posted 07-24-2000 06:58 PM            

I ask this because the detailed breakdown of your battle description is very similar to the way in which they studied the Battle of Tedorigawa. At least it lacks the severe smack on the wrist dealt out to Osprey writer Anthony Bryant, based on his comment:

quote:

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"The great general of Japanese history were by and large not born tactical geniuses...the majority of engagements still seem to have been frontal charges, however, with tactical sophistication such as flanking manoeuvres coming in a distant second..."

---

Jones and Solum's comment on this is:

quote:

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"Mr. Bryant's comments...should be treated with a large pinch of salt at best, and with raging contempt at worst...

---

Ouch!

posted 07-25-2000 06:18 AM               

Fear exists for a reason. It helps a soldier stay alert, keeps him alive. But face to face, blades out, it must not be allowed to come to the surface, even a bit. I think this is what the Japanese are getting at with the fatalism bit - although they added a huge pile of philosophy to it, and maybe took it a bit too far.

Courage in the face of death should not mean throwing away your life or disregarding your own value to army and country. A trained soldier is a commodity.

It is to be more or less expected that two samurai of roughly even skill will both die. I know that they assume this attitude will allow them to defeat any man who pays the slightest bit of attention to staying alive, but I don't buy it.

So basically I'm with you, but I understand where the Japanese are coming from.

posted 07-25-2000 02:08 PM               

On the other hand, a good example of soldiers "trying to stay alive," as Triton2 put it, might be the Italians. Huge numbers of them were quite determined to stay very much alive, and did exactly that.

It was the fighting quality (including fatalism and ferocity) of the poorly equiped Japanese soldier that allowed Japan to conquor most of Asia, an area far greater than that conquored by Nazi Germany, and doing so with only one-sixth as many troops. And it was not any supposed superior fighting quality of the American soldier that defeated the Japanese. Japan lost World War II, not because her soldiers were fatalistic, but because ultimatly she lost the war of production. No other nation could stand against the United States in industrial production and efficiancy. Admiral Yamamoto, who had been educated in the U.S. and understood the untapped industrial capacity and manpower pool the country could rely on and ultimatly unleash if she geared her economy to war, warned his superiors that a conflict with America could be successful for "six months or a year" at best, and urged them not to go to war with the United States. And despite the fact that American forces were still small and untried in battle, Winston Churchill recalled his thoughts upon hearing the news of Pearl Harbor: "So we had won after all."

posted 07-25-2000 03:32 PM            

As usual, watch out for a certain amount of Japanocentrism - I bristled a bit at the arrogance of the line "it was sheer professionalism on a scale unknown in Europe and probably not seen on a world-wide basis until well into this century." Well, that told Marlborough and Frederick the Great and Napoleon where to get off, didn't it?

As for the French name for "The Glorious First of June" - how about "L'incident malheureuse aprés le fin du Mai"?

posted 07-25-2000 04:12 PM               

The Italians did not fight to live they quit to live. They were fighting in a war they had been dragged into by their egocentric leader and never wanted any part of it for the most part.

As for Japan, I agree with Japan ultimately losing the war of production. I also agree with your assesment of Admiral Yamamoto and his beliefs about war with the U.S. I kind of think of him as the Robert E. Lee of Japan. He didn't want to go to war but did his best when his country called. I would also have to point out however that at Midway and Gaudalcanal vastly inferior U.S. forces defeated the fatalistic Japanese. In fact Japan was being pushed back across the Pacific while most of the resources of the United States were still being focused on Europe.

posted 07-25-2000 09:53 PM               

You all know some of the most brutal and ferocious close quarters battles of the war were on the Pacific islands, American and Japanese soldiers going full out in horrific conditions. My grandfather was on Guam, and he still won't talk about it. Both sides showed incredible bravery, as well as prowess, and I think it is completely erroneous to ascribe mental superiority to one side or the other. And one insists on doing so, well, I believe the Japanese had the heavier casualties on Guam, despite a defending position and similiar numbers...

We're all homo sapiens. Two warriors meeting blade to blade? I doubt it is truly possible to predict without coming down to an almost incalculable host of individual considerations. Yeah, Musashi is probably going to kill your average joe knight. But Musashi against, say, Jacque de Lalaing? Very very interesting...

