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Brock H Member |
posted 03-12-2001 03:12 PM
   
Tomaz--I lost my temper and I shouldn't have. I appologize. Of course the mercenary was unreliable and wantonly destructive. That's why Europe did away with him. Before you seemed to be refering only to the direct costs of a mercenary vs. the long-serving soldier. Then you seemed to change the rules of the debat by bringing up the indirect costs. IP: Logged |
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Roel Oosterop Member |
posted 03-12-2001 03:50 PM
It appears to me, that mercenaries are mistaken for 'soldiers of fortune' in this discussion. For example, in the late middle ages there were so-called 'free companies', who were independant soldiers. Their loyalty was dubious and when 'peace broke out', they could be a real nuissance for their former employers; they still had to make money, some way or another. On the other hand, when there was a war somewhere, friendly powers could send more organized bands of soldiers. They didn't do that out of charity, but to earn some money. To give you an idea, by the mid 15th century the Burgundians had seized almost complete control of the Low Countries. When somewhat later the Wars of the Roses were fought, the Burgundians sent quite some Flemish pikemen to England. It made the already wealthy dukes even more wealthy. Tomaz, you are right about the thirty years war, but that can be considerd an old-fashioned war for that period. The many, small German states still relied on mercenaries, as long their treasury allowed so. During that same period the Dutch reorganized their army into the 'Staatse Leger' (State's army). Quite some of the former mercenaries were incorporated in the new standing army and the balance was disbanded (well, they probably went to Germany). Some of the better aspects of this standing army was (and still is), that when there was no fighting to do, they returned to their barracks. Instead of sitting idle, the men spent their days with drill! In the mean time they learned all aspects of discipline (I once read a fine example of that; using profane language: three days in the cooler). This resulted in a smaller, but much more effective army. The army still had large numbers of Germans, Swiss and Scots in the ranks, but since they were employed the year round, there was little doubt about their loyalty. Appearantly this was a good idea, 'cause a decade later Cromwell used it to form the 'new model' army. Roel IP: Logged |
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Felix Member |
posted 03-12-2001 05:17 PM
To expand on Roel's last comment, the standing armies of the 18th century were not conscripts, nor were they mercenary in the usual sense of the term. These forces were professional standing armies, but the native language and ethnicity of the soldiers was not particularly related to the army they belonged to. In one sense, a man could be "mercenary" i.e. employed by a foreign army basically for money, but not be "a mercenary", i.e. a free-floating soldier of fortune. Some were refugees -- the Wild Geese of Ireland, and Jacobites; others were merely down-and-out. The country of origin was unimportant so long as they could learn the words of commmand. As I recall, Frederick the Great noted that his officers should be encouraged to recruit foreigners. That way, productive tax-paying Prussian citizens were not wasted by being used as cannon foder, and the pool of potential soldeirs available to other kings' armies was reduced. Conscription was not politically possible until nationalism swept in with the French Revolution. The transition from mercenary bands to professional armies was a painful one. In the Renaissance, colonels and captains "owned" their respective units, being chief financial officer as well as commander. This was a great opportunity for fraud, and also meant the bonds between the soldiers and the king were somewhat weakened. If pay was delayed too long, the troops might go on strike, or decide to pay themselves. The latter could be catastrophic, as when the Army of Flanders (Spanish) looted Antwerp during the 80 Year's War, which was an important factor in undermining the economy of the Hapsburg Low countries, and enabling the ascendency of the Netherlands. High finance was critical in supporting logistics, hence the importance of men like Foquet in the time of Louis XIV, and the Fuggers and Medici earlier. (I'm wandering pretty far from the battlefield, at this point.) IP: Logged |
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Tomaz Member |
posted 03-13-2001 12:20 PM
