty of fortifications manned (most of them in terrain much more difficult than the Hungarian plain) he had nothing to worry about.

Third, unlike you, I'm not saying I know what would have happened in case of a Mongol invasion of Western Europe. Consequently, I can't tell whether France and the German empire would've united their strength. However, I don't think any such coalition would've been necessary to halt the Mongols. The resources and military potential available to Frederick II were great and when employed correctly, they should've sufficed to stop a steppe army the size of the Golden Horde. Hungary seems to have almost achieved that very same goal with much more limited resources.

Fourth, I'm aware of the inner conflicts in the German empire. But it would be incorrect to overemphasize their importance. The conflict between the popes and emperors had a long history but in Frederick II's time, most of Germany was still under the emperor's control. Even during the interregnum after 1250 some of Germany's most prominent noblemen signed mutual pacts and alliances to tackle common problems together. I don't see any reason why similar actions couldn't have taken place against a serious Mongol threat if it ever materialized.

"The papal authority couldn't have ignored a serious threat of an all-out Mongol invasion, either.

Not only could the papacy do that it did do just that. It completely ignored pleas for help from Hungary."

Perhaps the Mongols were no serious threat to Western Europe in 1241... The Church could do little to provide real military assistance to Hungary. By the mid-13th c. the papal authority was already shaken; few would respond to a call to crusade unless the threat was indeed grave. The Church launched a propaganda campaign against the Mongols even before they reached Hungary and Poland, though, and this campaign seems to have been quite effective at spreading common anti-Mongol sentiments throughout Europe. But it wasn't enough to start a war against the Mongols. Western Europe viewed the Mongols with antipathy. But long as it wasn't threatened directly, there was little desire to launch an offensive against the Mongol infidels. In the end, it was a perfectly viable strategy because the Mongols never even attempted to invade Western Europe - much ado about nothing?