Oh, and I still think a katana is a crap anti-plate weapon. I hope this hypothetical samurai has a spear or something.

posted 07-27-2000 03:02 PM               

I think that the fatalistic or stoic attitude towards death made a lot more sense in pre-twentieth c., especially pre-gunpowder warfare. In the modern era, when a soldier might be killed by an artilleryman miles away, or by a bomb from a plane that he can't see and can't see him, one's attitude towards death doesn't matter. The shell or bomb doesn't care.

When fighting close up, when the other guy can look in your eyes, I think attitude may make a difference. The warrior who is not thinking (even in the back of his mind) about running away, the warrior who is solely focused on holding his ground or killing his enemy may have an edge. Since his enemies can see this, they may be intimidated, and more vulnerable.

This attitude shows up in other places than Japan and Russia. In North America, the Plains tribes (at least one, I don't remember which) had elite warrrior societies, one of which were the "Dog-Soldiers". One of their accoutrements was a stake and short cord. On occasion, these were used to literally stake a position on the battlefield, from which the warrior would not move until the foe fled or he was killed. The Chechens (yes, THOSE Chechens) were described by a Russian writer (Tolstoy, I think) as on occasion chaining themselves together when cornered by their Russian enemies, and fighting to the death. This wsa during the first Russian conquest of the Caucasus, in the mid 19th c. In classical literature (Plato?), an incident involving the philosopher Socrates makes the point about not showing any fear, and tempting death. He was serving as a hoplite during some battle that didn't go well for the Athenians. Where most soldiers turned and ran as fast as they could (probably throwing away shields, armor, etc.), he made the point of retiring slowly, backing off the field, daring any enemy hoplite to take him on. Obviously he was one of the last to leave, but his attitude (in both senses of the word) meant that he was left alone, and got away in one piece. (He may have been rescuing someone else in the process, I don't recall.)

I should also point out that the Russian stoicism served them very well up to the 20th c. If you look at the record for the 7 year's war (see Christopher Duffy) or the Napoleonic wars (Russell Weigley's "Ageof Battles" or David Chandler), one of the Russian army's great strengths was the "fatalist" attitude of its infantry. Frederick the Great remarked that you had to first kill Russian soldiers, and then knock them down. He had great trouble with the Russians because the wouldn't panic if outflanked or taken in the rear, but stood and fought regardless of how badly their general had been out-manouveured. Napoleon had similar problems.

posted 07-27-2000 11:28 PM               

It is also a most excellent way to die.

The Japanese call it ai-uchi, a mutual slaying. But is this really the highest level of skill to which a warrior aspires? I think not. It will, at most, force a draw, as even a halfway competent foe will kill you in the process. Traditional Budo masters do not like to think of anything in terms of victory or defeat, so they probably do not think of this sort of thing as a draw, either. I, however, do think of it in such terms.

Now, the idea is, as I have said, that this attitude will allow you to kill a man with any other mode of operation. Bah, humbug. It is not automatically cowardice to keep yourself alive, to parry, to block, etc. This sounds obvious but the Japanese ideal is to not "require" such actions. Fine. If both warriors wish to die, that is their prerogative. One will note that the Japanese have never favored shields very much (I just know at this point some idiot is going to pipe up that the Japanese did use shields at so-and-so point. I know that. It was still not prevalent. So shut up and sit down before you hit that "reply" button.) But a shield is a bloody good instrument of combat, and believe it or not most anyone who practices European combat thinks of it as quite an advantage over a single longsword or the like. Now, the person does matter more than the equipment, but this is an example of defensive thought creating a tangible advantage. I dare any of you to pick up a katana and just rush at a shield user without paying attention to your own defense. Yeah, I dare ya. Fatalistic ferocity my...

*ahem*. In karate, we block. It's defensive. In SCARS (Special Combat Aggressive Reactionary system, US government approved hand-to-hand method, navy course number ) we also block, except they call it a strike - and it is a strike, targeting nerves in the arm and numbing it for several seconds when done correctly. It's a very offensive thought process and execution, but it is functionally defensive. Fighting to live also works - at the last, it's not the philosophy that matters when you're finally standing in front of a guy who wants to kill you, it's the movements. You fight the way you train.