Brock H: No hard feelings about that! And I didn't mean to be offensive, sorry if it sounded that way. Actually, I've really enjoyed this debate so far. Roel: Some mercenaries were undoubtedly highly professional men, fierce and reliable. This is why the Swiss were so sought after. The Burgundians were also considerably above average. But let us not forget that such disciplined professionals with at least some code of honor were truly an exception to the rule. Most medieval mercenaries were actually more like soldiers for fortune. Their morale was low, training and expertise often quite doubtful. To rely on mercenaries too heavily was considered unwise (didn't Machiavelli write about that?). Perhaps the greatest single problem with mercenaries was that most were highly reluctant to risk their lives in combat. This meant that mercenaries were usually successful against a weaker enemy, but if the situation became too dangerous, you couldn't rely on them anymore. The Thirty Years' War was indeed an old-fashioned conflict. Yet it was also one of the most important turning points in European history and the one that proved the fundamental weakness of mercenary armies and the lack of a strong cventral government. Felix: 18th c. standing armies were essentially conscripts - not really in the modern sense, but conscripts nevertheless. In Austria, each district had to provide a certain number of recruits. If you were the only son in the family or had a job "vital to the interests of the state" (such as bakers, blacksmiths, miners, teachers etc.), you were exempted from that. But otherwise, military service was mandatory. I fully agree that mercenaries could turn into a nightmare if they weren't paid regularly. There were numerous incidents during the Thirty Years War when soldiers and sometimes even whole units switched sides in the midst of battle because they heard that the enemy pays more. IP: Logged |
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English Martin Member |
posted 03-14-2001 04:10 PM
Machiavelli gives some time in The Prince to the virtues of a standing army over mercenaries, yet no state managed to achieve this in his time. Part of the problem was that with good money to be made out of mercenary service, all the best soldiers were mercenaries. The citizen's armies that Machiavelli and others raised were very poor quality. Part of this is I think to do with the skil needed to use medieval weapons. Even being a pikeman requires the ability to march in formation. Come Napoleonic times and you could put a musket in a man's hand he's a soldier, but in medieval times it was a little harder. No medieval knigdom managed a proper standing army. The mot effective, like the English and Swiss, made do with an armed citizenry. This required military service to be part of the culture of the country. In Switzerland it still is, whilst in England, even though it is still law to have to practice archery three times a week, the number of suitably skilled citizen's gradually declined. IP: Logged |
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Tomaz Member |
posted 03-15-2001 11:38 AM
English Martin: Actually, I have to disagree on the first point. Some of the very best medieval armies consisted of citizens. The Dutch militiamen defended their country sucessefully against the French, who were far stronger. The Swiss stood up against the best heavy cavalry of the day and won. The Hussites consistently outfought much better equipped Austrian forces thanks to good tactics. And I probably don't need to remind you that the English longbowmen were recruited from yeomen. They were hardly mercenaries in the true sense of the word. However, I agree that standing armies did not really exist in the Middle Ages. For the most part, that was due to the lack of an effective government. But the inexistence of nationalism also played an important role. IP: Logged |
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English Martin Member |
posted 03-15-2001 01:24 PM
Good points. But it is always easier to get your citizens to defend theri home cities than to invade other people's. Whilst the Dutch fought the Spanish to a standstill they were never a military force that could march all over Europe. The sort of social factors that made the Dutch such hardy foes would have been difficult for Machiavelli to reproduce in Italy. Basically if you haven't got the raw material it's difficult to make effective soldiers. It takes something really special, like the French or Russian revolutions to make ordinary peasants into fearsome warriors. IP: Logged |
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Roel Oosterop Member |
posted 03-15-2001 06:05 PM