I've had bullets flying my way in Mozambique. It doesn't take very long to recognize your mortality when people start dying. If one thinks Japanese people in particular fight harder because they were "brought up with the thought of dying" (who isn't? Honestly, guys, who isn't...), they ignore the fact that people basically only have two biological reactions when their life is on the line. Fight, or run. Everyone who runs does so in the same spirit. Everyone who fights, fights in the same spirit. Kill or die. Differing levels of skill, equipment, and physical attributes make a difference, but the mentality is one. I think to a large extent the rest is semantics.

So it's back to the skill of individuals we go, as most of us intuitively recognize.

posted 07-28-2000 09:04 AM               

I cited the example of Russian casualties to show an what could be done by soldiers willing to spend their lives in a cause they believed in. Triton2's assertion that the Russian troops who fought and died to liberate their homeland from Nazi Germany were doing so for no other reason than because they were ordered to by their generals might illicit a strong response from any surviving Russian veterans of that war (or any surviving German veterans, for that matter).

Triton2 makes an excellent point regarding the similarities between General Lee and Admiral Yamamoto, and one I’d never considered (I gotta read more about the Civil War). However, regarding the examples of Midway and Guadalcanal, I don't think I understand how either battle reflects on the fighting ability of the Japanese soldier. Midway was a naval battle, and the Japanese fleet had been designed and built, and was operated, based on established European models. The battle itself was hardly one of superior valor or fighting ability winning out. The larger number of Japanese planes (which weren't that much greater) was countered by the American advantage of radar and the ability to decode Japanese communication. The vast number of ships in the Japanese fleet served almost no function at all in the battle, except perhaps as beacons for American fighter bombers searching for the enemy task force. As the world’s first carrier battle, it's even difficult to lay blame on poor command decisions or lack of foresight. The results were due far more to very good luck on the part of the Americans, and very poor luck on the part of the Japanese.

As for Guadalcanal, I assume you are referring to land-based conflict on the island, and not the Battle of Guadalcanal, which was a naval battle between capitol ships, in which American radar played the decisive role. As for the land battle, the tactics used by the Americans to achieve victory there and in all their future island fighting might best be summed up by historian John Keegan, who wrote, "As conceived and executed, it brought about a contest between morale and material. Both sides were to display supreme bravery; but, while the emperor's soldiers were ultimately dependent upon their concept of honor in sustaining their resistance, the Americans could call up overwhelming firepower to kill them in thousands. It was an unequal contest which in the long run the Americans were bound to win."

As for Guam, I know very little about it, except that it's American garrison fell almost immediately to Japanese attack on December 10, 1941.

Also, at which point did the topic of Japanese willingness to die in battle become "fighting to die"? The Japanese soldier, or to return to the original post, the Japanese samurai, fought to win, not to die. The question is whether his willingness to die in the pursuit of this goal gave him any advantage. Against an opponent possessing equal arms, armor, and ability, but not willing to die, I think it might. In a contest between armies, I think it almost certainly would.

If I may expound a bit on what Felix was saying, victory in battle in the pre-gunpowder era was usually determined by which side broke first. The reasons that might determine which side would run while the other continued to fight are obviously numerous. But one important aspect would be the slow or sudden collapse of morale; the conviction by one side, true or not, that they were losing or had lost and must flee to save their lives. This compulsion to flee was often involuntary and contagious. The discipline necessary to counter this was difficult to instill and came only with rigorous training, even in Roman armies. Felix’s excellent example of Socrates not succumbing to panic in the face of defeat is a rare case of this disciple being achieved through experience; the Greek hoplite could expect to fight for his city-state regularly for almost his entire life, engaging on average in one battle per summer, two summers out of every three. And a well-disciplined strategic withdrawal by Socrates is in fact recorded no less than two times; first after the Athenian loss at Delion, and then later after the loss at Amphipolis. Socrates was no doubt a seasoned warrior in these cases, as he was 46 at the time of Delion, and had probably been fighting for Athens regularly since he was 16.