We get somewhat diverted from the original topic, logistics, in favor of mercenary/standing/conscript army. I think there is an other factor, that hasn't been mentioned yet: the feudal system. Although the early Merovingian kings like Chlodovicus (or Clovis) tried to establish a 'national' state with a centralized administration, they soon had to resort to a primitive feudal system. The king granted (large) tracts of land to the gentry (and the church). They would put the farmers to work, thus providing revenues for themselves and the court. In return, the gentry (and their retinue) were required to provide military service for their monarch. They also had to supply food and transport for any military campaign. Charlemagne was pretty clear on this, when he stated "We want the 'comes' (counts) to appear well prepared for war", which meant they should have hauberk, helmet, sword, shield, spear and a warhorse, and, of course, bring enough supplies. The more important noblemen would employ several knights. It's interesting to know, that the old English word 'knighte' is similar to the Dutch and German 'knecht' (which, through Saxon, can be traced back to old Germanic) and simply denotes a servant or employee. So, the knight originally was a man-at-war employed by a nobleman; there are even records of unfree men (not slaves, because they couldn't be sold) who were professional soldiers. These were the men who formed the standing army. Charlemagne continued that "The poor people (the common, yet free men) shall outfit one out of every seven for service"; they should have at least spear and shield and preferrably some kind of side-arm. They were the conscripts and their feudal lord was responsible for, at least some form of, military training. Charlemagne already realized, that the 'peasants' first duty was to work the fields, so their military obligation was limited to a fixed number of days. This system worked well, as long as there were strong rulers like Charlemagne or William the Conqueror. Less powerfull kings would find their feudal tennants very unruly, so they had to rely on mercenaries every now and then. This would make the case of logistics even more difficult, since a not-so-powerfull ruler had to pay for it all by himself! However, mercenaries weren't the solution either, as the English found out in the 12th century. At the same time, local noblemen established their own 'feudalism' by granting land to the lesser gentry. These lesser gentry of course provided military service to their 'lord'. There is a nice example from early 11th century Holland, back then a part of the German (or 'Holy Roman') empire. Count Dirk III had established an illegal toll at the mouth of the river Rhine (what else can you do when your IRS isn't bringing in too much?), much to the dislike of merchants, who complained at the imperial (German) court. Well, Dirk defied the German emperor and in 1018 he defeated (with all the luck of the world) an imperial army! Another disadvantage of the feudal system was, that through marriage and inheritance, the nobility subsequently held tracts of land in different countries, thus 'dividing' their loyalty. At the outbreak of the hundred years war, noblemen of both sides were reluctant to fight, because they held lands in both England and France! Now it should be noted that about halfway the middle ages, cities and their citizens became an important factor. They liked their privileges, always a good reason (we may even call it 'ideology') to fight for! Their militias consisted almost entirely of conscripts, yet were sometimes formidable forces, like the Flemish at Courtrai or the Cologne militia at Woeringen. Whatever some books may say, these medieval cities were well organized so they also had the ability to tackle the logistical problems (at least for short campaigns). A nice feature of conscripts is, that you only have to pay them when they are in active service, which makes them a cheap force. Things changed however, when cities allowed their citizens to send 'remplacents'. Then the mercenaries were back in business! Roel IP: Logged |
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Brock H Member |
posted 03-16-2001 11:38 AM
Roel--about the Staatse Leger. From what I've read the credit for better drilled and disciplined armies does go to the Dutch, but it's even earlier than the period of the Thirty Years War. William of Nassau deserves the credit for instituting regular discipline and drill standardized throughout an army. Archer Jones in THE ART OF WAR IN THE WESTERN WORLD refers to "the Dutch tactical system" and its adoption throughout Europe following the Thirty Years War and the obvious failure of relying upon mercenaries. All armies today use a system of drill that is still recognizably that of William of Nassau's. In a way, a discussion of mercenaries does relate to logistics. Money and finances are very much a part of logistics. When states were less organized financially it was very difficult to have a standing army even if the concept had existed. It was cheaper to hire men only at need. As long as they could be paid somewhat regularily and could be fed, the problems of this system weren't too apparent. But come the Thirty Years War the mercenary armies grew too large to pay promptly and couldn't be supported by the areas in which they campaigned. So