However, an entire force that refuses to flee under any circumstances, that is inherently prepared to stand and fight to the death, will be by any standards extremely formidable (the Spartans at Thermopylae come to mind). This cultural imperative was fundamental to the character of the Japanese fighting man, which, combined with the natural ferocity engendered by such a philosophy, and equipped with highly developed arms and armor, made the samurai and their armies a force of truly awesome potential.

As I proposed in my first response to the original post, the results of battles between European knights and Japanese samurai against the Mongols might offer some insight into the topic. The Japanese response to the Mongol invasion is I think a good example of the overall quality of the samurai warrior. But judging by the responses this proposal elicited, a closer look at the actual events might be needed to understand what I meant (I'll try to keep it brief).

Kublai Khan's first invasion, in 1274, was quite formidable, consisting of around 200 vessels packed with 25,000 Mongol warriors and Chinese and Korean auxiliaries. This army managed to establish a bridgehead on the Japanese mainland, and was immediately confronted by Japanese forces. Used to beginning battle with honorable combat between champions, the samurai were unprepared for the Mongol tactics of massed maneuver and arrow attack, and were shocked by the Mongol use of explosives (as well illustrated in the scene from the Mongol War Scroll posted above by Sikandur), so the Japanese were at first unsuccessful. But they quickly adapted and counterattacked with such ferocity that the Mongol army was ultimately forced to re-embark and retreat back to China. During the return voyage the Mongol fleet was damaged by storms.

The second invasion came in June 1281, after long preparation. The Mongols gathered a massive army, consisting of 120,000 Chinese and Korean soldiers, and 45,000 Mongol warriors. The Mongol forces landed at Hizen province on Kyushu, and were again immediately attacked by the Japanese. Despite fierce fighting at the landing areas, the Mongols were unable to establish a permanent bridgehead, and were forced to retreat back to their ships to seek shelter. At night the Samurai would pile into small boats and attack the Mongol ships, which responded by moving their anchorage farther out to sea to avoid these attacks. Despite the danger of the approaching typhoon season to their vessels, which were anchored unprotected in deep waters, the Mongols were still unable to overcome Japanese resistance and establish a base on land. On August 15 the first typhoon of the season wrecked or scattered most of the Mongol fleet.

As Felix stated above, amphibious landings are difficult, no matter what the time period. And a comparison with Caesar's attack on Britain Felix mentions might actually make an interesting contrast.

Despite inferior numbers and in the face of fierce resistance, Caesar managed to land his legionaries and establish a base camp. Not long afterwards a storm wrecked his transport fleet, inspiring further British attacks. Nevertheless, the Romans were victorious in each instance. The Mongols on the other hand, despite vastly superior numbers, were unable to establish any kind of land base in the face of vicious Japanese attacks, and were forced to retreat to the safety of their ships where the samurai could not follow. Even if the kami-kaze had not struck and demolished the Mongol fleet, its doubtful further attempts would have ended any differently. And supposing the Mongols had managed to defeat the samurai armies of Hizen province, they still would have had to attack and conquer the remaining eight provinces of Chikuzen, Buzen, Chikugo, Bungo, Higo, Hyuga, Osumi, and Satasuma before the island of Kyushu could be considered defeated. After that, assuming they had enough soldiers left and they could manage another successful landing, they would have had to face and defeat the samurai armies of the four daimyo warlords in the four provinces of neighboring Shikoku Island. Then, on top of everything else, the Mongols still faced the infinitely more difficult task of invading and subduing the main Japanese island of Honshu, with it’s no less than fifty provinces, each with it’s daimyo military rulers and samurai armies.

It was the fighting ability and sheer fury of the Japanese samurai armies that ultimately defeated the Mongols. Any belief that without the intervention of the kami-kaze Japan would today be a Chinese province is, I feel, at best questionable.

Japan was a densely populated, heavily militarized, technologically sophisticated nation, protected by a large and extremely effective warrior class, which possessed advanced arms and armor, remarkable martial skills, and a ferocity in battle that became almost pathological in the face of a foreign invader. If Kublai Khan had had any idea what he was letting himself in for, I believe he would have quickly reconsidered the wisdom of invading Japan.

On the other hand, the Mongols fared somewhat differently when faced with the knightly armies of Europe.