as Tomaz has rightly pointed out they became very destructive, deciding to pay and feed themselves by plundering anyone they could. It's because the Dutch were the first European nation to evolve the beginings of a modern financial system that they were able to keep men under arms even when they were not needed. Thus they could drill and discipline them constantly and make for a more effective army for its numbers. Tomaz--basically, Machiavelli said even skilled mercenaries could ruin a prince because their leader could become ambitious and want to become a ruler himself, plus they were always open to a bribe from the other side. But poor mercenaries were even worse since they could lose the war. I read once long ago (I'm going on memory here, so I could be wrong) that Machiavelli proposed what we would consider a combined arms army. It was supposed to be an Italian army in order to keep the French, the Burgundians, the Holy Roman Emperor and other outsiders out of Italy. I don't remember what the missile troops were, but the rest of the infantry consisted of pikemen to hold off the cavalry and sword & buckler men to break into the pike blocks. This army would have creamed any other existing at the time, but of course the Italian states couldn't set aside their differences to form such an army and none could form it on its own. English Martin--the effectiveness of the English longbowmen was due to more than just regular practice. This is a good point to bring up something that's been overlooked in this discussion of mercenaries and standing armies. Let's remember that during the Middle Ages there were always landless knights, younger sons and such. Many of these were soldiers of fortune, wandering from one war to another, selling their swords. But others found a place in the retinue of a lord or king. We could regard them as semi-professional soldiers. These knights would form a better trained and somewhat disciplined core within the purely fuedal levies. Now back to the English longbowmen. During Edward I's constant campaigns and later during the Hundred Years War, there no doubt were a number of knights and longbowmen who made their living by signing up for campaign after campaign. While most probably weren't campaigning continuously, after service in a couple we can regard them as semi-professional soldiers when they signed up for another one. Many of the longbowmen at Crecy, Poitiers and Agincourt must have been experienced soldiers which would have added to their effectiveness. IP: Logged |
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Felix Member |
posted 03-16-2001 07:21 PM
If I remember correctly, the trends that English Martin and Brock H have been discussing in England evolved into a "neo-feudal" arangement called "maintenance and livery(?)". The great lords, who could afford it, paid retainers who served with them in a long term capacity. This did not necessarily involve a fief or homage in the typical medieval sense. These private armies helped make the Wars of the Roses possible. IP: Logged |
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Tomaz Member |
posted 03-17-2001 04:45 AM
English Martin: Obviously, a citizen army was far stronger on defense than offense. No, the Dutch were never a military force capable of dominating Europe - they had neither the numbers nor resources for that - but they were strong enough to defend their land for centuries, which must have been good enough. On the other hand, I can't think of a single mercenary army truly capable of marching all over Europe. That was something only an exceptional standing army could achieve, such as the French under Napoleon or Wehrmacht in WWII. The Romans also came close to that ideal, but their dreams were shattered in the Teutoburg forest in 9AD, so even they can't really qualify. It's true that the situation was wholly different in Italy than in the Low Lands. In Machiavelli's times, Italy was divided into numerous city states and the majority of people were more oriented towards making profit than war. Under such circumstances, forming a citizen army was impossible. Raw materials are vital to raise a strong army, but perhaps even more important is the support and determination of the citizens. The French revolutionary army started almost from stratch and fought against the mighty alliance of European powers, but the zeal of the French soldiers helped overcome any deficiency in numbers and equipment. Roel: Many good points and a lot of truth in your post! The feudal system indeed imposed a number of limitations. In most countries, the king was only the highest nobleman. Despite the moral authority he had, his power and influence depended solely on his wealth. With a few notable exceptions, most German emperors were little more than puppets in hands of the richest vassals. Feudalism was all about self-sufficiency. It created numerous small communities, basically independent and only loosely connected in a state. Although it provided safety in uncertain times, feudalism could no longer work efficiently once that cities became a significant factor. Brock H: While Machiavelli was a great thinker, he was not a soldier. Many of his propositions were pure theory that just couldn't possibly work in reality, so I'd take his ideas with a grain of salt. Although he correctly estimated the threat of mercenary armies, the solution he proposed was wholly unrealistic. Machiavelli was striving for a united Italy strong enough to repel the French the Austrians. His idea was to restore the power of the Roman empire and the military ideal he was looking up to was obviously the Roman legion. Unfortunately, Machiavelli did not understand that realities of the battlefield had changed dramatically since the times of Caesar. Like Felix and you have noted, the English longbowman was a semi-professional soldier. While not an independent mercenary looking for an employer, he nevertheless was an experienced soldier whose expertise vastly surpassed that of a peasant infantryman, so he was something of an exception in the Middle Ages. IP: Logged |
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English Martin Member |
posted 03-17-2001 08:17 AM
Could a mercenary army walk across Europe? Hannibal (the Carthagininan not the cannibal) did! The 'Ten Thousand' marched across most of Asia. true, they didn't have much choice, but it seems that despite all being mercenaries raised to seize the Persian crown, as professional fighting men and Greeks they had an esprite-de-corps that would be the envy of any standing army. In the end the Roman's citizen's army beat Hannibal, but it could be said that Hannibal won the war of manouevre but Rome won the war of attrition. IP: Logged |
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Brock H Member |
posted 03-17-2001 12:17 PM
Correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't Hannibal win every battle he fought in Italy? Wasn't it when the Romans landed an army in North Africa that forced the recall of Hannibal? And didn't he have to leave most of his experienced troops behind so the Roman citizen army faced essentially a Carthagian citizen army and inexperienced mercenaries which it soundly beat? The Romans never really beat Hannibal in Italy; they just prevented him from winning as long as they followed Fabius's strategy of staying behind city walls which Hannibal couldn't breach because he didn't have the siege equipment and engineers needed for that. So his army ended up essentially as freebooters, wandering around Italy looking for food and loot for pay. Another example of logistics at work. You can't say Hannibal's army marched all over Europe. He started in Spain, marched through a narrow corridor in Gaul and into Italy. He never got into most of Gaul or any of Germany or the countries of central Europe. This pales utterly in comparison to what the Romans, Revolutionary and Napoleonic France and the Wehrmach achieved. IP: Logged |
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Roel Oosterop Member |
posted 03-18-2001 06:21 PM
Sorry Brock H, I wished you were right, but it was not William of Nassau (actually William of Oranje-Nassau, the original ancestor of our Royal family and also known as Willem the Silent) who deserves credit. He's remembered in our history books 'cause he sold his posessions to hire troops. When he was assassinated in 1584 by a hitman (king Philip II of Spain had outlawed him in 1580), the Dutch army still consisted of mercenary bands. Only the navy was more or less professionally organized; the large cities and provinces paid for them (believe it or not, throughout the days of the Republic, there were FIVE admiralties). Upon his death, William had two sons (well, there was a third one, but he was hostage in Spain): Maurits (Maurice) and Frederik Hendrik (Frederick Henry, who was born just a week before his fathers death). Maurits led the army 'till his death in 1625, but never realy modernized it, although he tried to reform it. He did however buy time, because from 1609 to 1621 there was a cease fire. Unfortunately, peace negotiations failed, so in '21 hostilities were resumed. In the mean time, his half-brother Frederik Hendrik was busy studying the 'classics', like Caesars 'Bello Gallico'. Now it was Frederik Hendrik, who came in charge in 1625, to reorganize the army. He tranformed it to a 'modern' standing army. He was also the man to form for the first time since Roman days a corps of engineers (much later, when that same corps was incorporated in Napoleons army, they built a bridge over the Berezina, thus enabling the French retreat from Russia). His ideas were well established upon his death in 1647, so twenty years later, admiral De Ruyter met little opposition when he asked for a corps of marines! Sorry guys, when it comes to our war of independence or the Anglo-Dutch wars of the 17th century, I do get patriotic and chauvinistic. Roel IP: Logged |