Having conquered all of Russia in two short campaigns, the Mongols turned their sights towards Europe in 1241. The Mongols split their invasion force of 60,000 into two unequal armies, and on March 18 the Polish army of Count Boleslav IV faced the smaller army of 20,000 Mongols at Chmielnik. The Polish army consisted of Polish knights, knights from Western Europe, and knights of the military orders, and totaled about 30,000 men. To this was added the forces of the Russian prince of Galicia. This combined army was defeated and it’s survivors scattered by the Mongols. This Mongol force then advanced to meet the similarly composed army of Duke Henry of Silesia, which numbered about 40,000. The two armies met on April 9 at Liegnitz, a site chosen by the Europeans as advantageous to their tactics. The European army was annihilated, and nine sacks of ears were sent to the commanders of the larger Mongol army, then operating in Hungary. Two days later the larger Mongol force of 40,000 met King Bela of Hungary and his army, 80,000 strong and of high quality by European standards, on the plains of Mohi. At the end of the battle almost the entire Hungarian army, 65,000 men, lay dead. With the broad plains of Hungary at their disposal, no significant force stood between the Mongols and the heart of Western Europe.

The Death of the Great Khan resulted in the recall of the Mongol forces from Eastern Europe, and subsequent division in the Mongol empire prevented any further military adventures in the West. One can’t help but wonder, however, what might have happened had the Mongols been able to maintain their cohesion, and kept Hungary as a staging area for the invasion of Western Europe.

Who knows, maybe today we’d all be speaking Mongolian.

posted 07-28-2000 09:25 AM               

The knights of the air, like the samuarai and chevalier, were highly trained, expensivly equipped , relatively independent entities. As the war progressed, in engagements liek the Marianas Turkye Shoot, the fatalistic attitude of the Japanese resulted in a loss of trained pilots, a loss they , in the long run, could ill afford. Eventually, due to the dearth of experitise, the Japanese had to resort to the air equivalent of the bonsai charge - the kamikaze - except, fortunatly for the USN , the concept of tactical mass was forgotten. "one plane-one ship" allowed Triple-A and air cap to effectivly guard the embattled ship.
Fatalism give an edge to an individual combat situation - but in the long run, it is strategically better better live to fight another day.

On a side note, one only has to consider the battle of Nicopolis to see how the medieval knight had plenty of "valor" and yet met disaster. Also consider the French at Crecy, Pontier and Agincourt in the 100 Years war.

posted 07-28-2000 03:18 PM               

A very impressive post, both in length, detail and organization. My compliments.

To: Seamus

Your comparison of WWII aircraft to the styles of medieval warriors is a fascinating idea. I quite agree, that the philosophy of fighter plane design was different, and may go back to more basic cultural patterns. However, I feel that much of the reason for the USN's success lies with the advances in U.S. aircraft design during the war (from the Wildcat to the Corsair and Hellcat), and the massive numbers of well-designed planes which we produced. After a period of attrition in '42 and'43, the pool of trained Japanese pilots was exhausted as you mention, and the Japanese had to resort to kamikaze, etc. As mentioned above, Yamamoto recognized this from the start.

To: Lance

I don't believe that the Japanese attitude in combat usually precluded defending oneself. You mention a Japanese term for mutual killing, but also that karate has numerous defensive moves. They developed some very elaborate armor, even if not as effective as full plate. Certainly, in the later part of WW II, they abandoned the banzai charge, and dug some extraordinarily tough defensive positions on IwoJima and Okinawa. They did ultimately lose each island, but any isolated defense with no hope of relief, facing the attention of a large and determined opponent, will lose.

What really caught my attention was your comment on how everyone runs or fights. Now, I have no experience of this. But, I recommend you take a look at S.L.A. Marshal's "Men against Fire". He was one of the doyens of American military history for the 20th c. Among his other projects, he sat down and interviewed small units in Normandy and NW Europe, to find out what really happened in tactical combat. What he found was that the vast majority of soldiers did not contribute to the fighting. Even in parachute units, only 25% of the men actually shot their rifles or othewise actively participated. In line units, the percentage was less. The others did not run away, and moved with the units when ordered, may have helped the wounded or carried ammo, but couldn't bring themselves to actively try to kill. The participation was higher in men organized in teams: machine gunners, artillerymen, obviously tankers. (This work was part of the inspiration for the fireteam concept). A lot of people in the battlefield aren't really enthused about fighting, but don't necessarily run.