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Brock H Member |
posted 03-18-2001 08:43 PM
Roel: I bow to your superior knowledge on this, sir. Still, it is the Dutch who deserve credit for starting what has since evolved into the modern military of virtually every nation. Something for which you rarely get credit. IP: Logged |
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Felix Member |
posted 03-19-2001 02:28 PM
See below,sorry about the double post. [This message has been edited by Felix (edited 03-19-2001).] IP: Logged |
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Felix Member |
posted 03-19-2001 02:40 PM
Niggling coments (forgive me) William Macneil and other historians do give credit to Maurice of Nassau for reviving/inventing close order drill, which was a critical step in the progress of European warmaking. Effective drill sped up volley fire, made units more mobile on the battlefield, and allowed smaller units to successfully hold of cavalry (with pike, later bayonet) as opposed to the big square tercio. Close order drill also gave european soldiers an esprit de corps which greatly facilitated their defeating most of the rest of the planet. Hannibal did manage to bring back part of his army to Africa. The showdown at Zama was a close-run thing. Hannibal formed up his army in three lines, and Scipio's legions had to cut their way through two lines of inexperienced troops, before confronting Hannibal's rested veterans. The third Carthaginian line forced the Romans to a halt, and the battle was in grave doubt until the Roman (and allied Numidian) horse returned to the battlefield from chasing Hannibal's horsemen, and fell upon the rear of the Carthaginian foot. IP: Logged |
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Roel Oosterop Member |
posted 03-23-2001 07:08 PM
To Brock H Sir, thank you for the compliment, it makes a small nation grow! Besides, do you know who was the first U.S ambassador (and when) in the Netherlands? For those members who don't know, I'll give the answer below. To Felix Roel IP: Logged |
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Sikandur Member |
posted 03-24-2001 08:54 PM
On arrival in your country, Roel, Adams had some very nice (from an American point of view) things to say:
quote:. (From Barbara Tuchman's The First Salute--Primary Source: "The Country Where I Am", to Abigail (Adam's wife) letters of September 14, 15, 1780, Adams, Book of Abigail and John. IP: Logged |
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Roel Oosterop Member |
posted 03-25-2001 06:12 PM
Thanks Sikandur, That's a great mirror to look into. Even today, the rest of the world regards us as a 'weird little country', but that's the way we like ourselves. Kind regards, Roel IP: Logged |
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Thorsten Member |
posted 05-22-2001 04:27 PM
I am not sure If this could help, but in the book of John Haldon Warafare, State and Society in thr byzyntine World 565 - 1204 In his Appendices there are some interesting things about the rations and the weights and loads for supply IP: Logged |
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Brock H Member |
posted 05-22-2001 06:21 PM
Another book I need to buy now. BTW, I did get HENRY VIII AND THE INVASION OF FRANCE. THE ARMY OF FLANDERS AND THE SPANISH ROAD isn't available right now, so for Parker I got THE MILITARY REVOLUTION. It has some of the same material since he quotes himself. Any book giving hard numbers on supply and transport loading is of interest to me at least, Thorsten, so yes, your post is helpful. [This message has been edited by Brock H (edited 05-22-2001).] IP: Logged |
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Thorsten Member |
posted 05-23-2001 06:19 AM
Brock H The pages of the Appendices are only 11 of 400 pages. It has a few things on Logistics in one or two of the other chapters. Thorsten IP: Logged |
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Brock H Member |
posted 05-23-2001 10:32 AM
Thorsten: That's where most of my information has to come from. There are very few books which deal with logistics. For the most part I've had to find this information in notes, appendencies or a few pages in a chapter. I feel very lucky when a book devotes as much as a single chapter to the topic of logistics. IP: Logged |
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Andius Member |
posted 12-28-2004 08:54 PM
Just an interesting fact that I found out. The Romans actually had water bottles for each soldier to carry their water! And the curious thing about it, it looks just like water bottles the marines carry! Except that they are metallic. IP: Logged |
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