This applies to older periods also. The phalanx always had "file-closers", older or experienced men in the last rank, to make sure the others didn't run away, and push the faint-hearted into the fighting if need be. As I recall, this idea was familiar to 18th c. Europe as well, and NCO's carried ceremonial polearms in part to line the troops up, and keep them there by pushing them from behind. In WW II, some Russian units attacked with NKVD (russian security) maching guns behind them, positioned to shoot any stragglers. Those soldiers may have been reluctant, and may have valued their lives, but attacked into strong German defenses anyhow. In "Culloden", John Prebble makes the point that many of the Jacobite Highlanders were at the battle unwillingly, despite their reputation as a martial people. They obeyed their clan leader, or risked being burned out of their homes.

posted 07-28-2000 03:34 PM               

I would point out that parts of karate were adapted into jujutsu, but by and large it is a farmer's art, not a samurai's. Jujutsu contains significantly fewer parries and blocks, and kenjutsu also contains very few in comparison to western arts as described in surviving manuals. Farmers and samurai. I might add that the farmers did not always fare so badly against their more idolized, fatalistic warrior countrymen.

Who on earth came up with the idea that a European knight was unwilling to die? Gah.

On a side note, the mongols did indeed tear the heart out the first European armies they encountered. I always felt European tactics of that time period... how shall I say... kinda sucked. Who can say how they would have adapted? Of course, a century or two later, they would have started to face some grief from armies equiped with a lot of longbows... guess we'll never know...

posted 07-28-2000 03:42 PM               

I'm afraid that this experiment may come to nought. Medieval military history is replete with tales of the success of longbows, hoplites, Swiss pikemen and legionaries. Often it's a case of A versus B, then B versus C. We never see A versus C, and it's a leap of logic to presume that we know what the outcome would be. Too many factors at work here.

But, by golly, let's leap! The European knights of the 13th century had been tested against the Saracens. Nothing the Mongols brought to bear should have presented any surprises as far as military technology and tactics. Am I wrong here? How did the Mongols go about kicking European hiney? Was it just their superb organizational skills (and where is it today? ) or were the Europeans just burned out from the Crusades? To be fair, the knights were wearing maille, not plate, so perhaps a century or two would have changed things.

If am not mistaken, Japanese armor of the 13th century was nothing to sneeze at, and we can assume the katana proved successful against it many times. The medieval sword in general is not much more effective against plate, or even maille (try it!). Armor and weapons sort of evolve together. I have the feeling that military technology was pretty much equal in all three armies. Any takers on this point?

Lance remarked, "If one thinks Japanese people in particular fight harder because they were "brought up with the thought of dying" (who isn't? Honestly, guys, who isn't...)" He makes some very important points, but I think he overlooked the fact that a samurai preferred dying honorably over any other fate. When a western soldier leaves home to fight - to this day - his mother comes to the door to admonish him to come home alive. A Japanese mother would say, "Live or die, but please do not dishonor your family. If you die, we will certainly see you again."

Please don't take this as a blanket "Japanese = superior" statement. Japanese culture contains many flaws, lack of innovation and adaptation being among them, and a clever medieval warlord could exploit this to his advantage. We are basically seeking the truth here.

posted 07-28-2000 05:09 PM               

This battle you're talking about, is this a singular skirmish or a campaign?

The quality of arms and individual training would have little bearing on the outcome of a major campaign. Especially since the two sides would be on a technological parity during the 13 Century. Certainly in a prolonged war, economy, population size and ability to adapt to a changing military environment would impact the outcome far more so than the quality of katana versus the long sword. So let's establish some parameters that have real significance. . .

Are we assuming Japan and Europe are connected by land?

Is Europe a united political/military entity?

How united?

How large are the respective armies at the onset of confrontation?

Does anyone have operational surprise?

Which side is the aggressor?

How far do the aggressor have to travel to reach the frontlines?

What are the aggressor's logistic capabilities?

What is the population of Europe and Japan at this time?

What percentage of the male population is fit for military service?

Who can mobilize the larger peasant army? How fast?

What is the situation with the respective state treasuries and agricultural productivity?

Do the respective states have a sophisticated mass-arms production infrastructure?

How long is the campaign?

What's at stake?

"The wealth of a nation is the number of it's men." ----- Fredrick the Great

posted 07-28-2000 05:48 PM               

Heh. This *has* been fascinating, hasn't it? Just think. We took a silly question and made a good discussion out of it.

Progress.

posted 07-28-2000 06:08 PM               

Guam was recaptured by US forces landing on July 21, 1944. It was defended by 19,000 Japanese troops. After heavy fighting at Apra Harbor, the Americans had broken out my the morning of July 26. By the time the island had been swept clear except for a few small guerrilla bands, 1435 Americans were dead and 5646 were wounded. 8500 Japanese were dead, part of that number accounted for by suicide.

posted 10-04-2000 03:52 AM               

I think when we discuss the Japanese willingness to die, there's a point or two we're leaving out. Maybe its something we're only aware of on a sub-concious level or maybe its something we think is unimportant. So...I'm gonna throw it out there and we'll find out which.

Defeat is a psychological phenomenon, not a material one. An enemy isn't beaten until he thinks he is. Destroy his villages, murder his children, steal his weapons...if he's still willing to take to the field...you haven't won. The opposite is also true, some enemies cave just because you showed up.

There are two dangers in facing an army that you believe is willing to die to the last man, an army that insists it has not been defeated until you have killed every mother's son among them. The first is: that's gonna be a long fight. The second is this (and I think this is the important one): it is not uncommon for warriors to come to respect each other and to bemoan the destruction of their enemies (Roark's Drift for example). When 300 Spartans stand at the Hot Gates or our mythical Japanese army stands before these mythical Europeans, the commander has to wonder, "Will they do this for me? Will they not tire of the slaughter before its done?"

Coyote

posted 10-21-2000 10:09 PM               

While i respect a lot of what you've had to say as you are obviously reasonably knowledgable about european combat techniques ect. I have a few corrections to make about the samurai style of fighting that you seem to be a bit misled on.

First, modern kendo is in no way reflective of sword styles used by the samauri. As kendo is now more a sport then a serious method for use of a katana. Second, i have to disagree as to a katana's ability to cut through plate armour. I think when used by a skilled practitioner it could do so easily. This is because the katana's strength is vertical. You could break a katana over you knee if you wanted, but when used properly, it can cut through many substances where a european blade would either bend or snap.

As to who would win however, in single combat i would have to go with the samauri. This is because they are simply better trained with their weapon and their style more advanced.
You also forget that Musashi developed a two sword fighting technique that would make a fight with a european using sword-shield much more equal. Also, i don't know where everyone is getting their information on samauri mentality but their so called willingness to die was not fatalism as westerners understand it, nor was it a simple acceptness of death in battle -- which all warriors would be familiar with. It is more to do with a unshakable sense of honor and obligation to their lord (Daimyo) and to the code of Bushido (way of the warrior). In japan during fuedal time the only warriors who had a willingness to die in combat were the Sohei warrior Buddhist monks, to whom it was a religious issue.

I also saw mentioned somewhere above about the samauri reluctance to block or parry. I'm sorry, but that is utter bullshit. Read the book of five rings by Mushashi. He talks of such strategies as striking at the opponents blade in order to break their rhythm and then follow to a killing blow.

In relation to the mutual killing's that occured between samauri, this was because the two samauri were of almost equal skill and similar style that this occured, not out of some unwillingness to block.

I don't mean to say that the europeans were without skill or that they were completely inferior compared to the japanese warrior, even though i'm sure it seems that way, but i haven't even touched on the metaphysical element of the japanese martial arts that would have given the samauri a distinct advantage. I thought you would have mentioned this lance considering you have studied Aikido, as out of the modern martial arts is utilises the metaphysical the most.

Anyways, thats about it. I'm sure there's plenty of people who have lots of answering arguments on what i've said, i'll be looking forward to seeing them )